Transparent Memory Encryption and Authentication

Security features of modern (SoC) FPAGs permit to protect the confidentiality of hard- and software IP when the devices are powered off as well as to validate the authenticity of IP when being loaded at startup. However, these approaches are insufficient since attackers with physical access can also perform attacks during runtime, demanding for additional security measures. In particular, RAM used by modern (SoC) FPGAs is under threat since RAM stores software IP as well as all kinds of other sensitive information during runtime. To solve this issue, we present an open-source framework for building transparent RAM encryption and authentication pipelines, suitable for both FPGAs and ASICs. The framework supports various ciphers and modes of operation as shown by our comprehensive evaluation on a Xilinx Zynq-7020 SoC. For encryption, the ciphers Prince and AES are used in the ECB, CBC and XTS mode. Additionally, the authenticated encryption cipher Ascon is used both standalone and within a TEC tree. Our results show that the data processing of our encryption pipeline is highly efficient with up to 94% utilization of the read bandwidth that is provided by the FPGA interface. Moreover, the use of a cryptographically strong primitive like Ascon yields highly practical results with 54% bandwidth utilization

Flexible Memory Protection with Dynamic Authentication Trees

As computing appliances increase in use and handle more critical information and functionalities, the importance of security grows even greater. In cases where the device processes sensitive data or performs important functionality, an attacker may be able to read or manipulate it by accessing the data bus between the processor and memory itself. As it is impossible to provide physical protection to the piece of hardware in use, it is important to provide protection against revealing confidential information and securing the device\u27s intended operation. Defense against bus attacks such as spoofing, splicing, and replay attacks are of particular concern. Traditional memory authentication techniques, such as hashes and message authentication codes, are costly when protecting off-chip memory during run-time. Balanced authentication trees such as the well-known Merkle tree or TEC-Tree are widely used to reduce this cost. While authentication trees are less costly than conventional techniques it still remains expensive. This work proposes a new method of dynamically updating an authentication tree structure based on a processor\u27s memory access pattern. Memory addresses that are more frequently accessed are dynamically shifted to a higher tree level to reduce the number of memory accesses required to authenticate that address. The block-level AREA technique is applied to allow for data confidentiality with no additional cost. An HDL design for use in an FPGA is provided as a transparent and highly customizable AXI-4 memory controller. The memory controller allows for data confidentiality and authentication for random-access memory with different speed or memory size constraints. The design was implemented on a Zynq 7000 system-on-chip using the processor to communicate with the hardware design. The performance of the dynamic tree design is comparable to the TEC-Tree in several memory access patterns. The TEC-Tree performs better than a dynamic design in particular applications; however, speedup over the TEC-Tree is possible to achieve when applied in scenarios that frequently accessed previously processed data

FPGA-Augmented Secure Crash-Consistent Non-Volatile Memory

Emerging byte-addressable Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) technology, although promising superior memory density and ultra-low energy consumption, poses unique challenges to achieving persistent data privacy and computing security, both of which are critically important to the embedded and IoT applications. Specifically, to successfully restore NVMs to their working states after unexpected system crashes or power failure, maintaining and recovering all the necessary security-related metadata can severely increase memory traffic, degrade runtime performance, exacerbate write endurance problem, and demand costly hardware changes to off-the-shelf processors. In this thesis, we summarize and expand upon two of our innovative works, ARES and HERMES, to design a new FPGA-assisted processor-transparent security mechanism aiming at efficiently and effectively achieving all three aspects of a security triad—confidentiality, integrity, and recoverability—in modern embedded computing. Given the growing prominence of CPU-FPGA heterogeneous computing architectures, ARES leverages FPGA\u27s hardware reconfigurability to offload performance-critical and security-related functions to the programmable hardware without microprocessors\u27 involvement. In particular, recognizing that the traditional Merkle tree caching scheme cannot fully exploit FPGA\u27s parallelism due to its sequential and recursive function calls, ARES proposed a new Merkle tree cache architecture and a novel Merkle tree scheme which flattened and reorganized the computation in the traditional Merkle tree verification and update processes to fully exploit the parallel cache ports and to fully pipeline time-consuming hashing operations. To further optimize the throughput of BMT operations, HERMES proposed an optimally efficient dataflow architecture by processing multiple outstanding counter requests simultaneously. Specifically, HERMES explored and addressed three technical challenges when exploiting task-level parallelism of BMT and proposed a speculative execution approach with both low latency and high throughput