Cooperative smartphone relay selection based on fair power utilization for network coverage extension

This paper presents a relay selection algorithm based on fair battery power utilization for extending mobile network coverage and capacity by using a cooperative communication strategy where mobile devices can be utilized as relays. Cooperation improves the network performance for mobile terminals, either by providing access to out-of-range devices or by facilitating multi-path network access to connected devices. In this work, we assume that all mobile devices can benefit from using other mobile devices as relays and investigate the fairness of relay selection algorithms. We point out that signal strength based relay selection inevitably leads to unfair relay selection and devise a new algorithm that is based on fair utilization of power resources on mobile devices. We call this algorithm Credit based Fair Relay Selection (CF-RS) and in this paper show through simulation that the algorithm results in fair battery power utilization, while providing similar data rates compared with traditional approaches. We then extend the solution to demonstrate that adding incentives for relay operation adds clear value for mobile devices in the case they require relay service. Typically, mobile devices represent self-interested users who are reluctant to cooperate with other network users, mainly due to the cost in terms of power and network capacity. In this paper, we present an incentive based solution which provides clear mutual benefit for mobile devices and demonstrate this benefit in the simulation of symmetric and asymmetric network topologies. The CF-RS algorithm achieves the same performance in terms of achievable data rate, Jain's fairness index and utility of end devices in both symmetric and asymmetric network configurations

A Taxonomy for Congestion Control Algorithms in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks

One of the main criteria in Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) that has attracted the researchers' consideration is congestion control. Accordingly, many algorithms have been proposed to alleviate the congestion problem, although it is hard to find an appropriate algorithm for applications and safety messages among them. Safety messages encompass beacons and event-driven messages. Delay and reliability are essential requirements for event-driven messages. In crowded networks where beacon messages are broadcasted at a high number of frequencies by many vehicles, the Control Channel (CCH), which used for beacons sending, will be easily congested. On the other hand, to guarantee the reliability and timely delivery of event-driven messages, having a congestion free control channel is a necessity. Thus, consideration of this study is given to find a solution for the congestion problem in VANETs by taking a comprehensive look at the existent congestion control algorithms. In addition, the taxonomy for congestion control algorithms in VANETs is presented based on three classes, namely, proactive, reactive and hybrid. Finally, we have found the criteria in which fulfill prerequisite of a good congestion control algorithm

Coalitional Game Theoretic Approach for Cooperative Transmission in Vehicular Networks

Cooperative transmission in vehicular networks is studied by using coalitional game and pricing in this paper. There are several vehicles and roadside units (RSUs) in the networks. Each vehicle has a desire to transmit with a certain probability, which represents its data burtiness. The RSUs can enhance the vehicles' transmissions by cooperatively relaying the vehicles' data. We consider two kinds of cooperations: cooperation among the vehicles and cooperation between the vehicle and RSU. First, vehicles cooperate to avoid interfering transmissions by scheduling the transmissions of the vehicles in each coalition. Second, a RSU can join some coalition to cooperate the transmissions of the vehicles in that coalition. Moreover, due to the mobility of the vehicles, we introduce the notion of encounter between the vehicle and RSU to indicate the availability of the relay in space. To stimulate the RSU's cooperative relaying for the vehicles, the pricing mechanism is applied. A non-transferable utility (NTU) game is developed to analyze the behaviors of the vehicles and RSUs. The stability of the formulated game is studied. Finally, we present and discuss the numerical results for the 2-vehicle and 2-RSU scenario, and the numerical results verify the theoretical analysis.Comment: accepted by IEEE ICC'1