Accountability as a Debiasing Strategy: Testing the Effect of Racial Diversity in Employment Committees

Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with the primary goal of integrating the workforce and eliminating arbitrary bias against minorities and other groups who had been historically excluded. Yet substantial research reveals that racial bias persists and continues to limit opportunities and outcomes for racial minorities in the workplace. Because these denials of opportunity result from myriad individual hiring and promotion decisions made by vast numbers of managers, finding effective strategies to reduce the impact of bias has proven challenging. Some have proposed that a sense of accountability, or “the implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to others,” can decrease bias. This Article examines the conditions under which accountability to a committee of peers reduces racial bias and discrimination. More specifically, this Article provides the first empirical test of whether an employment committee’s racial composition influences the decision-making process. My experimental results reveal that race does in fact matter. Accountability to a racially diverse committee leads to more hiring and promotion of underrepresented minorities than does accountability to a homogeneous committee. Members of diverse committees were more likely to value diversity, acknowledge structural discrimination, and favor inclusive promotion decisions. This suggests that accountability as a debiasing strategy is more nuanced than previously theorized. If simply changing the racial composition of a committee can indeed nudge less discriminatory behavior, we can encourage these changes through voluntary organizational policies like having an NFL “Rooney Rule” for hiring committees. In addition, Title VII can be interpreted to hold employers liable under a negligence theory to encourage the types of changes that yield inclusive hires and promotions

Unbounding Rationality: Observing and Mitigating K-12 Public Education Administrators’ Cognitive Bias

Humans tend to simplify complex decisions by employing cognitive bias(es). Cognitively biased decision-making by public administrators can be adversely consequential for public organizations, public employees, and the public interest. Given the historical scope of experimental research on cognitive bias in the social and physical sciences, public administration scholars should continue to advance such research across various public sectors. This dissertation study responded to the long-ago call of Herbert Simon for empirical research situated in specific public or political contexts. This qual-QUAN mixed-method study had two main aims: (1) explore decisions that K-12 public education administrators make in personnel management and organizational policymaking; and (2) observe and mitigate the influences of anchoring bias and attribute framing bias in decision-making by these administrators. Qualitative results indicate that school district superintendents and school principals make decisions in highly collaborative contexts. This data informed the quantitative survey-in-the-field. Quantitative results indicate that anchoring bias significantly influences personnel management decisions, and that attribute framing bias significantly influences organizational policy decisions. Also, the consider-the-opposite (COS) intervention significantly mitigated anchoring bias and attribute framing bias about 67% of the time. Finally, for three of six anchoring bias scenarios, participant age and COS feedback quality significantly predicted COS interventional influence. And, for four of six attribute framing bias scenarios, COS feedback quality significantly predicted COS interventional influence. Recommendations for research and practice are advanced, including debiasing procedures implemented on the organizational level

Cognitive biases, heuristics and decision-making in design for behaviour change

Copyright @ 2012 Social Science Electronic PublishingMuch human behaviour can be seen as decision-making, and so understanding and influencing those decision-making processes could be an important component in design for behaviour change. This paper examines the 'heuristics and biases' approach to modelling decision-making, and attempts to extract insights which are relevant to designers working to influence user behaviour for social or environmental benefit -- either by exploiting biases, or helping to counter those which lead to undesirable behaviour. Areas covered include a number of specific cognitive biases in detail, and the alternative perspective of Gigerenzer and others, who contend (following Herbert Simon) that many heuristics potentially leading to biases are actually ecologically rational, and part of humans' adaptive responses to situations. The design relevance of this is briefly considered, and implications for designers are summarised

Conceptual Foundations on Debiasing for Machine Learning-Based Software

Machine learning (ML)-based software’s deployment has raised serious concerns about its pervasive and harmful consequences for users, business, and society inflicted through bias. While approaches to address bias are increasingly recognized and developed, our understanding of debiasing remains nascent. Research has yet to provide a comprehensive coverage of this vast growing field, much of which is not embedded in theoretical understanding. Conceptualizing and structuring the nature, effect, and implementation of debiasing instruments could provide necessary guidance for practitioners investing in debiasing efforts. We develop a taxonomy that classifies debiasing instrument characteristics into seven key dimensions. We evaluate and refine our taxonomy through nine experts and apply our taxonomy to three actual debiasing instruments, drawing lessons for the design and choice of appropriate instruments. Bridging the gaps between our conceptual understanding of debiasing for ML-based software and its organizational implementation, we discuss contributions and future research

A Framework for Theory Development in Design Science Research: Multiple Perspectives

One point of convergence in the many recent discussions on design science research in information systems (DSRIS) has been the desirability of a directive design theory (ISDT) as one of the outputs from a DSRIS project. However, the literature on theory development in DSRIS is very sparse. In this paper, we develop a framework to support theory development in DSRIS and explore its potential from multiple perspectives. The framework positions ISDT in a hierarchy of theories in IS design that includes a type of theory for describing how and why the design functions: Design-relevant explanatory/predictive theory (DREPT). DREPT formally captures the translation of general theory constructs from outside IS to the design realm. We introduce the framework from a knowledge representation perspective and then provide typological and epistemological perspectives. We begin by motivating the desirability of both directive-prescriptive theory (ISDT) and explanatory-predictive theory (DREPT) for IS design science research and practice. Since ISDT and DREPT are both, by definition, mid-range theories, we examine the notion of mid-range theory in other fields and then in the specific context of DSRIS. We position both types of theory in Gregor’s (2006) taxonomy of IS theory in our typological view of the framework. We then discuss design theory semantics from an epistemological view of the framework, relating it to an idealized design science research cycle. To demonstrate the potential of the framework for DSRIS, we use it to derive ISDT and DREPT from two published examples of DSRIS

The power of past performance in multidimensional supplier evaluation and supplier selection: Debiasing anchoring bias and its knock-on effects

© 2024 The Author. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY), https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This research examines how anchoring bias affects managers’ multi-dimensional evaluations of supplier performance, supplier selection, and the effectiveness of two debiasing techniques. We consider the supplier past performance in one performance dimension as the anchor and investigate whether and how this anchor would have a knock-on effects on evaluating a supplier’s performance in other dimensions. We conducted two online experimental studies (Study 1, sample size = 104 and Study 2, sample size = 408). Study 1 adopts a 2 x 1 (high anchor vs. low anchor) between-subjects factorial experimental design, and Study 2 is a 3 (debiasing: no, consider-the-opposite, mental-mapping) x 2 (high anchor vs. low anchor) between-subjects factorial design. The results from Studies 1 and 2 suggest that when a supplier has received a low evaluation score in one dimension in the past, participants assign the same supplier lower scores in the other dimensions compared to a supplier that has obtained a high score in the past. We also find that anchoring has a knock-on effect on how likely participants are to choose the same supplier in the future. Our findings highlight the asymmetric effectiveness of ‘consider-the-opposite’ and ‘mental-mapping’ debiasing techniques. This research is the first study that examines how anchoring bias managers’ evaluations in a multi-dimensional setting and its knock-on effects. It also explores the effectiveness of two low-cost debiasing techniques. A crucial practical implication is that suppliers’ exceptionally good or disappointing past performance affects the judgement of supply managers. Hence, managers should use consider-the-opposite or mental-mapping techniques to debias the effect of high and low anchors, respectively.Peer reviewe

Cognitive debiasing 2: Impediments to and strategies for change

In a companion paper, we proposed that cognitive debiasing is a skill essential in developing sound clinical reasoning to mitigate the incidence of diagnostic failure. We reviewed the origins of cognitive biases and some proposed mechanisms for how debiasing processes might work. In this paper, we first outline a general schema of how cognitive change occurs and the constraints that may apply. We review a variety of individual factors, many of them biases themselves, which may be impediments to change. We then examine the major strategies that have been developed in the social sciences and in medicine to achieve cognitive and affective debiasing, including the important concept of forcing functions. The abundance and rich variety of approaches that exist in the literature and in individual clinical domains illustrate the difficulties inherent in achieving cognitive change, and also the need for such interventions. Ongoing cognitive debiasing is arguably the most important feature of the critical thinker and the well-calibrated mind. We outline three groups of suggested interventions going forward: educational strategies, workplace strategies and forcing functions. We stress the importance of ambient and contextual influences on the quality of individual decision making and the need to address factors known to impair calibration of the decision maker. We also emphasise the importance of introducing these concepts and corollary development of training in critical thinking in the undergraduate level in medical education

Fraud by Hindsight

In securities-fraud cases, courts routinely admonish plaintiffs that they are not permitted to rely on allegations of fraud by hindsight. In effect, courts disfavor plaintiffs\u27 use of evidence of bad outcomes to support claims of securities fraud. Disfavoring hindsight evidence appears to tap into a well known, well-understood, and intuitively accessible problem of human judgment of 20/20 hindsight. Events come to seem predictable after unfolding, and hence, bad outcomes must have been predicted by people in a position to make forecasts. Psychologists call this phenomenon the hindsight bias. The popularity of this doctrine among judges deciding securities cases suggests that judges actively seek techniques that enable them to correct for psychological biases that might otherwise affect their decision-making. This paper assesses the hypothesis that judges have adopted the fraud-by-hindsight doctrine so as to avoid erroneous judgment infected with the hindsight bias. We find that although judges have identified a real problem in human judgment, they are not developing a doctrine to remedy the influence of hindsight on judgment. Rather, they are using this problem of human judgment as the justification for expanding their authority to manage the complex, high-stakes securities cases that come before them. The result provides judges with the greater case-management authority they seek, but leaves the securities litigation without a meaningful doctrine to ameliorate the influence of hindsight on judgment