4,105 research outputs found
Truthful Online Scheduling with Commitments
We study online mechanisms for preemptive scheduling with deadlines, with the
goal of maximizing the total value of completed jobs. This problem is
fundamental to deadline-aware cloud scheduling, but there are strong lower
bounds even for the algorithmic problem without incentive constraints. However,
these lower bounds can be circumvented under the natural assumption of deadline
slackness, i.e., that there is a guaranteed lower bound on the ratio
between a job's size and the time window in which it can be executed.
In this paper, we construct a truthful scheduling mechanism with a constant
competitive ratio, given slackness . Furthermore, we show that if is
large enough then we can construct a mechanism that also satisfies a commitment
property: it can be determined whether or not a job will finish, and the
requisite payment if so, well in advance of each job's deadline. This is
notable because, in practice, users with strict deadlines may find it
unacceptable to discover only very close to their deadline that their job has
been rejected
Truthful Online Scheduling with Commitments
We study online mechanisms for preemptive scheduling with deadlines, with the goal of maximizing the total value of completed jobs. This problem is fundamental to deadline-aware cloud scheduling, but there are strong lower bounds even for the algorithmic problem without incentive constraints. However, these lower bounds can be circumvented under the natural assumption of deadline slackness, i.e., that there is a guaranteed lower bound s > 1 on the ratio between a job's size and the time window in which it can be executed. In this paper, we construct a truthful scheduling mechanism with a constant competitive ratio, given slackness s > 1. Furthermore, we show that if s is large enough then we can construct a mechanism that also satisfies a commitment property: it can be determined whether or not a job will finish, and the requisite payment if so, well in advance of each job's deadline. This is notable because, in practice, users with strict deadlines may find it unacceptable to discover only very close to their deadline that their job has been rejected
Truth and Regret in Online Scheduling
We consider a scheduling problem where a cloud service provider has multiple
units of a resource available over time. Selfish clients submit jobs, each with
an arrival time, deadline, length, and value. The service provider's goal is to
implement a truthful online mechanism for scheduling jobs so as to maximize the
social welfare of the schedule. Recent work shows that under a stochastic
assumption on job arrivals, there is a single-parameter family of mechanisms
that achieves near-optimal social welfare. We show that given any such family
of near-optimal online mechanisms, there exists an online mechanism that in the
worst case performs nearly as well as the best of the given mechanisms. Our
mechanism is truthful whenever the mechanisms in the given family are truthful
and prompt, and achieves optimal (within constant factors) regret.
We model the problem of competing against a family of online scheduling
mechanisms as one of learning from expert advice. A primary challenge is that
any scheduling decisions we make affect not only the payoff at the current
step, but also the resource availability and payoffs in future steps.
Furthermore, switching from one algorithm (a.k.a. expert) to another in an
online fashion is challenging both because it requires synchronization with the
state of the latter algorithm as well as because it affects the incentive
structure of the algorithms. We further show how to adapt our algorithm to a
non-clairvoyant setting where job lengths are unknown until jobs are run to
completion. Once again, in this setting, we obtain truthfulness along with
asymptotically optimal regret (within poly-logarithmic factors)
Stability of Service under Time-of-Use Pricing
We consider "time-of-use" pricing as a technique for matching supply and
demand of temporal resources with the goal of maximizing social welfare.
Relevant examples include energy, computing resources on a cloud computing
platform, and charging stations for electric vehicles, among many others. A
client/job in this setting has a window of time during which he needs service,
and a particular value for obtaining it. We assume a stochastic model for
demand, where each job materializes with some probability via an independent
Bernoulli trial. Given a per-time-unit pricing of resources, any realized job
will first try to get served by the cheapest available resource in its window
and, failing that, will try to find service at the next cheapest available
resource, and so on. Thus, the natural stochastic fluctuations in demand have
the potential to lead to cascading overload events. Our main result shows that
setting prices so as to optimally handle the {\em expected} demand works well:
with high probability, when the actual demand is instantiated, the system is
stable and the expected value of the jobs served is very close to that of the
optimal offline algorithm.Comment: To appear in STOC'1
ERA: A Framework for Economic Resource Allocation for the Cloud
Cloud computing has reached significant maturity from a systems perspective,
but currently deployed solutions rely on rather basic economics mechanisms that
yield suboptimal allocation of the costly hardware resources. In this paper we
present Economic Resource Allocation (ERA), a complete framework for scheduling
and pricing cloud resources, aimed at increasing the efficiency of cloud
resources usage by allocating resources according to economic principles. The
ERA architecture carefully abstracts the underlying cloud infrastructure,
enabling the development of scheduling and pricing algorithms independently of
the concrete lower-level cloud infrastructure and independently of its
concerns. Specifically, ERA is designed as a flexible layer that can sit on top
of any cloud system and interfaces with both the cloud resource manager and
with the users who reserve resources to run their jobs. The jobs are scheduled
based on prices that are dynamically calculated according to the predicted
demand. Additionally, ERA provides a key internal API to pluggable algorithmic
modules that include scheduling, pricing and demand prediction. We provide a
proof-of-concept software and demonstrate the effectiveness of the architecture
by testing ERA over both public and private cloud systems -- Azure Batch of
Microsoft and Hadoop/YARN. A broader intent of our work is to foster
collaborations between economics and system communities. To that end, we have
developed a simulation platform via which economics and system experts can test
their algorithmic implementations
Simple Pricing Schemes for the Cloud
The problem of pricing the cloud has attracted much recent attention due to
the widespread use of cloud computing and cloud services. From a theoretical
perspective, several mechanisms that provide strong efficiency or fairness
guarantees and desirable incentive properties have been designed. However,
these mechanisms often rely on a rigid model, with several parameters needing
to be precisely known in order for the guarantees to hold. In this paper, we
consider a stochastic model and show that it is possible to obtain good welfare
and revenue guarantees with simple mechanisms that do not make use of the
information on some of these parameters. In particular, we prove that a
mechanism that sets the same price per time step for jobs of any length
achieves at least 50% of the welfare and revenue obtained by a mechanism that
can set different prices for jobs of different lengths, and the ratio can be
improved if we have more specific knowledge of some parameters. Similarly, a
mechanism that sets the same price for all servers even though the servers may
receive different kinds of jobs can provide a reasonable welfare and revenue
approximation compared to a mechanism that is allowed to set different prices
for different servers.Comment: To appear in the 13th Conference on Web and Internet Economics
(WINE), 2017. A preliminary version was presented at the 12th Workshop on the
Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon), 201
Optimum Statistical Estimation with Strategic Data Sources
We propose an optimum mechanism for providing monetary incentives to the data
sources of a statistical estimator such as linear regression, so that high
quality data is provided at low cost, in the sense that the sum of payments and
estimation error is minimized. The mechanism applies to a broad range of
estimators, including linear and polynomial regression, kernel regression, and,
under some additional assumptions, ridge regression. It also generalizes to
several objectives, including minimizing estimation error subject to budget
constraints. Besides our concrete results for regression problems, we
contribute a mechanism design framework through which to design and analyze
statistical estimators whose examples are supplied by workers with cost for
labeling said examples
Pricing for Online Resource Allocation: Intervals and Paths
We present pricing mechanisms for several online resource allocation problems
which obtain tight or nearly tight approximations to social welfare. In our
settings, buyers arrive online and purchase bundles of items; buyers' values
for the bundles are drawn from known distributions. This problem is closely
related to the so-called prophet-inequality of Krengel and Sucheston and its
extensions in recent literature. Motivated by applications to cloud economics,
we consider two kinds of buyer preferences. In the first, items correspond to
different units of time at which a resource is available; the items are
arranged in a total order and buyers desire intervals of items. The second
corresponds to bandwidth allocation over a tree network; the items are edges in
the network and buyers desire paths.
Because buyers' preferences have complementarities in the settings we
consider, recent constant-factor approximations via item prices do not apply,
and indeed strong negative results are known. We develop static, anonymous
bundle pricing mechanisms.
For the interval preferences setting, we show that static, anonymous bundle
pricings achieve a sublogarithmic competitive ratio, which is optimal (within
constant factors) over the class of all online allocation algorithms, truthful
or not. For the path preferences setting, we obtain a nearly-tight logarithmic
competitive ratio. Both of these results exhibit an exponential improvement
over item pricings for these settings. Our results extend to settings where the
seller has multiple copies of each item, with the competitive ratio decreasing
linearly with supply. Such a gradual tradeoff between supply and the
competitive ratio for welfare was previously known only for the single item
prophet inequality
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