Decentralization in education : an economic perspective

Evaluating decentralization in terms of three economic criteria - social efficiency, technical efficiency, and equity - the paper argues that some decisionmaking (about finance and teacher recruitment) should be provided for at the local level, and some (about school organization and curriculum) at the regional level. A system of central government grants should be used to correct problems of equity and inefficiency inherent in a decentralized system. Little is known about the economic and educational consequences of decentralization, despite a wide variety of country experiences. The effects of decentralization are difficult to isolate, so scholars have focused instead on issues of implementation.National Governance,Teaching and Learning,Gender and Education,Primary Education,Banks&Banking Reform

Fading Corporatism: Israel\u27s Labor Law and Industrial Relations in Transition

[Excerpt] This book surveys Israeli labor law from 1920 to the present. The process of writing and publishing a book does not always conform to the pace of events, particularly when the subject matter is contemporary history. The book is therefore updated until the end of 2005. References to court cases and events that began before 2005 were updated at the end of 2006. However, no developments since that time have been integrated into the text. In my opinion, no such event undermines the central argument of the book; several reinforce it. Presenting a book in English that focuses on Israel\u27s labor law presents many editorial dilemmas. Moreover, the book\u27s claim is that Israeli law developed on the basis of continental European systems and is now adopting features of American law. Hence it is difficult to determine how to translate the law and how to convey a feel of the Israeli story. While providing a consistent method was the most important goal, I have also attempted to keep the book as simple and user-friendly as possible

The Governance of Services

The problem of assessing a system of governance for composite services in the social economy is approached by means of original methods.The main innovation is that the welfare structure of a society is separated from the legal transaction- or institutional structure.As both the various types of services and the various modes of management are defined in terms of relations between sets of persons, these structures can be compared and the performance of a managementsystem can be assessed.The dynamics of a wide range of hybrid forms of organization - between market and hierarchy - is analyzed in this framework. The approach elaborates on the new institutional economics, and the social theory of micromotives and macrobehavior in exchange and transactions.welfare and transactions;hybrid organizations;typology of services;typology of modes of governance;institutional economics

On Government Centralization and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland

Previous theoretical and empirical research has shown that policymakers have an incentive to centralize government activities in order to weaken the com-petitive pressure of fiscal federalism. We propose and test a positive model of fiscal federalism in which centralization is less likely to occur where budget referendums are possible. The reason for this result is that budget referendums reduce the extent to which pro-centralization regions can commit to a low level of spending delegating the centralization choice to elected poli-cymakers. In addition, it reduces the ability of higher level policy-makers to attract additional responsibilities in order to gain policy discretion. Empi-rical findings from a panel data analysis for Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 support this hypothesis.centralization, fiscal federalism, budget referendums

Achieving accountability through decentralization : lessons for integrated river basin management

While decentralization holds out the promise of increased flexibility and efficiency, the preconditions for realizing it are daunting. To draw lessons for productive decentralization in integrated river basin management, this paper surveys the decentralization experience in education, health care, roads, irrigation, and public infrastructure services. Case studies reveal that the prime focus in the design of a decentralized structure must be accountability, based on principles of subsidiarity, transparency, and allocation of property rights. While some debates are sector-specific, others, such as the need for political and financial accountability, the related data requirements, educating stakeholders and potential beneficiaries of the new system, and ensuring effective participation are true of decentralization wherever it is to unfold. Inturn, initial conditions and the adaptation of political leadership to suit the historical context determine the success of decentralization. Four issues demand high priority in integrated river basin management. These are (1) overcoming financial inadequacy at the local level; (2) commitment to upgrading skills, particularly management skills, while also ensuring that the expertise accumulated in central bureaucracies is not dissipated; (3) assuring pre-reform beneficiaries that their rights would be protected; and (4) sustaining a long-term commitment to an inevitably slow and drawn out decentralization process. The main conclusions of the literature survey caution those who believe that decentralization is, in itself, a solution to problems of inefficiency and inequity in developing countries. Tradeoffs and tensions need to be reconciled (such as economies of scale versus local monitoring and integrated management or interregional equity versus local control).Municipal Financial Management,Decentralization,Water Conservation,Banks&Banking Reform,Environmental Economics&Policies,Municipal Financial Management,Environmental Economics&Policies,National Governance,Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions,Banks&Banking Reform

Optimal central bank design: benchmarks for the ECB

The paper discusses key elements of optimal central bank design and applies its findings to the Eurosystem. A particular focus is on the size of monetary policy committees, the degree of centralization, and the representation of relative economic size in the voting rights of regional (or sectoral) interests. Broad benchmarks for the optimal design of monetary policy committees are derived, combining relevant theoretical arguments with available empirical evidence. A new indicator compares the mismatch of relative regional economic size and voting rights in the monetary policy committees of the US Fed, the pre-1999 German Bundesbank, and the ECB over time. Based on these benchmarks, there seems to be room to improve the organization of the ECB Governing Board and current plans for reform. --Central bank design,federal central banks,ECB, Eurosystem,ECB reform

On Government Centralization and Fiscal Referendums: A Theoretical Model and Evidence from Switzerland

We propose and test a positive model of fiscal federalism in which centralization is less likely to occur in jurisdictions with referendum decisions on policy centralization. Citizens choose centralization of public spending and revenue in order to internalize spillovers if individual preferences in two jurisdictions are sufficiently homogeneous. Under representative democracy, centralization is inefficiently high because representatives can extract political rents by policy centralization. Referendums thus restrict representatives’ ability for rent extraction. An empirical analysis using a panel of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 supports the hypothesis that centralization is less likely under referendum decision-making.Centralization, Fiscal Federalism, Fiscal Referendums

Decentralized structures for providing roads : a cross-country comparison

Minimizing costs is often cited as essential for optimizing service delivery. Roads are the oldest, most important infrastructure services provided by governments. They require construction, rehabilitation, maintenance, and administration. Various institutional arrangements affect the degree to which costs can be minimized. Drawing on analyses of experiences with decentralized road provision in eight countries, a longitudinal change analysis of Korea, and vertical and horizontal analysis across states and local governments in Germany, the authors found that the impact of decentralization varies depending on which aspect one is considering: the efficiency of producing road services or the impact on road users. Resources costs are concave, increasing first and decreasing at later stages of decentralization. Preference costs are downward sloping, suggesting that road conditions improve as decentralization advances. In short, decentralization entails initial costs, mostly as losses in economies of scale. But those losses can be outweighed by increases in efficiency when the locus of roadwork is closer to the people. The advantages or limitations of decentralization are function-specific: a) maintenance functions are best provided locally; b) to minimize resource costs, construction should be either completely centralized or completely decentralized; and c) administrative activities are more efficiently provided by local units similar to local maintenance units.Decentralization,Municipal Financial Management,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,National Governance,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Financial Management,Regional Rural Development,National Governance

Descentralización y recentralización: enseñanzas de los sectores sociales de México y Nicaragua

(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) Este estudio está concebido para ayudar a los responsables a preparar y evaluar reformas institucionales de programas de educación y atención médica. Proporciona un marco analítico que puede ser usado por funcionarios públicos e investigadores, con estudios de casos específicos que ilustran una amplia gama de prácticas reales y un conjunto de lecciones aprendidas. El marco emplea el concepto de rendición de cuentas para vincular las metas amplias de reforma con las dimensiones claves de los arreglos organizacionales. Los estudios de casos específicos, basados en labor de campo en México y Nicaragua, muestran la amplia variedad de instrumentos de políticas disponibles.