532 research outputs found
Stability vs. optimality in selfish ring routing
We study the asymmetric atomic selfish routing in ring networks, which has diverse practical applications in network design and analysis. We are concerned with minimizing the maximum latency of source-destination node-pairs over links with linear latencies. We obtain the first constant upper bound on the price of anarchy and significantly improve the existing upper bounds on the price of stability. Moreover, we show that any optimal solution is a good approximate Nash equilibrium. Finally, we present better performance analysis and fast implementation of pseudo-polynomial algorithms for computing approximate Nash equilibria
The Price of Anarchy for Selfish Ring Routing is Two
We analyze the network congestion game with atomic players, asymmetric
strategies, and the maximum latency among all players as social cost. This
important social cost function is much less understood than the average
latency. We show that the price of anarchy is at most two, when the network is
a ring and the link latencies are linear. Our bound is tight. This is the first
sharp bound for the maximum latency objective.Comment: Full version of WINE 2012 paper, 24 page
Nash Social Welfare in Selfish and Online Load Balancing (Short Paper)
In load balancing problems there is a set of clients, each wishing to select a resource from a set of permissible ones, in order to execute a certain task. Each resource has a latency function, which depends on its workload, and a client's cost is the completion time of her chosen resource. Two fundamental variants of load balancing problems are selfish load balancing (aka. load balancing games), where clients are non-cooperative selfish players aimed at minimizing their own cost solely, and online load balancing, where clients appear online and have to be irrevocably assigned to a resource without any knowledge about future requests. We revisit both problems under the objective of minimizing the Nash Social Welfare, i.e., the geometric mean of the clients' costs. To the best of our knowledge, despite being a celebrated welfare estimator in many social contexts, the Nash Social Welfare has not been considered so far as a benchmarking quality measure in load balancing problems. We provide tight bounds on the price of anarchy of pure Nash equilibria and on the competitive ratio of the greedy algorithm under very general latency functions, including polynomial ones. For this particular class, we also prove that the greedy strategy is optimal, as it matches the performance of any possible online algorithm
Tolls For Atomic Congestion Games
In games where selfish players compete for resources, they often arrive at equilibria that are less desirable than the social optimum. To combat this inefficiency, it is common for some central authority to place tolls on the resources in order to guide these players to a more advantageous result. In this thesis, we consider the question of how to add tolls to atomic unsplittable congestion games in order to enforce a specific flow as the unique equilibrium. We consider this question in the context of both routing games and matroid congestion games. In the former case, we show that for the class of series-parallel graphs the nonatomic tolls suffice, and investigate examples for which nonatomic tolls fail. In the latter case, we show that the nonatomic tolls can also be used to impose flows in atomic laminar matroid games
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