2,541 research outputs found
Enabling Privacy-preserving Auctions in Big Data
We study how to enable auctions in the big data context to solve many
upcoming data-based decision problems in the near future. We consider the
characteristics of the big data including, but not limited to, velocity,
volume, variety, and veracity, and we believe any auction mechanism design in
the future should take the following factors into consideration: 1) generality
(variety); 2) efficiency and scalability (velocity and volume); 3) truthfulness
and verifiability (veracity). In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving
construction for auction mechanism design in the big data, which prevents
adversaries from learning unnecessary information except those implied in the
valid output of the auction. More specifically, we considered one of the most
general form of the auction (to deal with the variety), and greatly improved
the the efficiency and scalability by approximating the NP-hard problems and
avoiding the design based on garbled circuits (to deal with velocity and
volume), and finally prevented stakeholders from lying to each other for their
own benefit (to deal with the veracity). We achieve these by introducing a
novel privacy-preserving winner determination algorithm and a novel payment
mechanism. Additionally, we further employ a blind signature scheme as a
building block to let bidders verify the authenticity of their payment reported
by the auctioneer. The comparison with peer work shows that we improve the
asymptotic performance of peer works' overhead from the exponential growth to a
linear growth and from linear growth to a logarithmic growth, which greatly
improves the scalability
Consensus-based approach to peer-to-peer electricity markets with product differentiation
With the sustained deployment of distributed generation capacities and the
more proactive role of consumers, power systems and their operation are
drifting away from a conventional top-down hierarchical structure. Electricity
market structures, however, have not yet embraced that evolution. Respecting
the high-dimensional, distributed and dynamic nature of modern power systems
would translate to designing peer-to-peer markets or, at least, to using such
an underlying decentralized structure to enable a bottom-up approach to future
electricity markets. A peer-to-peer market structure based on a Multi-Bilateral
Economic Dispatch (MBED) formulation is introduced, allowing for
multi-bilateral trading with product differentiation, for instance based on
consumer preferences. A Relaxed Consensus+Innovation (RCI) approach is
described to solve the MBED in fully decentralized manner. A set of realistic
case studies and their analysis allow us showing that such peer-to-peer market
structures can effectively yield market outcomes that are different from
centralized market structures and optimal in terms of respecting consumers
preferences while maximizing social welfare. Additionally, the RCI solving
approach allows for a fully decentralized market clearing which converges with
a negligible optimality gap, with a limited amount of information being shared.Comment: Accepted for publication in IEEE Transactions on Power System
Reallocation Mechanisms
We consider reallocation problems in settings where the initial endowment of
each agent consists of a subset of the resources. The private information of
the players is their value for every possible subset of the resources. The goal
is to redistribute resources among agents to maximize efficiency. Monetary
transfers are allowed, but participation is voluntary.
We develop incentive-compatible, individually-rational and budget balanced
mechanisms for several classic settings, including bilateral trade, partnership
dissolving, Arrow-Debreu markets, and combinatorial exchanges. All our
mechanisms (except one) provide a constant approximation to the optimal
efficiency in these settings, even in ones where the preferences of the agents
are complex multi-parameter functions
Market-Based Scheduling in Distributed Computing Systems
In verteilten Rechensystemen (bspw. im Cluster und Grid Computing) kann eine Knappheit der zur Verfügung stehenden Ressourcen auftreten. Hier haben Marktmechanismen das Potenzial, Ressourcenbedarf und -angebot durch geeignete Anreizmechanismen zu koordinieren und somit die ökonomische Effizienz des Gesamtsystems zu steigern. Diese Arbeit beschäftigt sich anhand vier spezifischer Anwendungsszenarien mit der Frage, wie Marktmechanismen für verteilte Rechensysteme ausgestaltet sein sollten
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