Towards Efficient Data Valuation Based on the Shapley Value

"How much is my data worth?" is an increasingly common question posed by organizations and individuals alike. An answer to this question could allow, for instance, fairly distributing profits among multiple data contributors and determining prospective compensation when data breaches happen. In this paper, we study the problem of data valuation by utilizing the Shapley value, a popular notion of value which originated in coopoerative game theory. The Shapley value defines a unique payoff scheme that satisfies many desiderata for the notion of data value. However, the Shapley value often requires exponential time to compute. To meet this challenge, we propose a repertoire of efficient algorithms for approximating the Shapley value. We also demonstrate the value of each training instance for various benchmark datasets

DU-Shapley: A Shapley Value Proxy for Efficient Dataset Valuation

Many machine learning problems require performing dataset valuation, i.e. to quantify the incremental gain, to some relevant pre-defined utility, of aggregating an individual dataset to others. As seminal examples, dataset valuation has been leveraged in collaborative and federated learning to create incentives for data sharing across several data owners. The Shapley value has recently been proposed as a principled tool to achieve this goal due to formal axiomatic justification. Since its computation often requires exponential time, standard approximation strategies based on Monte Carlo integration have been considered. Such generic approximation methods, however, remain expensive in some cases. In this paper, we exploit the knowledge about the structure of the dataset valuation problem to devise more efficient Shapley value estimators. We propose a novel approximation of the Shapley value, referred to as discrete uniform Shapley (DU-Shapley) which is expressed as an expectation under a discrete uniform distribution with support of reasonable size. We justify the relevancy of the proposed framework via asymptotic and non-asymptotic theoretical guarantees and show that DU-Shapley tends towards the Shapley value when the number of data owners is large. The benefits of the proposed framework are finally illustrated on several dataset valuation benchmarks. DU-Shapley outperforms other Shapley value approximations, even when the number of data owners is small.Comment: 22 page

Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs), but the few results achieved so far are overly specific and do not exploit the full potential of transfers for successful treaty-making. Therefore, in this paper, we develop a framework that enables us to study the role of transfers in a more systematic way. We propose a design for transfers using both internal and external financial resources and making “welfare optimal agreements” self-enforcing. To illustrate the relevance of our transfer scheme for actual treaty-making, we use a well-known integrated assessment model of climate change to show how appropriate transfers may be able to induce almost all countries into signing a self-enforcing climate treaty.Self-enforcing international environmental agreements, Climate policy, Transfers

2D-Shapley: A Framework for Fragmented Data Valuation

Data valuation -- quantifying the contribution of individual data sources to certain predictive behaviors of a model -- is of great importance to enhancing the transparency of machine learning and designing incentive systems for data sharing. Existing work has focused on evaluating data sources with the shared feature or sample space. How to valuate fragmented data sources of which each only contains partial features and samples remains an open question. We start by presenting a method to calculate the counterfactual of removing a fragment from the aggregated data matrix. Based on the counterfactual calculation, we further propose 2D-Shapley, a theoretical framework for fragmented data valuation that uniquely satisfies some appealing axioms in the fragmented data context. 2D-Shapley empowers a range of new use cases, such as selecting useful data fragments, providing interpretation for sample-wise data values, and fine-grained data issue diagnosis.Comment: ICML 202

A Shapley-value Mechanism for Bandwidth On Demand between Datacenters

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Improving Fairness for Data Valuation in Horizontal Federated Learning

Federated learning is an emerging decentralized machine learning scheme that allows multiple data owners to work collaboratively while ensuring data privacy. The success of federated learning depends largely on the participation of data owners. To sustain and encourage data owners' participation, it is crucial to fairly evaluate the quality of the data provided by the data owners and reward them correspondingly. Federated Shapley value, recently proposed by Wang et al. [Federated Learning, 2020], is a measure for data value under the framework of federated learning that satisfies many desired properties for data valuation. However, there are still factors of potential unfairness in the design of federated Shapley value because two data owners with the same local data may not receive the same evaluation. We propose a new measure called completed federated Shapley value to improve the fairness of federated Shapley value. The design depends on completing a matrix consisting of all the possible contributions by different subsets of the data owners. It is shown under mild conditions that this matrix is approximately low-rank by leveraging concepts and tools from optimization. Both theoretical analysis and empirical evaluation verify that the proposed measure does improve fairness in many circumstances