The underlying social dynamics of paradigm shifts

We develop here a multi-agent model of the creation of knowledge (scientific progress or technological evolution) within a community of researchers devoted to such endeavors. In the proposed model, agents learn in a physical-technological landscape, and weight is attached to both individual search and social influence. We find that the combination of these two forces together with random experimentation can account for both i) marginal change, that is, periods of normal science or refinements on the performance of a given technology (and in which the community stays in the neighborhood of the current paradigm); and ii) radical change, which takes the form of scientific paradigm shifts (or discontinuities in the structure of performance of a technology) that is observed as a swift migration of the knowledge community towards the new and superior paradigm. The efficiency of the search process is heavily dependent on the weight that agents posit on social influence. The occurrence of a paradigm shift becomes more likely when each member of the community attaches a small but positive weight to the experience of his/her peers. For this parameter region, nevertheless, a conservative force is exerted by the representatives of the current paradigm. However, social influence is not strong enough to seriously hamper individual discovery, and can act so as to empower successful individual pioneers who have conquered the new and superior paradigm.Fil: Rodriguez Sickert, Carlos. Universidad del Desarrollo; ChileFil: Cosmelli, Diego. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile; ChileFil: Claro, Francisco. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile; ChileFil: Fuentes, Miguel Angel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad San Sebastián; Chil

Simple Forecasts and Paradigm Shifts

We postulate that agents make forecasts using overly simplified models of the world—i. e. , models that only embody a subset of available information. We then go on to study the implications of learning in this environment. Our key premise is that learning is based on a model-selection criterion. Thus if a particular simple model does a poor job of forecasting over a period of time, it is eventually discarded in favor of an alternative, yet equally simple model that would have done better over the same period. This theory makes several distinctive predictions, which, for concreteness, we develop in a stock-market setting. For example, starting with symmetric and homoskedastic fundamentals, the theory yields forecastable variation in the size of the value/glamour differential, in volatility, and in the skewness of returns. Some of these features mirror familiar accounts of stock-price bubbles.

The contribution of VM Slipher to the discovery of the expanding universe

A brief history of the discovery of the expanding universe is presented, with an emphasis on the seminal contribution of VM Slipher. It is suggested that the well-known Hubble graph of 1929 could also be known as the Hubble-Slipher graph. It is also argued that the discovery of the expanding universe matches the traditional view of scientific advance as a gradual process of discovery and acceptance, and does not concur with the Kuhnian view of science progressing via abrupt paradigm shifts.Comment: 13 pages, 2 figures. Accepted for publication in the proceedings of the conference "Origins of the Expanding Universe: 1912-1932", M. J. Way & D. Hunter, eds., ASP Conf. Ser., Vol. 471 in pres

Thinking differently about strategy: comparing paradigms

Our paper shows that mainstream strategic thinking and research already challenges the established Newtonian-Cartesian paradigm. Newtonian thought is the customary mode of western thinking, but is that about to change? Some papers from a complexity standpoint have appeared in the mainstream journals but its precise implications and merits have yet to be systematically spelled out and debated. We aim to facilitate this debate by comparing the established Newtonian and emergent complexity paradigms, clarifying the implications of this new perspective for strategy research. We suggest that the complexity paradigm is better attuned to current strategic realities than its Newtonian-Cartesian counterpart

Contested modelling

We suggest that the role and function of expert computational modelling in real-world decision-making needs scrutiny and practices need to change. We discuss some empirical and theory-based improvements to the coupling of the modelling process and the real world, including social and behavioural processes, which we have expressed as a set of questions that we believe need to be answered by all projects engaged in such modelling.  These are based on a systems analysis of four research initiatives, covering different scales and timeframes, and addressing the complexity of intervention in a sustainability context. Our proposed improvements require new approaches for analysing the relationship between a project’s models and its publics.  They reflect what we believe is a necessary and beneficial dialogue between the realms of expert scientific modelling and systems thinking.  This paper is an attempt to start that process, itself reflecting a robust dialogue between two practitioners sat within differing traditions, puzzling how to integrate perspectives and achieve wider participation in researching this problem space.&nbsp

Philosophical Commitments, Empirical Evidence, and Theoretical Psychology

The philosophical or theoretical commitments informing psychological research are sometimes characterized, even by theoretical psychologists themselves, as nonempirical, outside the bounds of methodological consideration, and/or nonrational. We argue that this characterization is incoherent. We illustrate our concern by analogy with problematic appeals to Kuhn’s work that have been influential in theoretical psychology. Following the contemporary pragmatist tradition, we argue that our philosophical/theoretical commitments are part of our larger webs of belief, and that for any of these beliefs to have meaning their content must be informed by our practical engagement with the world, i.e., they are based on empirical evidence, broadly construed. It is this empirical basis that allows us to recognize our commitments at all and rationally to assess and criticize them when necessary. We conclude by demonstrating a rational assessment of the philosophical/theoretical commitments underlying a recent study in the social psychology of religion

Fictionalism of Anticipation

A promising recent approach for understanding complex phenomena is recognition of anticipatory behavior of living organisms and social organizations. The anticipatory, predictive action permits learning, novelty seeking, rich experiential existence. I argue that the established frameworks of anticipation, adaptation or learning imply overly passive roles of anticipatory agents, and that a fictionalist standpoint reflects the core of anticipatory behavior better than representational or future references. Cognizing beings enact not just their models of the world, but own make-believe existential agendas as well. Anticipators embody plausible scripts of living, and effectively assume neo-Kantian or pragmatist perspectives of cognition and action. It is instructive to see that anticipatory behavior is not without mundane or loathsome deficiencies. Appreciation of ferally fictionalist anticipation suggests an equivalence of semiosis and anticipation