A Note on Prediction Markets

In a prediction market, individuals can sequentially place bets on the outcome of a future event. This leaves a trail of personal probabilities for the event, each being conditional on the current individual's private background knowledge and on the previously announced probabilities of other individuals, which give partial information about their private knowledge. By means of theory and examples, we revisit some results in this area. In particular, we consider the case of two individuals, who start with the same overall probability distribution but different private information, and then take turns in updating their probabilities. We note convergence of the announced probabilities to a limiting value, which may or may not be the same as that based on pooling their private information.Comment: 12 page

Effects of in-class variation and student rank on the probability of withdrawal : cross-section and time-series analysis for UK university students

From individual-level data for nine entire cohorts of undergraduate students in UK universities, we estimate the probability that an individual will drop out of university during their first-year. We examine the 1984-85 to 1992-93 cohorts of students enrolling full-time for a three or four-year course, and focus on the sensitivity of the probability of withdrawal to the individual’s prior qualifications relative to those of the other students in their university course. We show not only that weaker students are more likely to withdraw but also that the extent of variation in prior qualifications within the student’s university degree course exerts an influence on the individual's probability of withdrawal in a way that varies with the individual’s own in-class rank

Partition-dependent framing effects in lab and field prediction markets

Many psychology experiments show that individually judged probabilities of the same event can vary depending on the partition of the state space (a framing effect called "partition-dependence"). We show that these biases transfer to competitive prediction markets in which multiple informed traders are provided economic incentives to bet on their beliefs about events. We report results of a short controlled lab study, a longer field experiment (betting on the NBA playoffs and the FIFA World Cup), and naturally-occurring trading in macro-economic derivatives. The combined evidence suggests that partition-dependence can exist and persist in lab and field prediction markets

Herd behavior in financial markets: an experiment with financial market professionals

We study herd behavior in a laboratory financial market with financial market professionals. An important novelty of the experimental design is the use of a strategy-like method. This allows us to detect herd behavior directly by observing subjects' decisions for all realizations of their private signal. In the paper, we compare two treatments: one in which the price adjusts to the order flow in such a way that herding should never occur, and one in which the presence of event uncertainty makes herding possible. In the first treatment, subjects seldom herd, in accordance with both the theory and previous experimental evidence on student subjects. A proportion of subjects, however, engage in contrarianism, something not accounted for by the theory. In the second treatment, the proportion of herding decisions increases, but not as much as the theory would suggest. Moreover, contrarianism disappears altogether. In both treatments, in contrast with what theory predicts, subjects sometimes prefer to abstain from trading, which affects the process of price discovery negatively

Herd Behavior in Financial Markets: An Experiment with Financial Market Professionals

We study herd behavior in a laboratory ?nancial market with ?- nancial market professionals. An important novelty of the experi- mental design is the use of a strategy-like method. This allows us to detect herd behavior directly by observing subjects?decisions for all realizations of their private signal. In the paper, we compare two treatments - one in which the price adjusts to the order ?ow in such a way that herding should never occur, and one in which the presence of event uncertainty makes herding possible. In the ?rst treatment, traders herd seldom, in accordance with both the theory and previous experimental evidence on student subjects. A proportion of traders, however, engage in contrarianism, something not accounted for by the theory. In the second treatment, on the one hand, the proportion of herding decisions increases, but not as much as the theory would sug- gest; on the other hand, contrarianism disappears altogether. In both treatments, in contrast with what theory predicts, subjects sometimes prefer to abstain from trading, which a¤ects the process of price discovery negatively.

Herd Behavior in Financial Markets: An Experiment with Financial Market Professionals

We study herd behavior in a laboratory financial market with financial market professionals. An important novelty of the experimental design is the use of a strategy-like method. This allows us to detect herd behavior directly by observing subjects’ decisions for all realizations of their private signal. In the paper, we compare two treatments: one in which the price adjusts to the order flow in such a way that herding should never occur, and one in which the presence of event uncertainty makes herding possible. In the first treatment, subjects herd seldom, in accordance with both the theory and previous experimental evidence on student subjects. A proportion of sub jects, however, engage in contrarianism, something not accounted for by the theory. In the second treatment, the proportion of herding decisions increases, but not as much as the theory would suggest. Moreover, contrarianism disappears altogether. In both treatments, in contrast with what theory predicts, subjects sometimes prefer to abstain from trading, which affects the process of price discovery negatively.Herding, Contrarianism, Financial Market Professionals

Online Homework for Agricultural Economics Instruction: Frankenstein’s Monster or Robo TA?

This paper describes the programming required for online homework, evaluates its use, and presents methods for student identification and for processing student input. Online homework applications were evaluated in a real class setting. Generally, online homework is cost effective for large classes that have numerous assignments and repeated usage. Online homework appears to increase learning through increased student study-time allocations. Students felt that online homework made course website interaction more productive. They also indicated that online homework increased their perception of the value of lectures and that its use in other courses would be welcome. All findings were highly statistically significant.computer-aided instruction, economics teaching methods, instruction cost effectiveness, online homework, Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession, A220, G130, Q100,

Cyclicality and the Labor Market for Economists

A multimarket theory of optimal search suggests that job seekers will respond to a weakening market by adjusting their search strategies at the extensive margin (which markets to enter) and the intensive margin (how many applications to submit per market). Meanwhile, employers respond to the weakening market by raising their hiring standards. The equilibrium suggestst that high quality applicants will obtain an increased share of academic interviews in weak markets while applicants from weaker schools will increasingly secure interviews outside of the academic market. Empirical results show that in the bust market, graduates of elite schools shifted their search strategies to include weaker academic institutions, while graduates of lower ranked schools shifted their applications away from academia and toward the business sector. In bust conditions, academic institutions increasingly concentrate their interviews on elite school graduates, women and U.S. residents.