2,017 research outputs found

    Uncertainty in Multi-Commodity Routing Networks: When does it help?

    Full text link
    We study the equilibrium behavior in a multi-commodity selfish routing game with many types of uncertain users where each user over- or under-estimates their congestion costs by a multiplicative factor. Surprisingly, we find that uncertainties in different directions have qualitatively distinct impacts on equilibria. Namely, contrary to the usual notion that uncertainty increases inefficiencies, network congestion actually decreases when users over-estimate their costs. On the other hand, under-estimation of costs leads to increased congestion. We apply these results to urban transportation networks, where drivers have different estimates about the cost of congestion. In light of the dynamic pricing policies aimed at tackling congestion, our results indicate that users' perception of these prices can significantly impact the policy's efficacy, and "caution in the face of uncertainty" leads to favorable network conditions.Comment: Currently under revie

    Distributed Flow Scheduling in an Unknown Environment

    Full text link
    Flow scheduling tends to be one of the oldest and most stubborn problems in networking. It becomes more crucial in the next generation network, due to fast changing link states and tremendous cost to explore the global structure. In such situation, distributed algorithms often dominate. In this paper, we design a distributed virtual game to solve the flow scheduling problem and then generalize it to situations of unknown environment, where online learning schemes are utilized. In the virtual game, we use incentives to stimulate selfish users to reach a Nash Equilibrium Point which is valid based on the analysis of the `Price of Anarchy'. In the unknown-environment generalization, our ultimate goal is the minimization of cost in the long run. In order to achieve balance between exploration of routing cost and exploitation based on limited information, we model this problem based on Multi-armed Bandit Scenario and combined newly proposed DSEE with the virtual game design. Armed with these powerful tools, we find a totally distributed algorithm to ensure the logarithmic growing of regret with time, which is optimum in classic Multi-armed Bandit Problem. Theoretical proof and simulation results both affirm this claim. To our knowledge, this is the first research to combine multi-armed bandit with distributed flow scheduling.Comment: 10 pages, 3 figures, conferenc

    Inequality and Network Formation Games

    Full text link
    This paper addresses the matter of inequality in network formation games. We employ a quantity that we are calling the Nash Inequality Ratio (NIR), defined as the maximal ratio between the highest and lowest costs incurred to individual agents in a Nash equilibrium strategy, to characterize the extent to which inequality is possible in equilibrium. We give tight upper bounds on the NIR for the network formation games of Fabrikant et al. (PODC '03) and Ehsani et al. (SPAA '11). With respect to the relationship between equality and social efficiency, we show that, contrary to common expectations, efficiency does not necessarily come at the expense of increased inequality.Comment: 27 pages. 4 figures. Accepted to Internet Mathematics (2014

    Price of Anarchy for Non-atomic Congestion Games with Stochastic Demands

    Get PDF
    We generalize the notions of user equilibrium and system optimum to non-atomic congestion games with stochastic demands. We establish upper bounds on the price of anarchy for three different settings of link cost functions and demand distributions, namely, (a) affine cost functions and general distributions, (b) polynomial cost functions and general positive-valued distributions, and (c) polynomial cost functions and the normal distributions. All the upper bounds are tight in some special cases, including the case of deterministic demands.Comment: 31 page
    • …
    corecore