Values and coalition configurations

In this paper we consider coalition configurations (Albizuri et al. in Games Econ Behav 57:1–17, 2006), that is, families of coalitions not necessarily disjoint whose union is the grand coalition, and give a generalization of the Shapley value (Contributions to the theory of games II, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 307–317, 1953) and the Owen value (Essays in mathematical economics and game theory, Springer, Berlin, pp 76–88, 1977) when coalition configurations form. This will be an alternative definition to the one given by Albizuri et al.Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación | Ref. ECO2011-23460Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2012-33618Universidad del País Vasco | Ref. UFI11/5Universidad del País Vasco | Ref. GIU13/31Xunta de Galicia | Ref. 10PXIB362299P