The second-price auction solves King Solomon's dilemma

The planner wants to give k identical, indivisible objects to the top k valuation agents at zero costs. Each agent knows her own valuation of the object and whether it is among the top k. Modify the (k+1)st-price sealed-bid auction by introducing a small participation fee and the option not to participate in it. This simple mechanism implements the desired outcome in iteratively undominated strategies. Moreover, no pair of agents can profitably deviate from the equilibrium by coordinating their strategies or bribing each other.Comment: 12 pages;To appear in Japanese Economic Revie

The second-price auction solves King Solomon's dilemma

Consider the problem of allocating k identical, indivisible objects among n agents, where k is less than n. The planner's objective is to give the objects to the top k valuation agents at zero costs to the planner and the agents. Each agent knows her own valuation of the object and whether it is among the top k. Modify the (k+1)st-price sealed-bid auction by introducing a small participation fee and the option not to participate in it. This strikingly simple mechanism (modified auction) implements the desired outcome in iteratively weakly undominated strategies. Moreover, no pair of agents can profitably deviate from the equilibrium by coordinating their strategies or bribing each other

Winona Daily News

https://openriver.winona.edu/winonadailynews/1928/thumbnail.jp

Revealing Options

Legal scholars are beginning to explore how the options template, borrowed from finance, can be applied to legal problems outside the realm of finance. This Article uses the options framework to add a new, intermediate entitlement form to the property rule/liability rule schema pioneered by Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed. Building on a fascinating but underused literature on self-assessed valuation mechanisms, I propose an entitlement form that would require entitlement holders to create options for others (or for their future selves). These entitlements subject to self-made options, or ESSMOs, are capable of powerfully and elegantly addressing one of the most intractable problems in property theory - unknown subjective valuations. By requiring a party to package her subjective valuation in the form of an option - that is, a revealing option - the ESSMO dodges the primary problems associated with property rules and liability rules while harnessing advantages of each. The real payoff of this approach comes in dynamic, multiparty commons settings. Extending my earlier work, I show how the ESSMO can transform environmental controls, land conservation, and aesthetic controls in private neighborhoods. I also illustrate how revealing options can address intertemporal collective action problems in institutions, as well as time-inconsistent preferences in individuals (such as the smoker who wishes to quit)

The second-price auction solves King Solomon's dilemma

Consider the problem of allocating k identical, indivisible objects among n agents, where k is less than n. The planner's objective is to give the objects to the top k valuation agents at zero costs to the planner and the agents. Each agent knows her own valuation of the object and whether it is among the top k. Modify the (k+1)st-price sealed-bid auction by introducing a small participation fee and the option not to participate in it. This strikingly simple mechanism (modified auction) implements the desired outcome in iteratively weakly undominated strategies. Moreover, no pair of agents can profitably deviate from the equilibrium by coordinating their strategies or bribing each other.Solomon's problem; implementation; entry fees; Olszewski's mechanism; collusion; bribes

Subject Index for First 2,000 Tales.

78 page document compiled by Barbara K. Walker, one of the original three creators of the Archive of the Turkish Oral Narrative (ATON), that serves as a subject index for the first 2,000 Turkish folktales acquired for the oral narrative project