Rational indecisive choice

This paper proposes and characterises two preference-based choice rules that allow the decision maker to choose nothing if the criteria associated with them are satisfied by no feasible alternative. Strict preferences are primitive in the first rule and weak preferences in the second. Each of them includes the corresponding utility-maximisation theory of rational choice as a special case. The first one explains changes in the magnitude of context effects observed in experiments that allow for indecision. The second offers one explanation of experimental findings suggesting that choice is more likely to be made from small rather than from large sets. The general conclusion in both cases is that an individual conforms to meaningful and testable principles of choice consistency whenever assumed to be occasionally indecisive.Rationality; indecision; incomplete preferences; choice rules

The Complexity of Rooted Phylogeny Problems

Several computational problems in phylogenetic reconstruction can be formulated as restrictions of the following general problem: given a formula in conjunctive normal form where the literals are rooted triples, is there a rooted binary tree that satisfies the formula? If the formulas do not contain disjunctions, the problem becomes the famous rooted triple consistency problem, which can be solved in polynomial time by an algorithm of Aho, Sagiv, Szymanski, and Ullman. If the clauses in the formulas are restricted to disjunctions of negated triples, Ng, Steel, and Wormald showed that the problem remains NP-complete. We systematically study the computational complexity of the problem for all such restrictions of the clauses in the input formula. For certain restricted disjunctions of triples we present an algorithm that has sub-quadratic running time and is asymptotically as fast as the fastest known algorithm for the rooted triple consistency problem. We also show that any restriction of the general rooted phylogeny problem that does not fall into our tractable class is NP-complete, using known results about the complexity of Boolean constraint satisfaction problems. Finally, we present a pebble game argument that shows that the rooted triple consistency problem (and also all generalizations studied in this paper) cannot be solved by Datalog

Layered Social Network Analysis Reveals Complex Relationships in Kindergarteners.

The interplay between individuals forms building blocks for social structure. Here, we examine the structure of behavioral interactions among kindergarten classroom with a hierarchy-neutral approach to examine all possible underlying patterns in the formation of layered networks of "reciprocal" interactions. To understand how these layers are coordinated, we used a layered motif approach. Our dual layered motif analysis can therefore be thought of as the dynamics of smaller groups that tile to create the group structure, or alternatively they provide information on what the average child would do in a given local social environment. When we examine the regulated motifs in layered networks, we find that transitivity is at least partially involved in the formation of these layered network structures. We also found complex combinations of the expected reciprocal interactions. The mechanisms used to understand social networks of kindergarten children here are also applicable on a more general scale to any group of individuals where interactions and identities can be readily observed and scored

Coalitional Games with Overlapping Coalitions for Interference Management in Small Cell Networks

In this paper, we study the problem of cooperative interference management in an OFDMA two-tier small cell network. In particular, we propose a novel approach for allowing the small cells to cooperate, so as to optimize their sum-rate, while cooperatively satisfying their maximum transmit power constraints. Unlike existing work which assumes that only disjoint groups of cooperative small cells can emerge, we formulate the small cells' cooperation problem as a coalition formation game with overlapping coalitions. In this game, each small cell base station can choose to participate in one or more cooperative groups (or coalitions) simultaneously, so as to optimize the tradeoff between the benefits and costs associated with cooperation. We study the properties of the proposed overlapping coalition formation game and we show that it exhibits negative externalities due to interference. Then, we propose a novel decentralized algorithm that allows the small cell base stations to interact and self-organize into a stable overlapping coalitional structure. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm results in a notable performance advantage in terms of the total system sum-rate, relative to the noncooperative case and the classical algorithms for coalitional games with non-overlapping coalitions