How do Financial Institutions in China Mitigate Risks in Securitization Markets?

Asset securitization as the essential financial tool has increased the liquidity of underlying assets and promoted rapid economic development. In 2008, the outbreak of Subprime Mortgage Crisis that brought by the collapse of securitization triggered the U.S. securitization market to realize the risks involved in structured financial products, and thus facilitated the development of risk controlling tools. Through the analysis of securitization process, drivers, and credit rating agencies, the study concentrates on the formation of risks and modeling evaluation with evidence in both China and the U.S. markets. Statistical analysis was conducted on Chinese securitized products combining with risk management models built in the U.S. market. The results not only show risk evaluation tools that could improve the market maturity but also reveals the lack of information disclosure in China with the limited access to historical data. The paper attempts to address policy recommendations on mitigating potential risks and promoting financial developments in the China securitization market

Standards and Testing Agency annual report and financial statements 2012-2013: (for the year ended 31 March 2013)

Enabling power: Education Act 1996, s. 537A (4) (5) (6). Issued: 29.05.2013. Made: 20.05.2013. Laid: 29.05.2013. Coming into force: 28.06.2013. Effect: S.I. 2009/1563 amended. Territorial extent and classification: E. General

Nonbanks and risk in retail payments

This paper documents the importance of nonbanks in retail payments in the United States and in 15 European countries and analyzes the implications of the importance and multiple roles played by nonbanks on retail payment risks. This paper also reviews the main regulatory safeguards in place, and concludes that there may be a need to reconsider some of them in view of the growing role of nonbanks and of the global reach of risks in the electronic era.

Oversight of non-cash payment schemes: objectives and implementation procedures.

The use of non-cash payment schemes is particularly widespread in France where the number of non-cash transactions is in fact well above the European average. Though they have different features corresponding to users’ varying needs (payments may be face-to-face, remote or recurring, for instance), non-cash payment schemes generally consist of an instrument that generates a payment order combined with the technical and organisational arrangements that enable this order to be processed. Putting these arrangements in place requires close co-operation between all participants of the payment «network», i.e., naturally, credit institutions that hold accounts for debtors and beneficiaries, and also their technical service providers. The Everyday Security Act of 15 November 2001 entrusts the Banque de France with a specific task with regard to overseeing the security of non-cash means of payment. This task falls naturally within the purview of central banks, which guarantee both the value of the currency and the stability of payment systems. To carry out its task, the Banque de France analyses the potential threats associated with payment schemes and defines, in consultation with the parties involved, the minimum security objectives designed to prevent the occurrence of payment-specific risk events. To assess the security of a payment scheme, the Banque de France ensures that the parties involved comply with these objectives.

Developments, Issues, and Initiatives in Retail Payments

Innovations in basic information technologies, in payment applications, and in the availability of global markets, as well as substantial changes in financial sector policy, have fundamentally changed how the retail payments system in Canada operates. Principally, the volume and types of electronic payments have grown, and there is increased participation by diverse groups of financial and non-financial institutions as providers of retail payment services. The resulting policy problem for payment systems is how best to benefit from efficiency gains while managing payment risks. O'Connor examines the effect of the technological and legislative changes and the initiatives developed by the public and private sectors in such areas as the market arrangements for services; customer risks and costs for settling large-value retail payments; the security of payment information and the efficiency with which it is transmitted; and the effects of differing regulatory regimes on competition among providers of retail payment services.

Viewing microinsurance as a social risk management instrument

The objectives of this paper are to highlight some of the potential and limitations of microinsurance in the context of Social Risk Management (SRM) framework to stimulate further discussion. The paper draws on existing literature on SRM and microinsurance. Where relevant, it invokes lessons from microfinance. The authors conclude that there is potential for efficient and equitable risk management through microinsurance, but also limitations. Microinsurance may be an acceptable means of managing a few limited forms of risk, but not all. SRM practitioners need to recognize that effectiveness of any risk management instrument depends on the nature of risks, household and group characteristics and dynamics, and the availability of alternative risk management options. SRM options should strike a balance between household risk management activities and the multiple instruments available at different institutional levels, including informal, market-based, and publicly provided mechanisms. Microinsurance is a potential part of the SRM toolbox, but risk management can be enhanced through different mechanisms or combinations of them.Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Banks&Banking Reform,Non Bank Financial Institutions,Environmental Economics&Policies,Health Economics&Finance