2,017 research outputs found
Uncertainty in Multi-Commodity Routing Networks: When does it help?
We study the equilibrium behavior in a multi-commodity selfish routing game
with many types of uncertain users where each user over- or under-estimates
their congestion costs by a multiplicative factor. Surprisingly, we find that
uncertainties in different directions have qualitatively distinct impacts on
equilibria. Namely, contrary to the usual notion that uncertainty increases
inefficiencies, network congestion actually decreases when users over-estimate
their costs. On the other hand, under-estimation of costs leads to increased
congestion. We apply these results to urban transportation networks, where
drivers have different estimates about the cost of congestion. In light of the
dynamic pricing policies aimed at tackling congestion, our results indicate
that users' perception of these prices can significantly impact the policy's
efficacy, and "caution in the face of uncertainty" leads to favorable network
conditions.Comment: Currently under revie
Distributed Flow Scheduling in an Unknown Environment
Flow scheduling tends to be one of the oldest and most stubborn problems in
networking. It becomes more crucial in the next generation network, due to fast
changing link states and tremendous cost to explore the global structure. In
such situation, distributed algorithms often dominate. In this paper, we design
a distributed virtual game to solve the flow scheduling problem and then
generalize it to situations of unknown environment, where online learning
schemes are utilized. In the virtual game, we use incentives to stimulate
selfish users to reach a Nash Equilibrium Point which is valid based on the
analysis of the `Price of Anarchy'. In the unknown-environment generalization,
our ultimate goal is the minimization of cost in the long run. In order to
achieve balance between exploration of routing cost and exploitation based on
limited information, we model this problem based on Multi-armed Bandit Scenario
and combined newly proposed DSEE with the virtual game design. Armed with these
powerful tools, we find a totally distributed algorithm to ensure the
logarithmic growing of regret with time, which is optimum in classic
Multi-armed Bandit Problem. Theoretical proof and simulation results both
affirm this claim. To our knowledge, this is the first research to combine
multi-armed bandit with distributed flow scheduling.Comment: 10 pages, 3 figures, conferenc
Inequality and Network Formation Games
This paper addresses the matter of inequality in network formation games. We
employ a quantity that we are calling the Nash Inequality Ratio (NIR), defined
as the maximal ratio between the highest and lowest costs incurred to
individual agents in a Nash equilibrium strategy, to characterize the extent to
which inequality is possible in equilibrium. We give tight upper bounds on the
NIR for the network formation games of Fabrikant et al. (PODC '03) and Ehsani
et al. (SPAA '11). With respect to the relationship between equality and social
efficiency, we show that, contrary to common expectations, efficiency does not
necessarily come at the expense of increased inequality.Comment: 27 pages. 4 figures. Accepted to Internet Mathematics (2014
Price of Anarchy for Non-atomic Congestion Games with Stochastic Demands
We generalize the notions of user equilibrium and system optimum to
non-atomic congestion games with stochastic demands. We establish upper bounds
on the price of anarchy for three different settings of link cost functions and
demand distributions, namely, (a) affine cost functions and general
distributions, (b) polynomial cost functions and general positive-valued
distributions, and (c) polynomial cost functions and the normal distributions.
All the upper bounds are tight in some special cases, including the case of
deterministic demands.Comment: 31 page
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