Comparing stochastic design decision belief models : pointwise versus interval probabilities.

Decision support systems can either directly support a product designer or support an agent operating within a multi-agent system (MAS). Stochastic based decision support systems require an underlying belief model that encodes domain knowledge. The underlying supporting belief model has traditionally been a probability distribution function (PDF) which uses pointwise probabilities for all possible outcomes. This can present a challenge during the knowledge elicitation process. To overcome this, it is proposed to test the performance of a credal set belief model. Credal sets (sometimes also referred to as p-boxes) use interval probabilities rather than pointwise probabilities and therefore are more easier to elicit from domain experts. The PDF and credal set belief models are compared using a design domain MAS which is able to learn, and thereby refine, the belief model based on its experience. The outcome of the experiment illustrates that there is no significant difference between the PDF based and credal set based belief models in the performance of the MAS

Logic and Topology for Knowledge, Knowability, and Belief - Extended Abstract

In recent work, Stalnaker proposes a logical framework in which belief is realized as a weakened form of knowledge. Building on Stalnaker's core insights, and using frameworks developed by Bjorndahl and Baltag et al., we employ topological tools to refine and, we argue, improve on this analysis. The structure of topological subset spaces allows for a natural distinction between what is known and (roughly speaking) what is knowable; we argue that the foundational axioms of Stalnaker's system rely intuitively on both of these notions. More precisely, we argue that the plausibility of the principles Stalnaker proposes relating knowledge and belief relies on a subtle equivocation between an "evidence-in-hand" conception of knowledge and a weaker "evidence-out-there" notion of what could come to be known. Our analysis leads to a trimodal logic of knowledge, knowability, and belief interpreted in topological subset spaces in which belief is definable in terms of knowledge and knowability. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for this logic as well as its uni-modal belief fragment. We then consider weaker logics that preserve suitable translations of Stalnaker's postulates, yet do not allow for any reduction of belief. We propose novel topological semantics for these irreducible notions of belief, generalizing our previous semantics, and provide sound and complete axiomatizations for the corresponding logics.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2017, arXiv:1707.08250. The full version of this paper, including the longer proofs, is at arXiv:1612.0205