What's Decidable About Sequences?

We present a first-order theory of sequences with integer elements, Presburger arithmetic, and regular constraints, which can model significant properties of data structures such as arrays and lists. We give a decision procedure for the quantifier-free fragment, based on an encoding into the first-order theory of concatenation; the procedure has PSPACE complexity. The quantifier-free fragment of the theory of sequences can express properties such as sortedness and injectivity, as well as Boolean combinations of periodic and arithmetic facts relating the elements of the sequence and their positions (e.g., "for all even i's, the element at position i has value i+3 or 2i"). The resulting expressive power is orthogonal to that of the most expressive decidable logics for arrays. Some examples demonstrate that the fragment is also suitable to reason about sequence-manipulating programs within the standard framework of axiomatic semantics.Comment: Fixed a few lapses in the Mergesort exampl

Externalism, internalism and logical truth

The aim of this paper is to show what sorts of logics are required by externalist and internalist accounts of the meanings of natural kind nouns. These logics give us a new perspective from which to evaluate the respective positions in the externalist--internalist debate about the meanings of such nouns. The two main claims of the paper are the following: first, that adequate logics for internalism and externalism about natural kind nouns are second-order logics; second, that an internalist second-order logic is a free logic—a second order logic free of existential commitments for natural kind nouns, while an externalist second-order logic is not free of existential commitments for natural kind nouns—it is existentially committed

On existential declarations of independence in IF Logic

We analyze the behaviour of declarations of independence between existential quantifiers in quantifier prefixes of IF sentences; we give a syntactical criterion for deciding whether a sentence beginning with such prefix exists such that its truth values may be affected by removal of the declaration of independence. We extend the result also to equilibrium semantics values for undetermined IF sentences. The main theorem allows us to describe the behaviour of various particular classes of quantifier prefixes, and to prove as a remarkable corollary that all existential IF sentences are equivalent to first-order sentences. As a further consequence, we prove that the fragment of IF sentences with knowledge memory has only first-order expressive power (up to truth equivalence)

Logicism, Possibilism, and the Logic of Kantian Actualism

In this extended critical discussion of 'Kant's Modal Metaphysics' by Nicholas Stang (OUP 2016), I focus on one central issue from the first chapter of the book: Stang’s account of Kant’s doctrine that existence is not a real predicate. In §2 I outline some background. In §§3-4 I present and then elaborate on Stang’s interpretation of Kant’s view that existence is not a real predicate. For Stang, the question of whether existence is a real predicate amounts to the question: ‘could there be non-actual possibilia?’ (p.35). Kant’s view, according to Stang, is that there could not, and that the very notion of non-actual or ‘mere’ possibilia is incoherent. In §5 I take a close look at Stang’s master argument that Kant’s Leibnizian predecessors are committed to the claim that existence is a real predicate, and thus to mere possibilia. I argue that it involves substantial logical commitments that the Leibnizian could reject. I also suggest that it is danger of proving too much. In §6 I explore two closely related logical commitments that Stang’s reading implicitly imposes on Kant, namely a negative universal free logic and a quantified modal logic that invalidates the Converse Barcan Formula. I suggest that each can seem to involve Kant himself in commitment to mere possibilia

A \textsf{C++} reasoner for the description logic \shdlssx (Extended Version)

We present an ongoing implementation of a \ke\space based reasoner for a decidable fragment of stratified elementary set theory expressing the description logic \dlssx (shortly \shdlssx). The reasoner checks the consistency of \shdlssx-knowledge bases (KBs) represented in set-theoretic terms. It is implemented in \textsf{C++} and supports \shdlssx-KBs serialized in the OWL/XML format. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to implement a reasoner for the consistency checking of a description logic represented via a fragment of set theory that can also classify standard OWL ontologies.Comment: 15 pages. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1702.03096, arXiv:1804.1122