Egalitarianism in the rank aggregation problem: a new dimension for democracy

Winner selection by majority, in an election between two candidates, is the only rule compatible with democratic principles. Instead, when the candidates are three or more and the voters rank candidates in order of preference, there are no univocal criteria for the selection of the winning (consensus) ranking and the outcome is known to depend sensibly on the adopted rule. Building upon XVIII century Condorcet theory, whose idea was to maximize total voter satisfaction, we propose here the addition of a new basic principle (dimension) to guide the selection: satisfaction should be distributed among voters as equally as possible. With this new criterion we identify an optimal set of rankings. They range from the Condorcet solution to the one which is the most egalitarian with respect to the voters. We show that highly egalitarian rankings have the important property to be more stable with respect to fluctuations and that classical consensus rankings (Copeland, Tideman, Schulze) often turn out to be non optimal. The new dimension we have introduced provides, when used together with that of Condorcet, a clear classification of all the possible rankings. By increasing awareness in selecting a consensus ranking our method may lead to social choices which are more egalitarian compared to those achieved by presently available voting systems.Comment: 18 pages, 14 page appendix, RateIt Web Tool: http://www.sapienzaapps.it/rateit.php, RankIt Android mobile application: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=sapienza.informatica.rankit. Appears in Quality & Quantity, 10 Apr 2015, Online Firs

On the Importance of Equity in International Climate Policy: An Empirical Analysis

Based on unique data from a world-wide survey of agents involved in international climate policy, this paper empirically analyzes the importance of equity in this field. We find that equity issues are considered highly important in international climate negotiations and that the polluter-pays rule and the accompanying poor losers rule are the most widely accepted equity principles. Our econometric analysis shows a strong influence of the economic or emission performance of the agents? country on the importance of equity issues and principles: (i) Equity issues are seen as more important by individuals from G77/China countries or from countries with less current per capita GDP and less future per capita CO2 emissions. (ii) Agents from richer countries are less in favor of incorporating the polluter-pays and the ability-to-pay principle in future international climate agreements. (iii) The poor losers rule is more strongly supported by individuals from G77/China countries or by individuals from countries with less current per capita GDP. While these results are consistent with pure economic self-interest, the support for the egalitarian principle runs contrary to economic intuition: In the long-run, agents from richer countries are more in favor of incorporating the egalitarian principle. Furthermore, the effect of the economic performance variables on the desired degree of incorporating the polluter-pays principle interestingly becomes less significant in the long-run. This indicates that future international climate agreements could possibly be based on a combination of the polluter-pays, the egalitarian, and the poor losers rule. --International Climate Policy,International Environmental Negotiations,Equity Issues,Probit Models

Climate change policy and burden sharing in the European Union: applying alternative equity rules to a CGE-framework

The objective of this paper is to present different equity rules that can be applied to the initial allocation of greenhouse gas entitlements and to analyse the potential impacts of these rules EU-wide as well as on the level of member states. The methodological framework used in the empirical part of the paper is based on the GEM-E3 model, a multi-country and multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium model for fourteen EU-member states. The major finding of the paper is that being ex ante favoured with respect to the initial allocation of permits might not hold ex post, i.e. when trade of permits and actual emission reductions are carried out. The reason can be found in two effects. First, the interdependence of the EU economies allows smaller economies not to make full use of the advantages they get through the ability-to-pay allocation: The negative impact on the economic perfomance of the big economies leads to a drop of export demand in the smaller economies, which in turn lowers the expected positive impact on welfare in the latter ones. Second, the way of how a surplus of permits in a particular country is used has considerable impacts on consumer welfare. Selling the surplus of permits on the international market and use the receipts to reduce public deficit is one way, but it has no direct impact on demand. Other, more demand stimulating recycling strategies of the surplus (e.g. a lump-sum transfer to households) might be more promising if welfare losses are to be minimzed. Both effects may outweigh the positive effect realized ex ante in some countries due to a more ?fair? initial allocation of permits. The outcome emphasizes the importance of a consideration of full general equilibrium effects across countries. --

Deep Disagreements on Social and Political Justice: Their Meta-Ethical Relevance and the Need for a New Research Perspective

This article starts off with a historical section showing that deep disagreements among notions of social and political justice are a characteristic feature of the history of political thought. Since no agreement or consensus on distributive justice is possible, the article argues that political philosophers should – instead of continuously proposing new normative theories of justice – focus on analyzing the reasons, significance, and consequences of such kinds of disagreements. The next two sections are analytical. The first sketches five possible reasons for deep disagreements among notions of social and political justice. The second discusses the meta-ethical relevance of the lack of consensus on justice and rejects ethical realism and cognitivism based on the argument from deep disagreements

Whose impartiality? An experimental study of veiled stakeholders, impartial spectators and ideal observers

This article defines in a precise manner three different mechanisms to achieve impartiality in distributive justice and studies them experimentally. We consider a first-person procedure, the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, and two third-party procedures, the impartial spectator and the ideal observer. As a result, we find striking differences in the chosen outcome distributions by the three methods. Ideal observers that do not have a stake in the allocation problem nor information about their position in society propose significantly more egalitarian distributions than veiled stakeholders or impartial spectators. Risk preferences seem to explain why participants that have a stake in the final allocation propose less egalitarian distributions. Impartial spectators that are informed about their position in society tend to favor stakeholders holding the same position.impartiality, veil of ignorance, impartial spectator, distributive justice

The Role of Inter-Group Relationships in Institutional Analysis

Taking value as the socio-economic analogue of biological or cultural fitness, in this paper I start a study of the interaction between individual-level and group-level explanatory mechanisms by looking for what kind of intra-group relationships obtains given the nature of inter-group relationships. Specifically, it is shown that when value comes from appropriating resources from other groups, inter-group relationships are conflictual or war-like and, as a consequence, intra-group-relationships are centralized and hierarchical; when the value creation process involves niche-competition between groups, inter-group relationships are fission-fusion with commitment and intra-group relationships are decentralized and egalitarian; finally, when value comes from appropriating occasional benefits from cooperation, inter-group relationships are indistinguishable from intra-group relationships, and the latter are decentralized and hierarchical. Interpreting intra-group relationships as different forms of social order and the division of labour, applications to political and economic institutions are also provided. Exploitation, a well-defined concept in the paper without recourse to the labour theory of value, is shown to be consistent with some of these institutions and, particularly, with the absence of explicit coercionvalue, distribution, exploitation

Vallentyne 2010 and Zwolinski 2008 on "Libertarianism": Some Philosophical Responses to these Encyclopaedia Articles

Vallentyne 2010 and Zwolinski 2008 are internet encyclopaedia articles on “libertarianism” which include various serious faults. Vallentyne 2010 has the following ones. It does not properly explain mainstream libertarianism or consider criticisms of it. Instead, it mainly discusses self-ownership and natural-resource egalitarianism. Every aspect of the alleged “strict sense” of “libertarianism” is dubi ous, at best. So- called “left - libertarianism” is not made sense of as any kind of liberty-based libertarianism. Problems arise because self-ownership is assumed to be libertarian without an explicit theory of libertarian liberty. The replies to “five impor tant objections to full self- ownership” are confused and mistaken; both as regards philosophical analysis and as regards empirical assumptions. The long discussion about various ways to “Appropriate Natural Resources” is rendered muddled and barren by the lack of a clear libertarian theory of liberty, the mere presumption of some form of egalitarianism, and the inclusion of various non-libertarian criteria. The remaining sections are largely uninformed by any relevant libertarian literature. It reaches a justificationist conclusion that cites mistaken welfare concerns and ignores the productivity of free markets. Zwolinski 2008 shares some errors with Vallentyne 2010, but also includes the following ones. It is even less clear about what libertarian liberty is. It fails to understand that libertarianism (private-property anarchy and, possibly, minarchy) is a subset of classical liberalism. It asserts that libertarianism is about “the proper role of government.” It assumes (illogical) justificationist/foundationalist epistemology and does not mention critical-rationalist libertarianism. It eventually faults justificationism and unwittingly assumes something approaching critical rationalism. Finally, it embraces John Rawls’s “overlapping consensus” as a “justification” (i.e., defence) of libertarianism oblivious to the similar position in Lester 1996 and 2000