3 research outputs found

    Online Independent Set Beyond the Worst-Case: Secretaries, Prophets, and Periods

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    We investigate online algorithms for maximum (weight) independent set on graph classes with bounded inductive independence number like, e.g., interval and disk graphs with applications to, e.g., task scheduling and spectrum allocation. In the online setting, it is assumed that nodes of an unknown graph arrive one by one over time. An online algorithm has to decide whether an arriving node should be included into the independent set. Unfortunately, this natural and practically relevant online problem cannot be studied in a meaningful way within a classical competitive analysis as the competitive ratio on worst-case input sequences is lower bounded by Ω(n)\Omega(n). As a worst-case analysis is pointless, we study online independent set in a stochastic analysis. Instead of focussing on a particular stochastic input model, we present a generic sampling approach that enables us to devise online algorithms achieving performance guarantees for a variety of input models. In particular, our analysis covers stochastic input models like the secretary model, in which an adversarial graph is presented in random order, and the prophet-inequality model, in which a randomly generated graph is presented in adversarial order. Our sampling approach bridges thus between stochastic input models of quite different nature. In addition, we show that our approach can be applied to a practically motivated admission control setting. Our sampling approach yields an online algorithm for maximum independent set with competitive ratio O(ρ2)O(\rho^2) with respect to all of the mentioned stochastic input models. for graph classes with inductive independence number ρ\rho. The approach can be extended towards maximum-weight independent set by losing only a factor of O(logn)O(\log n) in the competitive ratio with nn denoting the (expected) number of nodes

    Brief Announcement: {Universally} Truthful Secondary Spectrum Auctions

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