THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION SEQUENTIAL AND PERSONALITY ON THE INVESTOR BELIEF REVISION (AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY IN DECISION MAKING)

This research examined that (1) there is a recency effect on investor belief revision from mix\ud information that presented sequentially, (2) there is an anchoring effect on investor belief\ud revision from mix information that presented sequentially, and (3) there is an interaction\ud between the order of information and the tolerance of ambiguity personality in affecting of the\ud revision belief of investors. Belief adjustment theory is employed as the main framework of\ud this research. Experiment method 2x2 between subject used in this research and the subject\ud that use is 75 students postgraduate Universitas Hasanuddin (UNHAS) accounting majors.\ud The hypothesis tested by using Independent Sample t-test, Kruskal-Wallis, ANOVA test. The\ud results show that there are a recency effect and anchoring effect on investor belief revision\ud from mix information that presented sequentially. Meanwhile, there is no interaction between\ud sequence information and personality-ambiguity tolerance on investor belief revision. This\ud study gives attention to the company's management to consider the sequencing of the\ud presentation of information because the sequence of presentation can be as important as the\ud content of the information presented to investors. If the information presented sequentially\ud and mix, the company's management should present information in negative information early\ud and positive information in the last section. The management of the company may consider\ud the sequencing of the presentation of information as a strategic tool in communicating\ud management planning to the various shareholders. Investors should realize that their\ud perception could be influenced by the company's strategy of presenting information.\ud Awareness of the influence of the order and how factors such sequence can influence a\ud person's beliefs revision process allows investors to be more careful in assessing the\ud information presented company

Modeling Belief in Dynamic Systems, Part II: Revision and Update

The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and AI. In recent years two special cases of belief change, belief revision and belief update, have been studied in detail. In a companion paper (Friedman & Halpern, 1997), we introduce a new framework to model belief change. This framework combines temporal and epistemic modalities with a notion of plausibility, allowing us to examine the change of beliefs over time. In this paper, we show how belief revision and belief update can be captured in our framework. This allows us to compare the assumptions made by each method, and to better understand the principles underlying them. In particular, it shows that Katsuno and Mendelzon's notion of belief update (Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1991a) depends on several strong assumptions that may limit its applicability in artificial intelligence. Finally, our analysis allow us to identify a notion of minimal change that underlies a broad range of belief change operations including revision and update.Comment: See http://www.jair.org/ for other files accompanying this articl

Is higher-order evidence evidence?

Suppose we learn that we have a poor track record in forming beliefs rationally, or that a brilliant colleague thinks that we believe P irrationally. Does such input require us to revise those beliefs whose rationality is in question? When we gain information suggesting that our beliefs are irrational, we are in one of two general cases. In the first case we made no error, and our beliefs are rational. In that case the input to the contrary is misleading. In the second case we indeed believe irrationally, and our original evidence already requires us to fix our mistake. In that case the input to that effect is normatively superfluous. Thus, we know that information suggesting that our beliefs are irrational is either misleading or superfluous. This, I submit, renders the input incapable of justifying belief revision, despite our not knowing which of the two kinds it is