2,898 research outputs found
Nominal Abstraction
Recursive relational specifications are commonly used to describe the
computational structure of formal systems. Recent research in proof theory has
identified two features that facilitate direct, logic-based reasoning about
such descriptions: the interpretation of atomic judgments through recursive
definitions and an encoding of binding constructs via generic judgments.
However, logics encompassing these two features do not currently allow for the
definition of relations that embody dynamic aspects related to binding, a
capability needed in many reasoning tasks. We propose a new relation between
terms called nominal abstraction as a means for overcoming this deficiency. We
incorporate nominal abstraction into a rich logic also including definitions,
generic quantification, induction, and co-induction that we then prove to be
consistent. We present examples to show that this logic can provide elegant
treatments of binding contexts that appear in many proofs, such as those
establishing properties of typing calculi and of arbitrarily cascading
substitutions that play a role in reducibility arguments.Comment: To appear in the Journal of Information and Computatio
On an Intuitionistic Logic for Pragmatics
We reconsider the pragmatic interpretation of intuitionistic logic [21]
regarded as a logic of assertions and their justications and its relations with classical
logic. We recall an extension of this approach to a logic dealing with assertions
and obligations, related by a notion of causal implication [14, 45]. We focus on
the extension to co-intuitionistic logic, seen as a logic of hypotheses [8, 9, 13] and on
polarized bi-intuitionistic logic as a logic of assertions and conjectures: looking at the
S4 modal translation, we give a denition of a system AHL of bi-intuitionistic logic
that correctly represents the duality between intuitionistic and co-intuitionistic logic,
correcting a mistake in previous work [7, 10]. A computational interpretation of cointuitionism
as a distributed calculus of coroutines is then used to give an operational
interpretation of subtraction.Work on linear co-intuitionism is then recalled, a linear
calculus of co-intuitionistic coroutines is dened and a probabilistic interpretation
of linear co-intuitionism is given as in [9]. Also we remark that by extending the
language of intuitionistic logic we can express the notion of expectation, an assertion
that in all situations the truth of p is possible and that in a logic of expectations
the law of double negation holds. Similarly, extending co-intuitionistic logic, we can
express the notion of conjecture that p, dened as a hypothesis that in some situation
the truth of p is epistemically necessary
Theories of truth based on four-valued infectious logics
Infectious logics are systems that have a truth-value that is assigned to a compound formula whenever it is assigned to one of its components. This paper studies four-valued infectious logics as the basis of transparent theories of truth. This take is motivated as a way to treat different pathological sentences differently, namely, by allowing some of them to be truth-value gluts and some others to be truth-value gaps and as a way to treat the semantic pathology suffered by at least some of these sentences as infectious. This leads us to consider four distinct four-valued logics: one where truth-value gaps are infectious, but gluts are not; one where truth-value gluts are infectious, but gaps are not; and two logics where both gluts and gaps are infectious, in some sense. Additionally, we focus on the proof theory of these systems, by offering a discussion of two related topics. On the one hand, we prove some limitations regarding the possibility of providing standard Gentzen sequent calculi for these systems, by dualizing and extending some recent results for infectious logics. On the other hand, we provide sound and complete four-sided sequent calculi, arguing that the most important technical and philosophical features taken into account to usually prefer standard calculi are, indeed, enjoyed by the four-sided systems
Tool support for reasoning in display calculi
We present a tool for reasoning in and about propositional sequent calculi.
One aim is to support reasoning in calculi that contain a hundred rules or
more, so that even relatively small pen and paper derivations become tedious
and error prone. As an example, we implement the display calculus D.EAK of
dynamic epistemic logic. Second, we provide embeddings of the calculus in the
theorem prover Isabelle for formalising proofs about D.EAK. As a case study we
show that the solution of the muddy children puzzle is derivable for any number
of muddy children. Third, there is a set of meta-tools, that allows us to adapt
the tool for a wide variety of user defined calculi
Non-normal modalities in variants of Linear Logic
This article presents modal versions of resource-conscious logics. We
concentrate on extensions of variants of Linear Logic with one minimal
non-normal modality. In earlier work, where we investigated agency in
multi-agent systems, we have shown that the results scale up to logics with
multiple non-minimal modalities. Here, we start with the language of
propositional intuitionistic Linear Logic without the additive disjunction, to
which we add a modality. We provide an interpretation of this language on a
class of Kripke resource models extended with a neighbourhood function: modal
Kripke resource models. We propose a Hilbert-style axiomatization and a
Gentzen-style sequent calculus. We show that the proof theories are sound and
complete with respect to the class of modal Kripke resource models. We show
that the sequent calculus admits cut elimination and that proof-search is in
PSPACE. We then show how to extend the results when non-commutative connectives
are added to the language. Finally, we put the logical framework to use by
instantiating it as logics of agency. In particular, we propose a logic to
reason about the resource-sensitive use of artefacts and illustrate it with a
variety of examples
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