644,709 research outputs found
A Complete Theory of Everything (will be subjective)
Increasingly encompassing models have been suggested for our world. Theories
range from generally accepted to increasingly speculative to apparently bogus.
The progression of theories from ego- to geo- to helio-centric models to
universe and multiverse theories and beyond was accompanied by a dramatic
increase in the sizes of the postulated worlds, with humans being expelled from
their center to ever more remote and random locations. Rather than leading to a
true theory of everything, this trend faces a turning point after which the
predictive power of such theories decreases (actually to zero). Incorporating
the location and other capacities of the observer into such theories avoids
this problem and allows to distinguish meaningful from predictively meaningless
theories. This also leads to a truly complete theory of everything consisting
of a (conventional objective) theory of everything plus a (novel subjective)
observer process. The observer localization is neither based on the
controversial anthropic principle, nor has it anything to do with the
quantum-mechanical observation process. The suggested principle is extended to
more practical (partial, approximate, probabilistic, parametric) world models
(rather than theories of everything). Finally, I provide a justification of
Ockham's razor, and criticize the anthropic principle, the doomsday argument,
the no free lunch theorem, and the falsifiability dogma.Comment: 26 LaTeX page
The non-unique Universe
The purpose of this paper is to elucidate, by means of concepts and theorems
drawn from mathematical logic, the conditions under which the existence of a
multiverse is a logical necessity in mathematical physics, and the implications
of Godel's incompleteness theorem for theories of everything.
Three conclusions are obtained in the final section: (i) the theory of the
structure of our universe might be an undecidable theory, and this constitutes
a potential epistemological limit for mathematical physics, but because such a
theory must be complete, there is no ontological barrier to the existence of a
final theory of everything; (ii) in terms of mathematical logic, there are two
different types of multiverse: classes of non-isomorphic but elementarily
equivalent models, and classes of model which are both non-isomorphic and
elementarily inequivalent; (iii) for a hypothetical theory of everything to
have only one possible model, and to thereby negate the possible existence of a
multiverse, that theory must be such that it admits only a finite model
Feynman versus Bakamjian-Thomas in Light Front Dynamics
We compare the Bakamjian-Thomas (BT) formulation of relativistic few-body
systems with light front field theories that maintain closer contact with
Feynman diagrams. We find that Feynman diagrams distinguish Melosh rotations
and other kinematical quantities belonging to various composite subsystem
frames that correspond to different loop integrals. The BT formalism knows only
the rest frame of the whole composite system, where everything is evaluated.Comment: 5 page
David Foster Wallace on the Good Life
This chapter presents David Foster Wallace's views about three positions regarding the good life—ironism, hedonism, and narrative theories. Ironism involves distancing oneself from everything one says or does, and putting on Wallace's so-called “mask of ennui.” Wallace said that the notion appeals to ironists because it insulates them from criticism. However, he reiterated that ironists can be criticized for failing to value anything. Hedonism states that a good life consists in pleasure. Wallace rejected such a notion, doubting that pleasure could play a fundamental role in the good life. Lastly, narrative theories characterize the good life by fidelity to a unified narrative -- a systematic story about one's life, composed of a set of ends or principles according to which one lives. Wallace believed that these theories turn people into spectators, rather than the participants in their own lives
Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition
Externalist theories of justification create the possibility of cases in which everything appears to one relevantly similar with respect to two propositions, yet one proposition is justified while the other is not. Internalists find this difficult to accept, because it seems irrational in such a case to affirm one proposition and not the other. The underlying internalist intuition supports a specific internalist theory, Phenomenal Conservatism, on which epistemic justification is conferred by appearances
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