The price of connectedness in graph partitioning problems

International audienc

Modeling Complex Networks For (Electronic) Commerce

NYU, Stern School of Business, IOMS Department, Center for Digital Economy Researc

Leverage analysis: A method for locating points of influence in systemic design decisions

Many systemic design processes include the development and analysis of systems models that represent the issue(s) at hand. In causal loop diagram models, phenomena are graphed as nodes, with connections between them indicating a control relationship. Such models provide mechanisms for stakeholder collaboration, problem finding and generative insight and are powerful . These functions are valued in design thinking, but the potential of these models may yet be unfulfilled. We introduce the notion of “leverage measures” to systemic design, adapting techniques from social network analysis and systems dynamics to uncover key structures, relationships and latent leverage positions of modelled phenomena. We demonstrate their utility in a pilot study. By rethinking the logics of leverage, we make better arguments for change and find the place from which to move the world

Topics in social network analysis and network science

This chapter introduces statistical methods used in the analysis of social networks and in the rapidly evolving parallel-field of network science. Although several instances of social network analysis in health services research have appeared recently, the majority involve only the most basic methods and thus scratch the surface of what might be accomplished. Cutting-edge methods using relevant examples and illustrations in health services research are provided

Us Knows Us in the UK: On Director Networks and CEO Compensation

We analyze the relation between CEO compensation and networks of executive and non-executive directors for all listed UK companies over the period 1996-2007. We examine whether networks are built for reasons of information gathering or for the accumulation of managerial influence. Both indirect networks (enabling directors to collect information) and direct networks (leading to more managerial influence) enable the CEO to obtain higher compensation. Direct networks can harm the efficiency of the remuneration contracting in the sense that the performance sensitivity of compensation is then lower. We find that in companies with strong networks and hence busy boards the directors’ monitoring effectiveness is reduced which leads to higher and less performance-sensitive CEO compensation. Our results suggest that it is important to have the ‘right’ type of network: some networks enable a firm to access valuable information whereas others can lead to strong managerial influence that may come at the detriment of the firm and its shareholders. We confirm that there are marked conflicts of interest when a CEO increases his influence by being a member of board committees (such as the remuneration committee) as we observe that his or her compensation is then significantly higher. We also find that hiring remuneration consultants with sizeable client networks also leads to higher CEO compensation especially for larger firms.Executive remuneration;Professional and social networks;Corporate governance;Managerial Power;Remuneration consultants