Evaluating the impact of liberalisation on public services: a critique of the European Commission 2004 report "Horizontal Evaluation Of The Performance Of Network Industries Providing Services Of General Economic Interest" EC SEC(2004) 866

A critique of the European Commission's 2004 Horizontal Evaluation Report's conclusions and analysis, and a set of proposals for a better way of evaluating Services of General Economic Interest across Europe

A Dynamic Approach to Estimate the Efficiency of U.S. Electric Utilities

The static production efficiency model and the dynamic duality model of intertemporal decision making using a parametric approach have been continuously developed but in separate direction. The parametric approach takes statistical noise into account, which consequently provides accurate measures in a stochastic environment. In this study the static shadow cost approach and the dynamic duality model of intertemporal decision making are integrated to formulate theoretical and econometric models of dynamic efficiency with intertemporal cost minimizing firm behavior. The dynamic efficiency model is a dynamic measure of firms’ inefficiency and it accounts for allocative and technical inefficiencies of net investment and of variable inputs. The dynamic efficiency model is implemented by using the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) estimation and empirically applied into a panel data set of 72 U.S. major investor-owned electric utilities using fossil-fuel fired steam electric power generation during the time period of 1986 to 1999. The major results of this study are that most electric utilities in this study underutilized fuel relative to the aggregated labor and maintenance input and they overutilized capital in production. The estimates of the input price elasticities present the substitution possibilities among the inputs. Finally, the results suggest evidence of increasing returns to scale in the production of the electricity industryEfficiency, GMM estimation, shadow cost approach, dynamic duality, deregulation, electricity

Dynamic Efficiency Estimation: An Application to US Electric Utilities

The static production efficiency model and the dynamic duality model of intertemporal decision making using a parametric approach have been continuously developed but in separate direction. In this study the static shadow cost approach and the dynamic duality model of intertemporal decision making are integrated to formulate theoretical and econometric models of dynamic efficiency with intertemporal cost minimizing firm behavior. The dynamic efficiency model is empirically implemented using a panel data set of 72 U.S. major investor-owned electric utilities using fossil-fuel fired steam electric power generation during the time period of 1986 to 1999. The major results of this study are that most electric utilities in this study underutilized fuel relative to the aggregated labor and maintenance input and they overutilized capital in production. Electric utilities with relatively high technical inefficiency of variable inputs demand in production in states adopting a deregulation plan improve the performance of the utilities. The estimates of the input price elasticities present the substitution possibilities among the inputs. Finally, the results suggest evidence of increasing returns to scale in the production of the electricity industry.

The Environmental Responsibility of the Regionalizing Electric Utility Industry

In this Article, I will address environmental issues in the context of our rapidly evolving understanding of restructuring. The market for electricity is fast becoming a series of regional marketplaces for wholesale transactions, operating on bid-based systems that move power at the lowest cost. There are plenty of states where power is still delivered as it has been for decades: by bundled service provided by vertically integrated utilities. However, the trend is toward regionalization, where independent entities control the transmission grid and play a major role in determining how power is delivered. These market participants, confusingly, have been known by a number of names and acronyms, though the most recent one is regional transmission organizations ( RTOs ). The trend toward regiona

Regulatory Policies and Reforms in the Power and Downstream Oil Industries

This paper looks at the regulatory reforms in the electricity and downstream oil industries, two important inputs to the production process that were heavily regulated by the government. While electricity has strong externalities as well as economies of scale and scope, the oil industry does not exhibit natural monopoly characteristics nor does it display economic features that would warrant government regulation. The paper also analyzes the economic theories underlying these reforms: why is regulation necessary, what are the different forms of regulation, and how can these policy reforms bring about competition? It also identifies the emerging issues and problems associated with the regulatory reforms. Given our little experience in the effective use of public regulation in a market-driven setting, research is needed to provide a deeper understanding of these issues within the context of our economic, institutional, and political structure. This is necessary in order to come up with possible approaches to overcome our weaknesses and shore up weak administrative and enforcement capacities.electricity and power, economic regulation, regulatory reform, downstream oil

The "Regulatory Compact" and Implicit Contracts: Should Stranded Costs Be Recoverable?

Progress toward electricity market deregulation has brought controversy over whether or not utilities are entitled to compensation for "stranded costs," i.e., costs utilities will not be able to recover due to the advent of competition in their markets. This paper uses a legal and economic analysis of contracts to address the desirability of utility cost recovery. First, underlying principles of law are reviewed to determine whether or not there is a legal presumption of recovery. Then, the analysis considers whether or not an implicit "regulatory compact" between utilities and regulators follows from principles in the economic analysis of law, particularly theories of efficient breach and implicit contracts. The paper concludes that recovery should occur in only a proscribed set of circumstances and that, when called for, compensation should be partial, rather than full.

Global experience with electricity liberalisation

This paper examines global experiences with electricity liberalisation relevant to the new legislation on electricity passed by the Indonesian parliament in September 2009. It covers experiences in the UK, EU, USA and ten major developing economies. Finally, the paper comments on a number of the issues emerging from this survey, in particular the reliance on public finance for extensions to electricity networks, the advantages of public finance for cheaper capital and for developing renewables, and the comparative evidence on efficiency

Regulatory Policies and Reforms in the Power and Downstream Oil Industries

This paper looks at the regulatory reforms in the electricity and downstream oil industries, two important inputs to the production process that were heavily regulated by the government. While electricity has strong externalities as well as economies of scale and scope, the oil industry does not exhibit natural monopoly characteristics nor does it display economic features that would warrant government regulation. The paper also analyzes the economic theories underlying these reforms: why is regulation necessary, what are the different forms of regulation, and how can these policy reforms bring about competition? It also identifies the emerging issues and problems associated with the regulatory reforms. Given our little experience in the effective use of public regulation in a market-driven setting, research is needed to provide a deeper understanding of these issues within the context of our economic, institutional, and political structure. This is necessary in order to come up with possible approaches to overcome our weaknesses and shore up weak administrative and enforcement capacities.electricity and power, economic regulation, regulatory reform, downstream oil

Network Utilities in the U.S. - Sector Reforms without Privatization

U.S. network industry reforms led other countries in the past, but have recently run into difficulties in specific areas. In particular, the U.S. telecommunications sector was hit by a deep crisis and electricity reforms suffered under the California disaster. Part of the explanation for these difficulties stems from past successful liberalization and deregulation experiences in other areas suggesting that competition could provide large benefits to hitherto regulated utilities in local telephony and the electricity sector. Part of the explanation lies in an underestimate of the coordination problems, resulting in bad institutional design, and in the difficulty to deal with vested consumer interests.network industries, regulation, competition, telecoms, electricity

Agglomerative Magnets and Informal Regulatory Networks: Electricity Market Design Convergence in the USA and Continental Europe

The absence of one broadly accepted design template for liberalised electricity markets induces regulatory competition and institutional diversity. Focussing on continental Europe and the USA, this analysis explores how agents and structures accelerate or impede the move to one standard market design in the electricity sector. It reveals that market design convergence in Europe is driven by the 'Florence Consensus,' a tripartite coalition between the European Commission fostering European integration and the internal market, informal regulatory networks between grid operators, standardisation authorities and regulators, who have been coordinating their actions in the 'Florence Forum,' and epistemic communities exemplified in the Florence School of Regulation. In contrast, the United States' Federal Energy Regulatory Commission lacks support among politicians, many states' public utility commissions, the neo-liberal intelligentsia and even industrial lobbying groups to effectively push for a standardised market design. However, design convergence in the USA may be induced by the gradual expansion of multi-state markets operated by regional transmission organisations.Electricity, Deregulation, Regulatory Competition, Policy Diffusion