28,515 research outputs found
Towards a Logic of Epistemic Theory of Measurement
We propose a logic to reason about data collected by a num- ber of measurement systems. The semantic of this logic is grounded on the epistemic theory of measurement that gives a central role to measure- ment devices and calibration. In this perspective, the lack of evidences (in the available data) for the truth or falsehood of a proposition requires the introduction of a third truth-value (the undetermined). Moreover, the data collected by a given source are here represented by means of a possible world, which provide a contextual view on the objects in the domain. We approach (possibly) conflicting data coming from different sources in a social choice theoretic fashion: we investigate viable opera- tors to aggregate data and we represent them in our logic by means of suitable (minimal) modal operators
Strict finitism, feasibility, and the sorites
This paper bears on four topics: observational predicates and phenomenal properties, vagueness, strict finitism as a philosophy of mathematics, and the analysis of feasible computability. It is argued that reactions to strict finitism point towards a seman- tics for vague predicates in the form of nonstandard models of weak arithmetical theories of the sort originally introduced to characterize the notion of feasibility as understood in computational complexity theory. The approach described eschews the use of non-classical logic and related devices like degrees of truth or supervaluation. Like epistemic approaches to vagueness, it may thus be smoothly integrated with the use of classical model theory as widely employed in natural language semantics. But unlike epistemicism, the described approach fails to imply either the existence of sharp boundaries or the failure of tolerance for soritical predicates. Applications of measurement theory (in the sense of Krantz et al. 1971) to vagueness in the nonstandard setting are also explored
Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence
Evidentialism is the thesis, roughly, that one’s beliefs should fit one’s evidence. The
enkratic principle is the thesis, roughly, that one’s beliefs should "line up" with one’s
beliefs about which beliefs one ought to have. While both theses have seemed attractive to many, they jointly entail the controversial thesis that self-misleading evidence is impossible. That is to say, if evidentialism and the enkratic principle are both true, one’s evidence cannot support certain false beliefs about which beliefs one’s evidence supports. Recently, a number of epistemologists have challenged the thesis that self-misleading evidence is impossible on the grounds that misleading higher-order evidence does not have the kind of strong and systematic defeating force that would be needed to rule out the possibility of such self-misleading evidence. Here I respond to this challenge by proposing an account of higher-order defeat that does, indeed, render self-misleading evidence impossible. Central to the proposal is the idea that higher-order evidence acquires its normative force by influencing which conditional beliefs it is rational to have. What emerges, I argue, is an independently plausible view of higher-order evidence, which has the additional benefit of allowing us to reconcile evidentialism with the enkratic principle
Epistemological vs. Ontological Relationalism in Quantum Mechanics: Relativism or Realism?
In this paper we investigate the history of relationalism and its present use
in some interpretations of quantum mechanics. In the first part of this article
we will provide a conceptual analysis of the relation between substantivalism,
relationalism and relativism in the history of both physics and philosophy. In
the second part, we will address some relational interpretations of quantum
mechanics, namely, Bohr's relational approach, the modal interpretation by
Kochen, the perspectival modal version by Bene and Dieks and the relational
interpretation by Rovelli. We will argue that all these interpretations ground
their understanding of relations in epistemological terms. By taking into
account the analysis on the first part of our work, we intend to highlight the
fact that there is a different possibility for understanding quantum mechanics
in relational terms which has not been yet considered within the foundational
literature. This possibility is to consider relations in (non-relativist)
ontological terms. We will argue that such an understanding might be capable of
providing a novel approach to the problem of representing what quantum
mechanics is really talking about.Comment: Welcome
Scientific Instruments and Epistemology Engines
This article outlines the gradually changing attitude towards instruments and materials in the philosophy and historiography of science and confronts contemporary revaluations of the material culture of science with Hans-Jörg Rhein- berger's concept of an experimental system and Don Ihde's notion of an epistemology engine
Immanent Powers versus Causal Powers (Propensities, Latencies and Dispositions) in Quantum Mechanics
In this paper we compare two different notions of 'power', both of which
attempt to provide a realist understanding of quantum mechanics grounded on the
potential mode of existence. For this propose we will begin by introducing two
different notions of potentiality present already within Aristotelian
metaphysics, namely, irrational potentiality and rational potentiality. After
discussing the role played by potentiality within classical and quantum
mechanics, we will address the notion of causal power which is directly related
to irrational potentiality and has been adopted by many interpretations of QM.
We will then present the notion of immanent power which relates to rational
potentiality and argue that this new concept presents important advantages
regarding the possibilities it provides for understanding in a novel manner the
theory of quanta. We end our paper with a comparison between both notions of
'power', stressing some radical differences between them.Comment: Forthcoming in: Probing the Meaning and Structure of Quantum
Mechanics, D. Aerts, M.L. Dalla Chiara, C. de Ronde and D. Krause (Eds.),
World Scientific, Singapore. arXiv admin note: text overlap with
arXiv:1310.453
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