17,068 research outputs found
Classical and quantum partition bound and detector inefficiency
We study randomized and quantum efficiency lower bounds in communication
complexity. These arise from the study of zero-communication protocols in which
players are allowed to abort. Our scenario is inspired by the physics setup of
Bell experiments, where two players share a predefined entangled state but are
not allowed to communicate. Each is given a measurement as input, which they
perform on their share of the system. The outcomes of the measurements should
follow a distribution predicted by quantum mechanics; however, in practice, the
detectors may fail to produce an output in some of the runs. The efficiency of
the experiment is the probability that the experiment succeeds (neither of the
detectors fails).
When the players share a quantum state, this gives rise to a new bound on
quantum communication complexity (eff*) that subsumes the factorization norm.
When players share randomness instead of a quantum state, the efficiency bound
(eff), coincides with the partition bound of Jain and Klauck. This is one of
the strongest lower bounds known for randomized communication complexity, which
subsumes all the known combinatorial and algebraic methods including the
rectangle (corruption) bound, the factorization norm, and discrepancy.
The lower bound is formulated as a convex optimization problem. In practice,
the dual form is more feasible to use, and we show that it amounts to
constructing an explicit Bell inequality (for eff) or Tsirelson inequality (for
eff*). We give an example of a quantum distribution where the violation can be
exponentially bigger than the previously studied class of normalized Bell
inequalities.
For one-way communication, we show that the quantum one-way partition bound
is tight for classical communication with shared entanglement up to arbitrarily
small error.Comment: 21 pages, extended versio
Hardness of Exact Distance Queries in Sparse Graphs Through Hub Labeling
A distance labeling scheme is an assignment of bit-labels to the vertices of
an undirected, unweighted graph such that the distance between any pair of
vertices can be decoded solely from their labels. An important class of
distance labeling schemes is that of hub labelings, where a node
stores its distance to the so-called hubs , chosen so that for
any there is belonging to some shortest
path. Notice that for most existing graph classes, the best distance labelling
constructions existing use at some point a hub labeling scheme at least as a
key building block. Our interest lies in hub labelings of sparse graphs, i.e.,
those with , for which we show a lowerbound of
for the average size of the hubsets.
Additionally, we show a hub-labeling construction for sparse graphs of average
size for some , where is the
so-called Ruzsa-Szemer{\'e}di function, linked to structure of induced
matchings in dense graphs. This implies that further improving the lower bound
on hub labeling size to would require a
breakthrough in the study of lower bounds on , which have resisted
substantial improvement in the last 70 years. For general distance labeling of
sparse graphs, we show a lowerbound of , where is the communication complexity of the
Sum-Index problem over . Our results suggest that the best achievable
hub-label size and distance-label size in sparse graphs may be
for some
Complexity Theory, Game Theory, and Economics: The Barbados Lectures
This document collects the lecture notes from my mini-course "Complexity
Theory, Game Theory, and Economics," taught at the Bellairs Research Institute
of McGill University, Holetown, Barbados, February 19--23, 2017, as the 29th
McGill Invitational Workshop on Computational Complexity.
The goal of this mini-course is twofold: (i) to explain how complexity theory
has helped illuminate several barriers in economics and game theory; and (ii)
to illustrate how game-theoretic questions have led to new and interesting
complexity theory, including recent several breakthroughs. It consists of two
five-lecture sequences: the Solar Lectures, focusing on the communication and
computational complexity of computing equilibria; and the Lunar Lectures,
focusing on applications of complexity theory in game theory and economics. No
background in game theory is assumed.Comment: Revised v2 from December 2019 corrects some errors in and adds some
recent citations to v1 Revised v3 corrects a few typos in v
Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication
We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each
bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider
both welfare- and profit-maximizing auctions under this communication
restriction. For both measures, we determine the optimal auction and show that
the loss incurred relative to unconstrained auctions is mild. We prove
non-surprising properties of these kinds of auctions, e.g., that in optimal
mechanisms bidders simply report the interval in which their valuation lies in,
as well as some surprising properties, e.g., that asymmetric auctions are
better than symmetric ones and that multi-round auctions reduce the
communication complexity only by a linear factor
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