Finding All Nash Equilibria of a Finite Game Using Polynomial Algebra

The set of Nash equilibria of a finite game is the set of nonnegative solutions to a system of polynomial equations. In this survey article we describe how to construct certain special games and explain how to find all the complex roots of the corresponding polynomial systems, including all the Nash equilibria. We then explain how to find all the complex roots of the polynomial systems for arbitrary generic games, by polyhedral homotopy continuation starting from the solutions to the specially constructed games. We describe the use of Groebner bases to solve these polynomial systems and to learn geometric information about how the solution set varies with the payoff functions. Finally, we review the use of the Gambit software package to find all Nash equilibria of a finite game.Comment: Invited contribution to Journal of Economic Theory; includes color figure

Note on maximally entangled Eisert-Lewenstein-Wilkens quantum games

Maximally entangled Eisert-Lewenstein-Wilkens games are analyzed. For a general class of gate operators defined in the previous papers of the first author the general conditions are derived which allow to determine the form of gate operators leading to maximally entangled games. The construction becomes particularly simple provided one does distinguish between games differing by relabelling of strategies. Some examples are presented.Comment: 20 pages, no figures, appendix added, references added, concluding remarks extende

Computing Equilibria of Semi-algebraic Economies Using Triangular Decomposition and Real Solution Classification

In this paper, we are concerned with the problem of determining the existence of multiple equilibria in economic models. We propose a general and complete approach for identifying multiplicities of equilibria in semi-algebraic economies, which may be expressed as semi-algebraic systems. The approach is based on triangular decomposition and real solution classification, two powerful tools of algebraic computation. Its effectiveness is illustrated by two examples of application.Comment: 24 pages, 5 figure

Approximate well-supported Nash equilibria in symmetric bimatrix games

The $\varepsilon$-well-supported Nash equilibrium is a strong notion of approximation of a Nash equilibrium, where no player has an incentive greater than $\varepsilon$ to deviate from any of the pure strategies that she uses in her mixed strategy. The smallest constant $\varepsilon$ currently known for which there is a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an $\varepsilon$-well-supported Nash equilibrium in bimatrix games is slightly below $2/3$. In this paper we study this problem for symmetric bimatrix games and we provide a polynomial-time algorithm that gives a $(1/2+\delta)$-well-supported Nash equilibrium, for an arbitrarily small positive constant $\delta$