584 research outputs found
The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks
This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker's objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender's objective is diametrically opposed. We apply two benchmark contest success functions (CSFs): the auction CSF and the lottery CSF. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, under the auction CSF, attackers utilize a stochastic âguerilla warfareâ strategy â in which a single random target is attacked â more than 80% of the time. Under the lottery CSF, attackers utilize the stochastic guerilla warfare strategy almost 45% of the time, contrary to the theoretical prediction of an equal allocation of forces across the targets.Colonel Blotto, conflict resolution, weakest-link, best-shot, multi-dimensional resource allocation, experiments.
The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks
This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attackerâs objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defenderâs objective is diametrically opposed. We apply two benchmark contest success functions (CSFs): the auction CSF and the lottery CSF. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, under the auction CSF, attackers utilize a stochastic âguerilla warfareâ strategy â in which a single random target is attacked â more than 80% of the time. Under the lottery CSF, attackers utilize the stochastic guerilla warfare strategy almost 45% of the time, contrary to the theoretical prediction of an equal allocation of forces across the targets.Colonel Blotto, conflict resolution, weakest-link, best-shot, multi-dimensional resource allocation, experiments
The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks
This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attackerâs objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defenderâs objective is diametrically opposed .We apply two benchmark contest success functions (CSFs): the auction CSF and the lottery CSF. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, under the auction CSF, attackers utilize a stochastic âguerilla warfareâ strategy - in which a single random target is attacked - more than 80% of the time. Under the lottery CSF, attackers utilize the stochastic guerilla warfare strategy almost 45% of the time, contrary to the theoretical prediction of an equal allocation of forces across the targets.Colonel Blotto, conflict resolution, weakest-link, best-shot, multi-dimensional resource allocation, experiments
Allocating Limited Resources to Protect a Massive Number of Targets using a Game Theoretic Model
Resource allocation is the process of optimizing the rare resources. In the
area of security, how to allocate limited resources to protect a massive number
of targets is especially challenging. This paper addresses this resource
allocation issue by constructing a game theoretic model. A defender and an
attacker are players and the interaction is formulated as a trade-off between
protecting targets and consuming resources. The action cost which is a
necessary role of consuming resource, is considered in the proposed model.
Additionally, a bounded rational behavior model (Quantal Response, QR), which
simulates a human attacker of the adversarial nature, is introduced to improve
the proposed model. To validate the proposed model, we compare the different
utility functions and resource allocation strategies. The comparison results
suggest that the proposed resource allocation strategy performs better than
others in the perspective of utility and resource effectiveness.Comment: 14 pages, 12 figures, 41 reference
Fight or Flight? Defending Against Sequential Attacks in the Game of Siege
This paper examines theory and behavior in a two-player game of siege, sequential attack and defense. The attackerâs objective is to successfully win at least one battle while the defenderâs objective is to win every battle. Theoretically, the defender either folds immediately or, if his valuation is sufficiently high and the number of battles is sufficiently small, then he has a constant incentive to fight in each battle. Attackers respond to defense with diminishing assaults over time. Consistent with theoretical predictions, our experimental results indicate that the probability of successful defense increases in the defenders valuation and it decreases in the overall number of battles in the contest. However, the defender engages in the contest significantly more often than predicted and the aggregate expenditures by both parties exceed predicted levels. Moreover, both defenders and attackers actually increase the intensity of the fight as they approach the end of the contest.Colonel Blotto, conflict resolution, weakest-link, game of siege, multi-period resource allocation, experiments.
The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks
This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attackerâs objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defenderâs objective is diametrically opposed. We apply two benchmark contest success functions (CSFs): the auction CSF and the lottery CSF. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, under the auction CSF, attackers utilize a stochastic âguerilla warfareâ strategy â in which a single random target is attacked â more than 80% of the time. Under the lottery CSF, attackers utilize the stochastic guerilla warfare strategy almost 45% of the time, contrary to the theoretical prediction of an equal allocation of forces across the targets
Conflicts with Multiple Battlefields
This paper examines conflicts in which performance is measured by the players' success or failure in multiple component conflicts, commonly termed âbattlefieldsâ. In multi-battlefield conflicts, behavioral linkages across battlefields depend both on the technologies of conflict within each battlefield and the nature of economies or diseconomies in how battlefield out-comes and costs aggregate in determining payoffs in the overall conflict.conflict, contest, battlefield, Colonel Blotto Game, auction, lottery
Fight or Flight? Defending Against Sequential Attacks in the Game of Siege
This paper examines theory and behavior in a two-player game of siege, sequential attack and defense. The attackerâs objective is to successfully win at least one battle while the defenderâs objective is to win every battle. Theoretically, the defender either folds immediately or, if his valuation is sufficiently high and the number of battles is sufficiently small, then he has a constant incentive to fight in each battle. Attackers respond to defense with diminishing assaults over time. Consistent with theoretical predictions, our experimental results indicate that the probability of successful defense increases in the defenders valuation and it decreases in the overall number of battles in the contest. However, the defender engages in the contest significantly more often than predicted and the aggregate expenditures by both parties exceed predicted levels. Moreover, both defenders and attackers actually increase the intensity of the fight as they approach the end of the contest
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