611 research outputs found
IoTBeholder: A Privacy Snooping Attack on User Habitual Behaviors from Smart Home Wi-Fi Traffic
With the deployment of a growing number of smart home IoT devices, privacy leakage has become a growing concern. Prior work on privacy-invasive device localization, classification, and activity identification have proven the existence of various privacy leakage risks in smart home environments. However, they only demonstrate limited threats in real world due to many impractical assumptions, such as having privileged access to the user's home network. In this paper, we identify a new end-to-end attack surface using IoTBeholder, a system that performs device localization, classification, and user activity identification. IoTBeholder can be easily run and replicated on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) devices such as mobile phones or personal computers, enabling attackers to infer user's habitual behaviors from smart home Wi-Fi traffic alone. We set up a testbed with 23 IoT devices for evaluation in the real world. The result shows that IoTBeholder has good device classification and device activity identification performance. In addition, IoTBeholder can infer the users' habitual behaviors and automation rules with high accuracy and interpretability. It can even accurately predict the users' future actions, highlighting a significant threat to user privacy that IoT vendors and users should highly concern
Peek-a-Boo: I see your smart home activities, even encrypted!
A myriad of IoT devices such as bulbs, switches, speakers in a smart home
environment allow users to easily control the physical world around them and
facilitate their living styles through the sensors already embedded in these
devices. Sensor data contains a lot of sensitive information about the user and
devices. However, an attacker inside or near a smart home environment can
potentially exploit the innate wireless medium used by these devices to
exfiltrate sensitive information from the encrypted payload (i.e., sensor data)
about the users and their activities, invading user privacy. With this in
mind,in this work, we introduce a novel multi-stage privacy attack against user
privacy in a smart environment. It is realized utilizing state-of-the-art
machine-learning approaches for detecting and identifying the types of IoT
devices, their states, and ongoing user activities in a cascading style by only
passively sniffing the network traffic from smart home devices and sensors. The
attack effectively works on both encrypted and unencrypted communications. We
evaluate the efficiency of the attack with real measurements from an extensive
set of popular off-the-shelf smart home IoT devices utilizing a set of diverse
network protocols like WiFi, ZigBee, and BLE. Our results show that an
adversary passively sniffing the traffic can achieve very high accuracy (above
90%) in identifying the state and actions of targeted smart home devices and
their users. To protect against this privacy leakage, we also propose a
countermeasure based on generating spoofed traffic to hide the device states
and demonstrate that it provides better protection than existing solutions.Comment: Update (May 13, 2020): This is the author's version of the work. It
is posted here for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive
Version of Record was published in the 13th ACM Conference on Security and
Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec '20), July 8-10, 2020, Linz
(Virtual Event), Austria, https://doi.org/10.1145/3395351.339942
User Perceptions of Smart Home IoT Privacy
Smart home Internet of Things (IoT) devices are rapidly increasing in
popularity, with more households including Internet-connected devices that
continuously monitor user activities. In this study, we conduct eleven
semi-structured interviews with smart home owners, investigating their reasons
for purchasing IoT devices, perceptions of smart home privacy risks, and
actions taken to protect their privacy from those external to the home who
create, manage, track, or regulate IoT devices and/or their data. We note
several recurring themes. First, users' desires for convenience and
connectedness dictate their privacy-related behaviors for dealing with external
entities, such as device manufacturers, Internet Service Providers,
governments, and advertisers. Second, user opinions about external entities
collecting smart home data depend on perceived benefit from these entities.
Third, users trust IoT device manufacturers to protect their privacy but do not
verify that these protections are in place. Fourth, users are unaware of
privacy risks from inference algorithms operating on data from non-audio/visual
devices. These findings motivate several recommendations for device designers,
researchers, and industry standards to better match device privacy features to
the expectations and preferences of smart home owners.Comment: 20 pages, 1 tabl
Securing Smart Home Iot Applications Via Wireless Traffic Analysis
Householders have widely used IoT security systems with the development of smart home applications. Wireless security cameras are integral components of IoT security systems used by many private homes. These cameras commonly employ motion sensors to identify something occurring in their fields of vision before recording and notifying the property owner of the activity. In this thesis, we discover that the motion-sensing action can disclose the camera's location through a novel wireless camera localization technique we call MotionCompass. In short, a user who aims to avoid surveillance can find a hidden camera by creating motion stimuli and sniffing wireless traffic for a response to that stimuli. With the motion trajectories within the motion detection zone, the user can then compute the camera's exact location. We develop an Android app to implement MotionCompass. Our extensive experiments using the developed app and 18 popular wireless security cameras demonstrate that MotionCompass can attain a mean localization error of around 5 cm in less than 140 seconds for cameras with one motion sensor. This localization technique builds upon existing work that detects the existence of hidden cameras to pinpoint their exact location and area of surveillance
Information exposure from consumer IoT devices: a multidimensional, network-informed measurement approach
Internet of Things (IoT) devices are increasingly found in everyday homes, providing useful functionality for devices such as TVs, smart speakers, and video doorbells. Along with their benefits come potential privacy risks, since these devices can communicate information about their users to other parties over the Internet. However, understanding these risks in depth and at scale is difficult due to heterogeneity in devices' user interfaces, protocols, and functionality. In this work, we conduct a multidimensional analysis of information exposure from 81 devices located in labs in the US and UK. Through a total of 34,586 rigorous automated and manual controlled experiments, we characterize information exposure in terms of destinations of Internet traffic, whether the contents of communication are protected by encryption, what are the IoT-device interactions that can be inferred from such content, and whether there are unexpected exposures of private and/or sensitive information (e.g., video surreptitiously transmitted by a recording device). We highlight regional differences between these results, potentially due to different privacy regulations in the US and UK. Last, we compare our controlled experiments with data gathered from an in situ user study comprising 36 participants
Traffic Privacy Study on Internet of Things – Smart Home Applications
Internet of Things (IoT) devices have been widely adopted in many different applications in recent years, such as smart home applications. An adversary can capture the network traffic of IoT devices and analyze it to reveal user activities even if the traffic is encrypted. Therefore, traffic privacy is a major concern, especially in smart home applications. Traffic shaping can be used to obfuscate the traffic so that no meaningful predictions can be drawn through traffic analysis. Current traffic shaping methods have many tunable variables that are difficult to optimize to balance bandwidth overheads and latencies. In this thesis, we study current traffic shaping algorithms in terms of computational requirements, bandwidth overhead, latency, and privacy protection based on captured traffic data from a mimic smart home network. A new traffic shaping method - Dynamic Traffic Padding is proposed to balance bandwidth overheads and delays according to the type of devices and desired privacy. We use previous device traffic to adjust the padding rate to reduce the bandwidth overhead. Based on the mimic smart home application data, we verify our proposed method can preserve privacy while minimizing bandwidth overheads and latencies
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