Institutional Quality and Fiscal Transparency

This paper uses new data on fiscal transparency for a cross-section of countries; these data possess several advantages. First, the data are based on in-depth reports using a standardized methodology and protocol. Second, this study covers 82 countries, more than previous comparable studies. Third, the fiscal measures used have been obtained with the collaboration of government authorities, which makes them particularly reliable. Finally, the data collection has been undertaken at a high level. These new data permit examination of a relevant but little-studied issue, the role of institutional quality in a country’s fiscal transparency. It is shown that there is in fact a causal relationship between institutions and transparency. The findings are robust to changes in specification and a host of transparency sub-measures.Fiscal management, Institutions, Public administration, Transparency

Which Jobs for Which Boys? Party Financing, Patronage and State Capacity in African Democracies

Both Benin and Ghana are amongst Africa\u27s most celebrated examples of democratic success, but there is growing divergence in the capacity of their state institutions to act as effective agents of development. Why? This dissertation argues that modes of party financing are integral to understanding patterns of patronage-based recruitment to public office, and that these patronage practices have consequences for the broader developmental capacities of the state. The first part of the dissertation shows that leaders use political patronage not only as a means of buying votes, but more fundamentally as a means of exerting control over the state\u27s resources. How leaders choose to access and control these resources depends on the size of the private sector and the strength of party organizations, both of which vary considerably across African countries. Where party organizations are strong and the private sector large, patronage is likely to be concentrated primarily at the elite level to facilitate the exchange of contracts for financial support to the party. Conversely, where private capital is more scarce, leaders will concentrate patronage at the public service level, enabling political supporters to access state revenue and rents for their party. These varying patronage practices have consequences for the broader developmental capacities of the state. Elite level patronage leads to more stability and cohesion in the executive which, among other things, strengthens commitment to development programs over time even in the face of serious implementation challenges. High levels of public service patronage, by contrast, heighten organizational problems including technical deficiencies amongst public personnel, the frequent disappearance of state resources for political use and excessive control over bureaucratic agencies. This latter environment is particularly challenging for the implementation of development programs. The argument is developed by combining comparative case analysis of Benin and Ghana with medium-N cross national analysis on a broader set of African countries. The case analysis draws on three principal sources of data collected in both countries, including 1) a comprehensive database containing appointment and biographical information on all cabinet ministers from the early 1990s through 2013, 2) an original survey of over 500 civil servants in each country and 3) interviews with approximately 60 political and state actors. Together, the data allow for a novel empirical strategy that considers patronage across both elite and public service levels of the executive apparatus, and lends considerable support to a party-financing based explanation of the relationship between multi-party politics, patronage and state institutional capacity. Although the neopatrimonial perspective in African politics often leads us to believe that patronage is both ubiquitous and uniformly detrimental to African states, this project shows otherwise. Instead the dissertation\u27s findings suggest the need to consider not only how much patronage, but which jobs are distributed and to whom. In so doing, the project moves away from monotonic conceptions of the relationship between democracy and state capacity, asking instead how multi-party politics interact with neopatrimonial forms of authority to produce variation in state institutional capacity

Dataset for corruption risk assessment in a public administration

This data article describes a dataset of corruption approach and possible variables related, and this dataset was created by integrating eight different systems of Brazilian federal government and Federal District. We present real data from civil servants and militaries to comply with GDPR legislation, the attributes that could identify a person were removed, making the data anonymized.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Political and Judicial Checks on Corruption: Evidence from American State Governments

The paper investigates the effects of checks and balances on corruption. Within a presidential system, effective separation of powers is achieved under divided government, with the executive and legislative branches being controlled by different political parties. When government is unified, no effective separation exists even within a presidential system, but, we argue, can be partially restored by having an accountable judiciary. Our empirical findings show that divided government and elected, rather than appointed, state supreme court judges are associated with lower corruption and, furthermore, that the effect of an accountable judiciary is stronger under unified government, where government cannot control itself. The effect of an accountable judiciary seems to be driven primarily by judges chosen through direct elections, rather than those exposed to a retention vote following appointment.separation of powers; corruption; rent seeking; checks and balances; political institutions; judicial independence; rule of law

EVALUATION OF POLICIES ON THE FIT AND PROPER TEST FOR STRATEGIC OFFICIALS IN SUPPORTING EFFORTS TO PREVENT AND ERADICATE CORRUPTION

Integrity of strategic officials is absolutely necessary to support the effective implementation of corruption prevention and eradication system in a government. To get officials with integrity, one of the efforts pursued is to apply the mechanism of fit and proper test. Based on a comparative study of various invitation laws, it was found a number of crucial issues relating to the policy of the fit and proper test of a number of strategic officials. These crucial issues include differences in the standard requirements of prospective officials, the presence / absence of a selection committee, the absence of detailed guidelines on information sources and measures to provide objective assessments of the value of integrity from a candidate, and provisions regarding dismissal of officials who are potentially counterproductive with corruption prevention and eradication effort

The Empire is dead, long live the Empire! Long-run persistence of trust and corruption in the bureaucracy

Do empires affect attitudes towards the state long after their demise? We hypothesize that the Habsburg Empire with its localized and well-respected administration increased citizens’ trust in local public services. In several Eastern European countries, communities on both sides of the long-gone Habsburg border have been sharing common formal institutions for a century now. Identifying from individuals living within a restricted band around the former border, we find that historical Habsburg affiliation increases current trust and reduces corruption in courts and police. Falsification tests of spuriously moved borders, geographic and pre-existing differences, and interpersonal trust corroborate a genuine Habsburg effect

Bureaucracy and Pro-poor Change

Based on the premise that a functioning state is a necessary pre-requisite for pro-poor change, it is critical to investigate the role of the bureaucracy as a key catalyst in this process. Weber (1968) ascribes bureaucracies to be anchors of the modern nation state as their conduct is based on rational-legal norms. Bureaucracies, according to this ideal type, temper the populist urges of politicians who wish to execute policy unencumbered by rules and procedures. State success or failure in many cases, therefore, can be gauged by the degree to which this tensionbetween the rules based bureaucratic form of administration and populist politicsis resolved. Prognosis on pro-poor change in the light of the present and anticipated balance between bureaucratic procedures and political compulsions is thus an important area of inquiry. There is consensus that the disconnect between policy formulation and execution in Pakistan has widened considerably in the last three decades or so. And this is in spite of the fact of the generally acclaimed view that Pakistan inherited a well functioning and competent bureaucracy from the British Raj [Braibanti (1966)]. While part of the blame for this disconnect can be ascribed to incoherence in policy formulation on the part of the political leadershipboth civil and militarybut bureaucratic malfeasance, incompetence and corruption have been critical factors in the level of governance declining over time. This paper takes a political economy perspective in analysing the nature and causes on the decline in bureaucratic conduct. Section 1 lays out the details of this structure. Based on a logical model which places the bureaucracy within the larger context of the objective function of the state, the nature of the political process, the degree of centralisation and fragmentation of the bureaucratic structure and processes for monitoring and accountability of the bureaucracy, this model provides the basis for subsequent analysis. Section 2 provides a historical overview with regard to changes in the bureaucratic and political structure and the impact it had on the above mentioned balance between bureaucratic conduct and political compulsions. Section 3 then analyses the consequences on service delivery that this systematic weakening of the bureaucratic structure has had. Section 4 then critically assesses some of the recent attempts at bureaucratic reform in the light of the framework developed in Section 1. The conclusion then summarises the paper and draws implications for pro-poor change of the structure and conduct of the bureaucratic structure in Pakistan.bureaucracy, pro-poor change, consequences on service

Assessing the Stability of Elite Political Culture: An Empirical Analysis of the Attitudes of Elected Officials in Canada

Do attitudes of Members of the 32nd and 40th parliament differ on issues of political ethics? Or have attitudes remained unchanged? Based on interviews of 44 members of the 40th parliament and 107 members of the 32nd parliament, this thesis explores attitude shifts across time. The study reveals that in the areas of conflict of interest and patronage attitudes have hardened. Members of Parliament (MPs) from the 40th parliament are more sensitive to these dimensions of political corruption as opposed to MPs from the 32nd parliament. For ethically charged scenarios dealing with gifts & gains and lying, MPs from the 40th parliament are more tolerant than MPs from the 32nd parliament. Finally, the thesis calls for future research on potential differences in opinions related to factors such as years of service, regionalism and the role of partisanship