Infant cortex responds to other humans from shortly after birth

A significant feature of the adult human brain is its ability to selectively process information about conspecifics. Much debate has centred on whether this specialization is primarily a result of phylogenetic adaptation, or whether the brain acquires expertise in processing social stimuli as a result of its being born into an intensely social environment. Here we study the haemodynamic response in cortical areas of newborns (1–5 days old) while they passively viewed dynamic human or mechanical action videos. We observed activation selective to a dynamic face stimulus over bilateral posterior temporal cortex, but no activation in response to a moving human arm. This selective activation to the social stimulus correlated with age in hours over the first few days post partum. Thus, even very limited experience of face-to-face interaction with other humans may be sufficient to elicit social stimulus activation of relevant cortical regions

A percepção da configuração do movimento biológico em bebés

Tese de doutoramento em Psicologia BásicaPara compreender os outros, interpretar as suas ações, emoções ou intenções, é necessário aprender a descodificar o movimento dos nossos parceiros sociais. Para isso, primeiro, precisamos de ser capazes de orientar a nossa atenção para o movimento das outras pessoas; em seguida, necessitámos de integrar o movimento das diferentes partes do corpo (por exemplo, dos membros) na configuração coerente e global de um corpo humano em movimento—a isto designamos de processamento configural; só então é que finalmente somos capazes de interpretar o objetivo e o significado de uma ação. O processamento configural do movimento biológico é um processo básico, mas altamente relevante na interpretação do significado de uma ação e, consequentemente, crucial para a interação social e para a cognição social humana. A investigação acerca do desenvolvimento da percepção do movimento biológico indica que o processamento configural surge durante o primeiro ano de vida (Bertenthal, 1993), associado à maturação cortical dos bebés e ao seu desenvolvimento sociocognitivo (Pavlova, 2012). A presente dissertação pretende investigar o desenvolvimento do processamento configural na percepção do movimento biológico durante a primeira metade do primeiro ano de vida dos bebés. Para isso, combinamos duas técnicas de investigação da Psicologia do Desenvolvimento, distintas mas complementares: o functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) e o procedimento de atenção preferencial (preferential looking). Nesta dissertação são então apresentados os resultados de quatro estudos experimentais, dois de fNIRS e dois comportamentais, realizados em bebés com idades compreendidas entre os três e os sete meses de idade. No Capítulo 1 é apresentada uma extensa revisão da literatura sobre o papel do processamento configural na percepção do movimento biológico, ou seja, sobre como esta competência perceptual é relevante para a cognição-social humana e, em particular, para o desenvolvimento sociocognitivo dos bebés. No Capítulo 2 e 3 são apresentados e discutidos dois estudos de fNIRS realizados com bebés de sete meses. Estes foram os primeiros estudos realizados na infância, que mediram a resposta hemodinâmica do cérebro ao movimento humano utilizando displays de pontos de luz (point-light walkers) como estímulos. Estes estudos visaram investigar se a percepção do movimento biológico é sustentada, na infância tal como nos adultos, pelo funcionamento do sulco temporal superior direito (STS direito). O STS é uma área central do córtex humano para o processamento de estímulos sociais, e o processamento da configuração do movimento biológico parece também ocorrer neste local em adultos (Deen, Koldewyn, Kanwisher, & Saxe, 2015). No Capítulo 4, são apresentados dois estudos de atenção preferencial, um longitudinal e outro transversal. Os dois estudos pretendem perceber quando é que os bebés preferem uma configuração coerente do movimento humano. Especificamente, procuram descobrir quando, na infância, surge uma preferência pela configuração coerente e global humana de uma pessoa a andar em relação a um estímulo cujas posições dos pontos de luz foram randomizadas. Bebés de três e cinco meses foram testados num estudo transversal, e bebés de três, cinco e sete meses de idade, longitudinalmente. Finalmente, no Capítulo 5, discutimos e concluímos acerca as implicações das nossas descobertas. Encontramos importantes mudanças de desenvolvimento na percepção da configuração do movimento biológico durante os primeiros meses de vida—os nossos resultados contribuem para uma compreensão mais completa da percepção do movimento biológico em bebés e das origens e desenvolvimento da cognição social humana.To understand others, interpret their actions, emotions or intentions, we have to learn how to decode human motion. For that, first, we need to start by paying attention to the motion of others; afterward, we have to be able to integrate the individual and local motion of moving body parts (such as limbs) into the coherent and motion configuration of a whole human body acting—this is called configural processing; only then we are finally able to predict, interpret, and understand the goal and meaning of an action. Configural processing is a basic but highly relevant process in biological motion perception with implications on action understanding, social interaction and in human social cognition. Developmental research on biological motion perception indicates that configural processing emerges during our first year of life (Bertenthal, 1993), associated to important cortical specializations, and to infants’ social-cognitive development (Pavlova, 2012). The present dissertation investigated the development of configural processing in biological motion during the first half of infants’ first year of life. For that, two distinct but complementary techniques from developmental research were combined: functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) and the preferential looking procedure. This dissertation presents and discusses the outcomes of two neuroimaging and two behavioral experiments conducted with infants, aged from three to seven months of age, on the perception of biological motion configuration. Chapter 1 begins with an extensive literature revision on the role of configural processing in biological motion perception, namely, on how this basic perceptual skill is relevant for human social abilities and, in particular, for infants’ social-cognitive development. In Chapter 2 and 3, two fNIRS experiments conducted with seven months old infants are presented and discussed. These were the first fNIRS studies conducted in infancy, using point-light walkers as stimuli. They intended to investigate whether the perception of biological motion is underpinned, in infants as in adults, by the right superior temporal sulcus (right STS) functioning. The right STS is a cornerstone for human social-cognition, and biological motion configural processing occurs in this site in the adults brain (Deen, Koldewyn, Kanwisher, & Saxe, 2015). In Chapter 4, two preferential looking experiments, one longitudinal and another cross sectional, are presented. These two studies intended to find when, in infancy, emerges a preference for biological motion configuration. Specifically, when, in infants aged three to seven months, emerges a preference for the coherent motion configuration of a person walking in relation to scrambled display. Finally, in Chapter 5, we discuss and conclude about the implications of our findings. We found important developmental changes in the perception of biological motion configuration during the first few months of life—our results contribute to a broader understanding of biological motion perception in infancy thus to the origins of human social-cognition.The Portuguese Science Foundation through an individual doctoral grant attributed to Isabel C. Lisboa (PD/BD/105966/2014) supported this research. This grant was supported by Fundo Social Europeu and by national founds from MEC

Learning, Arts, and the Brain: The Dana Consortium Report on Arts and Cognition

Reports findings from multiple neuroscientific studies on the impact of arts training on the enhancement of other cognitive capacities, such as reading acquisition, sequence learning, geometrical reasoning, and memory

Mindfulness Training to Enhance Emotion Regulation in a Polarizing Political Context: A Multimethod Investigation

The U.S. continues to show an upward trend in political polarization, perceived as a moral divide between liberal and conservative ideological groups. This moralization of political identity has contributed to the escalation of negative emotions (e.g., fear, anger, and hatred) directed towards political outgroup members. Although negative emotions are potent motivators of political intolerance, these emotions are nevertheless subject to regulation. Mindfulness offers a promising yet understudied emotion regulation strategy which may facilitate open receptivity towards opposing partisans. The present randomized controlled trial (RCT) examines the effects of short-term mindfulness training (MT) vs structurally equivalent Cognitive Reappraisal training (CT) on the regulation of political intergroup negative affect using an ecologically-situated naturalistic neuorimaging paradigm. Functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) neural synchrony effects coupled with emotion reactivity ratings reveal an ostensible pathway for the mindful regulation of negative intergroup emotion

Investigating emerging self-awareness : its neural underpinnings, the significance of self-recognition, and the relationship with social interactions

Up until now, self-recognition in the mirror, achieved at around 18 months, has been used to assess self-awareness in infancy. Even though the significance of this test is not universally accepted, this field has progressed very little over the last decades, in contrast to a broad volume of literature on the self in adults. However, a relationship between self-other differentiation and social cognitive abilities has been recently hypothesized, renewing the interest in mechanisms underlying emerging self-awareness. Adult studies have highlighted that brain networks, instead of isolated brain areas, support self-processing. Therefore, the first two studies of this thesis validated the use of advanced connectivity analyses on infant fNIRS data. Making use of these methods, one study demonstrated that functional connectivity between regions belonging to a network that has been related to abstract self-processing in adults gradually increases over the first two years of life. The same network was found to characterise infants who recognise themselves in the mirror. In another study, crucial regions of this network were shown to be engaged during self-recognition in 18-month-olds. As social interactions have been suggested to be fundamental for the construction of the self, the last two studies of this thesis investigated the relationship between emerging self-awareness and social interactions. To test this, I focused on mimicry, known to play an important role in affiliation and in mediating relationships. One study demonstrated that emerging selfawareness may affect infants’ tendency to selectively mimic in-group members, which may indicate a possible role of self-comparison and identification processes. The last study did not find evidence for a relationship between mothers’ tendency to imitate their infants at 4 months and emerging selfawareness. Taken together, these studies enrich our understanding of the mechanisms underlying emerging self-awareness and they represent a pioneering starting point for further investigations into this topic

Measuring cognitive load and cognition: metrics for technology-enhanced learning

This critical and reflective literature review examines international research published over the last decade to summarise the different kinds of measures that have been used to explore cognitive load and critiques the strengths and limitations of those focussed on the development of direct empirical approaches. Over the last 40 years, cognitive load theory has become established as one of the most successful and influential theoretical explanations of cognitive processing during learning. Despite this success, attempts to obtain direct objective measures of the theory's central theoretical construct – cognitive load – have proved elusive. This obstacle represents the most significant outstanding challenge for successfully embedding the theoretical and experimental work on cognitive load in empirical data from authentic learning situations. Progress to date on the theoretical and practical approaches to cognitive load are discussed along with the influences of individual differences on cognitive load in order to assess the prospects for the development and application of direct empirical measures of cognitive load especially in technology-rich contexts

The mentalizing triangle: how interactions among self, other and object prompt mentalizing

To smoothly interact with other people requires individuals to generate appropriate responses based on other’s mental states. The ability we rely on is termed mentalizing. As humans it seems that we are endowed with the abilities to rapidly process other’s mental states, either by taking their perspectives or using mindreading skills. These abilities allow us to go beyond our direct experience of reality and to see or infer some of the contents of another’s mental world. Due to the complexity of social contexts, our mentalizing system needs to address a variety of challenges which put different requirements on either time or flexibility. During years of research, investigators have come up with various theories to explain how we cope with these challenges. Among them, the two-system account raised up by Apperly and colleagues (2010) has been favoured by many studies. Concisely, the two-system account claims that we have a fast-initiated mentalizing system which guarantees us to make quick judgments with limited cognitive resource; and a flexible system which allows deliberate thinking and enables mentalizing to generalize to multiple targets. Such a framework provides good explanations to debates such as whether preverbal young children can process mentalizing or not. But it is still largely unknown how healthy adults engage in mentalizing in everyday life. Specifically, why it seems easier for some targets to activate our mentalizing system, but with some others, we frequently fail to consider their perspectives or beliefs? To give an explanation to this question, I adopted a different research orientation in my PhD from the two-system account, which considers the dynamic interactions among three key elements in mentalizing: the self, agent(s), and object(s). I put forward a mentalizing triangle model and assume the interactions in these triadic relationships act as gateways triggering mentalizing. Thus, with some agents, we feel more intimate with them, which makes it easier for us to think about their minds. Similarly, in certain context, the agent may have frequent interactions with the object, thus we become more motivated to engage in mentalizing. In the following chapters, I first reviewed current literatures and illustrate evidence that could support or oppose the triangle model, then examined these triangle hypotheses both from behavioural and neuroimaging levels. In Study 1, I first measured mentalizing in the baseline condition where no interaction in the triangle relationships was provided. By adapting the false belief paradigm used by Kovacs, Teglas, & Endress (2010), I imported the Signal Detection theory to obtain more indices which could reflect participants mentalizing processes. Results of this study showed that people have a weak tendency to ascribe other’s beliefs when there is no interaction. Then, in Study 2, we added another condition which included the ‘agent-object’ interaction factor while using a similar paradigm in Study 1. Results in the noninteractiond condition replicated our findings of Study 1, but adding ‘agent-object’ interactions didn’t boost mentalizing. Study 3 and 4 tested the ‘self-agent’ interaction hypothesis in visual perspective taking (VPT), another basic mentalizing ability. In Study 3, I adopted virtual reality approach and for the first time investigated how people select which perspective to take when exposed to multiple conflicting perspectives. Importantly, I examined whether the propensity to engage in VPT is correlated with how we perceive other people as humans, i.e. the humanization process. Congruent with our hypotheses, participant exhibited stronger propensity to take a more humanised agent’s perspective. Then in Study 4, I used functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) and investigated the neural mechanism underlying this finding. In general, the ‘selfagent’ hypothesis in the mentalizing triangle model was supported but not for the ‘agentobject’ hypothesis, which we consider may due to several approach limitations. The findings in this thesis are derived from applying novel approaches to classic experimental paradigms, and have shown the potentials of using new techniques, such as VR and fNIRS, in investigating the philosophical question of mentalizing. It also enlights social cognitive studies by considering classic psychological methods such as the Signal Detection Theory in future research