Bid distributions of competing agents in simple models of auctions

Models of auctions or tendering processes are introduced. In every round of bidding the players select their bid from a probability distribution and whenever a bid is unsuccessful, it is discarded and replaced. For simple models, the probability distributions evolve to a stationary power law with the exponent dependent only on the number of players. For most situations, the system converges towards a state where all players are identical. A number of variations of this model are introduced and the application of these models to the dynamics of market makers is discussed. The effect of price uncertainty on bid distributions is presented. An underlying market structure generates heterogenous agents which do not have power law bid distribution in general

Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A Primer

We discuss the literatures on behavioral economics, bounded rationality and experimental economics as they apply to firm behaviour in markets. Topics discussed include the impact of imitative and satisficing behavior by firms, outcomes when managers care about their position relative to peers, the benefits of employing managers whose objective diverges from profit-maximization (including managers who are overconfident or base pricing decisions on sunk costs), the impact of social preferences on the ability to collude, and the incentive for profit-maximizing firms to mimic irrational behavior.behavioral economics, firms, oligopoly, bounded rationality, collusion

Behavioral economics as applied to firms: a primer

We discuss the literatures on behavioral economics, bounded rationality and experimental economics as they apply to firm behavior in markets. Topics discussed include the impact of imitative and satisficing behavior by firms, outcomes when managers care about their position relative to peers, the benefits of employing managers whose objective diverges from profit-maximization (including managers who are overconfident or base pricing decisions on sunk costs), the impact of social preferences on the ability to collude, and the incentive for profit-maximizing firms to mimic irrational behavior.Behavioral economics, bounded rationality, experimental economics, oligopoly, antitrust

Footwear Cluster in Kolkata: A Case of Self-Exploitative Fragmentation

Studies in industrial clusters largely identify the institutional failures and imperfections that prevail in the supply of indivisible inputs and collective action. This paper critically reviews a typical ‘low‐road’ cluster in Kolkata and argues that market failures due to existence of information imperfections, externalities and public good and the institutional failure to resolve those imperfections only partially explain the depressed status in these clusters. The explanation, however, critically rests on the fact of asymmetric power relations and conflicts arising between the trader and the small producer reproducing a production relation that thwarts the high road growth path. The spawning of small enterprises in such clusters, as the argument goes, is a result of self‐exploitative fragmentation that does not flow from entrepreneurship but is a result of survival strategy of labour in the context of depressed wages.contested exchange; self-exploitative fragmentation;

Individual Contacts, Collective Patterns. Prato 1975-97, a story of interactions.

This article presents an agent-based model (ABM) of an Italian textile district where thousands of small firms specialize in particular phases of fabrics production. It is an empirical model because it reconstructs the communications between firms when they arrange production chains. In their turn, production chains reflect into the pattern of road traffic in the geographical areas where the district extends. It is a methodological model because it aims to show that ABMs can be used to reconstruct a web of movements in geographical space. ABMs are proposed as a tool for Hägerstrand’s “time-geography”.Industrial districts, Industrial clusters, Agent-based models, Prato

Improving Kenya's Domestic Horticultural Production and Marketing System: Current Competitiveness, Forces of Change, and Challenges for the Future (Volume II: Horticultural Marketing)

The specific objectives of this Volume are to: estimate the share of domestic FFV production going to international and domestic markets; determine the share of imports from Tanzania and Uganda in Kenya’s horticultural markets; investigate the competitiveness of Kenya’s horticultural produce in local and regional markets; determine the current and likely future share of key marketing channels in Kenya’s domestic FFV marketing system, especially “modern” channels such as supermarkets and more traditional channels such as open air markets and kiosks; and recommend steps that should be taken to place Kenya’s domestic horticulture in a position to compete favorably in local and regional markets.Food Security, Food Policy, Horticultural Marketing, Kenya, Crop Production/Industries, Q18,

Cooperatives: Issues and trends in developing countries Report of a workshop held in Perth, 24-25 March 2003

Agribusiness,