Finding Optimal Strategies in a Multi-Period Multi-Leader-Follower Stackelberg Game Using an Evolutionary Algorithm

Stackelberg games are a classic example of bilevel optimization problems, which are often encountered in game theory and economics. These are complex problems with a hierarchical structure, where one optimization task is nested within the other. Despite a number of studies on handling bilevel optimization problems, these problems still remain a challenging territory, and existing methodologies are able to handle only simple problems with few variables under assumptions of continuity and differentiability. In this paper, we consider a special case of a multi-period multi-leader-follower Stackelberg competition model with non-linear cost and demand functions and discrete production variables. The model has potential applications, for instance in aircraft manufacturing industry, which is an oligopoly where a few giant firms enjoy a tremendous commitment power over the other smaller players. We solve cases with different number of leaders and followers, and show how the entrance or exit of a player affects the profits of the other players. In the presence of various model complexities, we use a computationally intensive nested evolutionary strategy to find an optimal solution for the model. The strategy is evaluated on a test-suite of bilevel problems, and it has been shown that the method is successful in handling difficult bilevel problems.Comment: To be published in Computers and Operations Researc

A Consensus-ADMM Approach for Strategic Generation Investment in Electricity Markets

This paper addresses a multi-stage generation investment problem for a strategic (price-maker) power producer in electricity markets. This problem is exposed to different sources of uncertainty, including short-term operational (e.g., rivals' offering strategies) and long-term macro (e.g., demand growth) uncertainties. This problem is formulated as a stochastic bilevel optimization problem, which eventually recasts as a large-scale stochastic mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) problem with limited computational tractability. To cope with computational issues, we propose a consensus version of alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM), which decomposes the original problem by both short- and long-term scenarios. Although the convergence of ADMM to the global solution cannot be generally guaranteed for MILP problems, we introduce two bounds on the optimal solution, allowing for the evaluation of the solution quality over iterations. Our numerical findings show that there is a trade-off between computational time and solution quality

Solving ill-posed bilevel programs

This paper deals with ill-posed bilevel programs, i.e., problems admitting multiple lower-level solutions for some upper-level parameters. Many publications have been devoted to the standard optimistic case of this problem, where the difficulty is essentially moved from the objective function to the feasible set. This new problem is simpler but there is no guaranty to obtain local optimal solutions for the original optimistic problem by this process. Considering the intrinsic non-convexity of bilevel programs, computing local optimal solutions is the best one can hope to get in most cases. To achieve this goal, we start by establishing an equivalence between the original optimistic problem an a certain set-valued optimization problem. Next, we develop optimality conditions for the latter problem and show that they generalize all the results currently known in the literature on optimistic bilevel optimization. Our approach is then extended to multiobjective bilevel optimization, and completely new results are derived for problems with vector-valued upper- and lower-level objective functions. Numerical implementations of the results of this paper are provided on some examples, in order to demonstrate how the original optimistic problem can be solved in practice, by means of a special set-valued optimization problem

Opportunities for Price Manipulation by Aggregators in Electricity Markets

Aggregators are playing an increasingly crucial role in the integration of renewable generation in power systems. However, the intermittent nature of renewable generation makes market interactions of aggregators difficult to monitor and regulate, raising concerns about potential market manipulation by aggregators. In this paper, we study this issue by quantifying the profit an aggregator can obtain through strategic curtailment of generation in an electricity market. We show that, while the problem of maximizing the benefit from curtailment is hard in general, efficient algorithms exist when the topology of the network is radial (acyclic). Further, we highlight that significant increases in profit are possible via strategic curtailment in practical settings