Stackelberg games are a classic example of bilevel optimization problems,
which are often encountered in game theory and economics. These are complex
problems with a hierarchical structure, where one optimization task is nested
within the other. Despite a number of studies on handling bilevel optimization
problems, these problems still remain a challenging territory, and existing
methodologies are able to handle only simple problems with few variables under
assumptions of continuity and differentiability. In this paper, we consider a
special case of a multi-period multi-leader-follower Stackelberg competition
model with non-linear cost and demand functions and discrete production
variables. The model has potential applications, for instance in aircraft
manufacturing industry, which is an oligopoly where a few giant firms enjoy a
tremendous commitment power over the other smaller players. We solve cases with
different number of leaders and followers, and show how the entrance or exit of
a player affects the profits of the other players. In the presence of various
model complexities, we use a computationally intensive nested evolutionary
strategy to find an optimal solution for the model. The strategy is evaluated
on a test-suite of bilevel problems, and it has been shown that the method is
successful in handling difficult bilevel problems.Comment: To be published in Computers and Operations Researc