From Linear to Branching-Time Temporal Logics: Transfer of Semantics and Definability

This paper investigates logical aspects of combining linear orders as semantics for modal and temporal logics, with modalities for possible paths, resulting in a variety of branching time logics over classes of trees. Here we adopt a unified approach to the Priorean, Peircean and Ockhamist semantics for branching time logics, by considering them all as fragments of the latter, obtained as combinations, in various degrees, of languages and semantics for linear time with a modality for possible paths. We then consider a hierarchy of natural classes of trees and bundled trees arising from a given class of linear orders and show that in general they provide different semantics. We also discuss transfer of definability from linear orders to trees and introduce a uniform translation from Priorean to Peircean formulae which transfers definability of properties of linear orders to definability of properties of all paths in tree

Probability Logic for Harsanyi Type Spaces

Probability logic has contributed to significant developments in belief types for game-theoretical economics. We present a new probability logic for Harsanyi Type spaces, show its completeness, and prove both a de-nesting property and a unique extension theorem. We then prove that multi-agent interactive epistemology has greater complexity than its single-agent counterpart by showing that if the probability indices of the belief language are restricted to a finite set of rationals and there are finitely many propositional letters, then the canonical space for probabilistic beliefs with one agent is finite while the canonical one with at least two agents has the cardinality of the continuum. Finally, we generalize the three notions of definability in multimodal logics to logics of probabilistic belief and knowledge, namely implicit definability, reducibility, and explicit definability. We find that S5-knowledge can be implicitly defined by probabilistic belief but not reduced to it and hence is not explicitly definable by probabilistic belief

Counting Incompossibles

We often speak as if there are merely possible people—for example, when we make such claims as that most possible people are never going to be born. Yet most metaphysicians deny that anything is both possibly a person and never born. Since our unreflective talk of merely possible people serves to draw non-trivial distinctions, these metaphysicians owe us some paraphrase by which we can draw those distinctions without committing ourselves to there being merely possible people. We show that such paraphrases are unavailable if we limit ourselves to the expressive resources of even highly infinitary first-order modal languages. We then argue that such paraphrases are available in higher-order modal languages only given certain strong assumptions concerning the metaphysics of properties. We then consider alternative paraphrase strategies, and argue that none of them are tenable. If talk of merely possible people cannot be paraphrased, then it must be taken at face value, in which case it is necessary what individuals there are. Therefore, if it is contingent what individuals there are, then the demands of paraphrase place tight constraints on the metaphysics of properties: either (i) it is necessary what properties there are, or (ii) necessarily equivalent properties are identical, and having properties does not entail even possibly being anything at all

An Integrated First-Order Theory of Points and Intervals over Linear Orders (Part II)

There are two natural and well-studied approaches to temporal ontology and reasoning: point-based and interval-based. Usually, interval-based temporal reasoning deals with points as a particular case of duration-less intervals. A recent result by Balbiani, Goranko, and Sciavicco presented an explicit two-sorted point-interval temporal framework in which time instants (points) and time periods (intervals) are considered on a par, allowing the perspective to shift between these within the formal discourse. We consider here two-sorted first-order languages based on the same principle, and therefore including relations, as first studied by Reich, among others, between points, between intervals, and inter-sort. We give complete classifications of its sub-languages in terms of relative expressive power, thus determining how many, and which, are the intrinsically different extensions of two-sorted first-order logic with one or more such relations. This approach roots out the classical problem of whether or not points should be included in a interval-based semantics. In this Part II, we deal with the cases of all dense and the case of all unbounded linearly ordered sets.Comment: This is Part II of the paper `An Integrated First-Order Theory of Points and Intervals over Linear Orders' arXiv:1805.08425v2. Therefore the introduction, preliminaries and conclusions of the two papers are the same. This version implements a few minor corrections and an update to the affiliation of the second autho