An Appraisal of Cashless Economy Policy in Development of Nigerian Economy

This paper is motivated by the seeming inadequacy of Nigeria in adopting and implementing the cashless economy policy. The problem is defined by Nigeria’s backdrop level of development both technologically and educationally. The objective of the study is to examine its significant benefits and essential elements, and to check the extent to which it can enhance the growth of financial stability in the country. Two research hypotheses were formulated in line with the objectives of the study. The descriptive research design was adopted for the study with a sample size of 68. The convenience sampling technique was used. The questionnaire which was structured was the main instrument used for data collection. The data collected was subjected to face validity test, and was tested with ANOVA and chi – square (x2) technique was used to test the hypotheses. The results indicate that: majority of Nigerians are already aware of the policy and majority agree that the policy will help fight against corruption/money laundering and reduce the risk of carrying cash. Major problems envisaged to hamper the implementation of the policy are cyber fraud and illiteracy. Based on the findings some recommendations made are: the government should adopt a different strategy to educate the non-literate Nigerians about the cashless economy; and a framework should be worked out to provide cyber security in Nigeria. Key Words: cashless economy, financial stability, Policy development and Nigerian econom

Quantifying transport, regulatory and other costs of India–Bangladesh trade

In the globalised world, international borders ought to be mere lines on the map. But recent studies have shown that informal trade barriers still exist, and inhibit trade, particularly so in the developing countries. This can arise due to a host of factors such as complex customs procedures, which sometimes change, and capacity constraints, given limited facilities and/or corruption at the border. However, non-tariff barriers of various sorts and structural impediments are less obvious and perhaps more interesting, but also much more difficult to measure directly. In this context, this paper attempts to quantify the relevant costs resulting from informal barriers that impinge upon trade between India and Bangladesh through the land customs stations (LCSs) at Petrapole (West Bengal) and Benapole (Bangladesh). The study is based on primary data collated through surveys conducted in West Bengal. Our estimates show that the aggregate delay pertaining to all the phases of exports turns out to be approximately four days for a single shipment. It also shows that the additional transaction costs in terms of delays and speed money incurred by the Indian exporters during trading with Bangladesh is about 10 per cent of shipment value. The present study has shown that informal barriers/para-tariff in India-Bangladesh trade are already high and further trade liberalisation without improving the infrastructure would be counterproductive. The paper ends with feasible policy recommendations to make trade between India and Bangladesh more vibrant.

Just Rewards?Local Politics and Public ResourceAllocation in South India

This paper uses data on elected village councils in South India to examine thepolitical economy of public resource allocation. We find that the pattern ofpolicy-making reflects politicians' self-interest. Elected councillors benefit fromimproved personal access to public resources. In addition, the headcouncillor's group identity and residence influences public resource allocation.While electoral incentives do not eliminate politician opportunism, votersappear able to use their electoral clout to gain greater access to publicresources.decentralization, India, Panchayat.

Is Government in India Becoming More Responsive? Has Democratic Decentralisation Made a Difference? (SWP 8)

This paper reviews evidence and argument concerning the quality of government in India, especially provision of basic services, and the extent to which democratic decentralization has helped to make government more responsive. As Lant Pritchett has put it, India appears in many ways to be a ‘flailing state’. India is quite clearly not a ‘failing state’ – the central functions of government are often performed with exceptional competence – but the delivery of basic services is generally very poor. The paper explores why poor people, who tend to participate more actively in electoral politics than wealthier people, and who would greatly benefit from better public health, education and other services, do not hold politicians (or the bureaucrats in charge of service delivery) democratically accountable for poor public provisioning. Why has the implementation of progressive social legislation been left substantially to judicial activism? Answers to these questions are found in the idea that India is a ‘patronage democracy’. In these circumstances, government appears most responsive in states with the highest newspaper circulation and a history of lower-class political mobilisation (Kerala, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal). Democratic decentralization, through the panchayat system of local government, remains controversial as to its implementation and long-term outcomes, but achievements thus far have been limited