3,987 research outputs found

    Translation invariant mean field games with common noise

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    This note highlights a special class of mean field games in which the coefficients satisfy a convolution-type structural condition. A mean field game of this type with common noise is related to a certain mean field game without common noise by a simple transformation, which permits a tractable construction of a solution of the problem with common noise from a solution of the problem without

    Linear-Quadratic NN-person and Mean-Field Games with Ergodic Cost

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    We consider stochastic differential games with NN players, linear-Gaussian dynamics in arbitrary state-space dimension, and long-time-average cost with quadratic running cost. Admissible controls are feedbacks for which the system is ergodic. We first study the existence of affine Nash equilibria by means of an associated system of NN Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and NN Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck partial differential equations. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of quadratic-Gaussian solutions in terms of the solvability of suitable algebraic Riccati and Sylvester equations. Under a symmetry condition on the running costs and for nearly identical players we study the large population limit, NN tending to infinity, and find a unique quadratic-Gaussian solution of the pair of Mean Field Game HJB-KFP equations. Examples of explicit solutions are given, in particular for consensus problems.Comment: 31 page

    Mean field games with common noise

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    A theory of existence and uniqueness is developed for general stochastic differential mean field games with common noise. The concepts of strong and weak solutions are introduced in analogy with the theory of stochastic differential equations, and existence of weak solutions for mean field games is shown to hold under very general assumptions. Examples and counter-examples are provided to enlighten the underpinnings of the existence theory. Finally, an analog of the famous result of Yamada and Watanabe is derived, and it is used to prove existence and uniqueness of a strong solution under additional assumptions

    On the convergence problem in Mean Field Games: a two state model without uniqueness

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    We consider N-player and mean field games in continuous time over a finite horizon, where the position of each agent belongs to {-1,1}. If there is uniqueness of mean field game solutions, e.g. under monotonicity assumptions, then the master equation possesses a smooth solution which can be used to prove convergence of the value functions and of the feedback Nash equilibria of the N-player game, as well as a propagation of chaos property for the associated optimal trajectories. We study here an example with anti-monotonous costs, and show that the mean field game has exactly three solutions. We prove that the value functions converge to the entropy solution of the master equation, which in this case can be written as a scalar conservation law in one space dimension, and that the optimal trajectories admit a limit: they select one mean field game soution, so there is propagation of chaos. Moreover, viewing the mean field game system as the necessary conditions for optimality of a deterministic control problem, we show that the N-player game selects the optimizer of this problem
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