Reforging Ockham’s Razor: an enquiry into the ontology of parsimony arguments

Nearly every philosopher in English-speaking world has heard of Ockham’s Razor, which is given in one of two ways, don’t multiply entities beyond necessity and all things being equal choose the simpler explanation. Yet it is unclear from the scholarship whether the use of Ockham’s Razor is justified in science and philosophy. However, if it can be shown to ‘get’ us truth, it would gain an unequivocal justification, as disputes that are continued after the parties to the substantive truth of one or the other are defined as frivolous. Alternative, one may contend that explanation could have other criteria of success. The implication of a direct connection between the razor and truth comes with ontological commitments, namely a commitment to realism (about universals) and philosophical theism. This is contrary to the razor’s use as a tool of nominalism and naturalism. I argue in this thesis there that the only possible non-circular justification for Ockham’s Razor is truth and that therefore certain philosophical positions are excluded from using the razor to animate their positions. There is an additional, second criteria for the success of our inquiry, namely the justification must in some way be consistent with the razor, which means the chosen explanation for the razor, must be simpler than any of its rivals and not have superfluous entities, otherwise our justification would be contrary to the advice of the razor. We are presented with a Scylla and Charybdis type problem, we avoid a circularity on the one hand and on the other we must not contradict the razor itself, these are contrary intellectual impulses. So firstly I will look at disciplines outside philosophy for some initial inspiration. If we could answer this question in a ‘non’ philosophical way, the problem would have solved itself in a way that require little change of practice. If lawyers or scientist can account for the razor properly, there is not really a problem of justification, at least not a philosophical one. Second, I consider the realist and theist positions, namely an argument of Aristotle’s in the Posterior Analytics and part of Aquinas’ On the Divine Simplicity. Further, I consider the work of Ockham as a nominalist. Lastly, I consider modern and contemporary philosophy, in the form of Hume, Quine and Sober (a modern writer on the razor). The aim here is to ‘stress test’ the philosophical resources of the various systems and analyse the results to see if they can produce a non-circular result.Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 202

Humean laws, explanatory circularity, and the aim of scientific explanation

One of the main challenges confronting Humean accounts of natural law is that Humean laws appear to be unable to play the explanatory role of laws in scientific practice. The worry is roughly that if the laws are just regularities in the particular matters of fact (as the Humean would have it), then they cannot also explain the particular matters of fact, on pain of circularity. Loewer (2012) has defended Humeanism, arguing that this worry only arises if we fail to distinguish between scientific and metaphysical explanations. However, Lange (2013, 2018) has argued that scientific and metaphysical explanations are linked by a transitivity principle, which would undercut Loewer's defense and re-ignite the circularity worry for the Humean. I argue here that the Humean has antecedent reasons to doubt that there are any systematic connections between scientific and metaphysical explanations. The reason is that the Humean should think that scientific and metaphysical explanation have disparate aims, and therefore that neither form of explanation is beholden to the other in its pronouncements about what explains what. Consequently, the Humean has every reason to doubt that Lange's transitivity principle obtains

The Perils of Parsimony

It is widely thought in philosophy and elsewhere that parsimony is a theoretical virtue in that if T1 is more parsimonious than T2, then T1 is preferable to T2, other things being equal. This thesis admits of many distinct precisifications. I focus on a relatively weak precisification on which preferability is a matter of probability, and argue that it is false. This is problematic for various alternative precisifications, and even for Inference to the Best Explanation as standardly understood

Debunking The Hellenistic Myth: Why Christians Should Believe That God Is In Time

In this essay I will try to convince you: (1) that the question of God’s relation to time is of practical relevance for every believer (2) that the idea of God being outside time is a philosophically untenable concept which creates major clashes with Christian doctrine and therefore that every Christian should adopt some temporalist view of God To do that, I will present four arguments against the “outside time” view of God. I then briefly treat the question where the idea of God’s timelessness presumably came from and conclude with an outlook on problems that temporalist accounts of God must face

Complex Philosophy

As science, knowledge, and ideas evolve and are increased and refined, the branches of philosophy in charge of describing them should also be increased and refined. In this work we try to expand some ideas as a response to the recent approach from several sciences to complex systems. Because of their novelty, some of these ideas might require further refinement and may seem unfinished, but we need to start with something. Only with their propagation and feedback from critics they might be improved. We make a brief introduction to complex systems, for then defining <em>abstraction levels</em>. Abstraction levels represent simplicities and regularities in nature. We make an ontological distinction of absolute being and relative being, and then discuss issues on causality, metaphysics, and determinism

Theism, naturalism, and scientific realism

Scientific knowledge is not merely a matter of reconciling theories and laws with data and observations. Science presupposes a number of metatheoretic shaping principles in order to judge good methods and theories from bad. Some of these principles are metaphysical and some are methodological. While many shaping principles have endured since the scientific revolution, others have changed in response to conceptual pressures both from within science and without. Many of them have theistic roots. For example, the notion that nature conforms to mathematical laws flows directly from the early modern presupposition that there is a divine Lawgiver. This interplay between theism and shaping principles is often unappreciated in discussions about the relation between science and religion. Today, of course, naturalists reject the influence of theism and prefer to do science on their terms. But as Robert Koons and Alvin Plantinga have argued, this is more difficult than is typically assumed. In particular, they argue, metaphysical naturalism is in conflict with several metatheoretic shaping principles, especially explanatory virtues such as simplicity and with scientific realism more broadly. These arguments will be discussed as well as possible responses. In the end, theism is able to provide justification for the philosophical foundations of science that naturalism cannot

A ’Trinitarian’ Theory of the Self

I argue that the self is simple metaphysically, whilst being complex psychologically and that the persona that links these moments might be dubbed ”creativity’ or ”imagination’. This theory is trinitarian because it ascribes to the self these three ”features’ or ”moments’ and they bear at least some analogy with the Persons of the Trinity, as understood within the neo- platonic, Augustinian tradition