Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block: Incrementalism and National Climate Change Legislation

This Article examines the effects of incremental domestic legislation on international negotiations to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Mitigating the effects of climate change is a global public good, which, ultimately, only an international agreement can provide. The common presumption (justified or not) is that national legislation is a step forward to an international agreement. This Article analyzes how national legislation can create a demand for international action but can also preempt or frustrate international efforts. The crucial issue, which has been largely ignored thus far, is how incremental steps at the domestic level alter international negotiations. This paper identifies four mechanisms that support the intuitive idea that national legislation will have positive effects: (1) allocating economic resources, (2) providing leadership in international negotiations, (3) creating a demand for a uniform standard, and (4) cultivating public opinion. This Article demonstrates that, on closer examination, each of these mechanisms could hinder international efforts to create a comprehensive agreement. This is by no means an argument against all efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions at the national level. Instead, this Article calls for a more careful analysis the dynamic political impact of domestic proposals

Exploring the financial and investment implications of the Paris Agreement

A global energy transition is underway. Limiting warming to 2°C (or less), as envisaged in the Paris Agreement, will require a major diversion of scheduled investments in the fossil-fuel industry and other high-carbon capital infrastructure towards renewables, energy efficiency, and other low or negative carbon technologies. The article explores the scale of climate finance and investment needs embodied in the Paris Agreement. It reveals that there is little clarity in the numbers from the plethora of sources (official and otherwise) on climate finance and investment. The article compares the US$100 billion target in the Paris Agreement with a range of other financial metrics, such as investment, incremental investment, energy expenditure, energy subsidies, and welfare losses. While the relatively narrowly defined climate finance included in the US$100 billion figure is a fraction of the broader finance and investment needs of climate-change mitigation and adaptation, it is significant when compared to some estimates of the net incremental costs of decarbonization that take into account capital and operating cost savings. However, even if the annual US$100 billion materializes, achieving the much larger implied shifts in investment will require the enactment of long-term internationally coordinated policies, far more stringent than have yet been introduced.</i

An internal model approach to (optimal) frequency regulation in power grids with time-varying voltages

This paper studies the problem of frequency regulation in power grids under unknown and possible time-varying load changes, while minimizing the generation costs. We formulate this problem as an output agreement problem for distribution networks and address it using incremental passivity and distributed internal-model-based controllers. Incremental passivity enables a systematic approach to study convergence to the steady state with zero frequency deviation and to design the controller in the presence of time-varying voltages, whereas the internal-model principle is applied to tackle the uncertain nature of the loads.Comment: 16 pages. Abridged version appeared in the Proceedings of the 21st International Symposium on Mathematical Theory of Networks and Systems, MTNS 2014, Groningen, the Netherlands. Submitted in December 201

Self-enforcing Agreements on Water allocation

Many water allocation agreements in transboundary river basins are inherently unstable. Due to stochastic river flow, agreements may be broken in case of drought. The objective of this paper is to analyse whether water allocation agreements can be self-enforcing. An agreement is modelled as the outcome of bargaining game on river water allocation. Given this agreement, the bargaining game is followed by a repeated extensive-form game in which countries decide whether or not to comply with the agreement. I assess under what conditions such agreements are self-enforcing, given stochastic river flow. The results show that, for sufficiently low discounting, every efficient agreement can be sustained in subgame perfect equilibrium. Requiring renegotiation-proofness may shrink the set of possible agreements to a unique self-enforcing agreement. The solution induced by this particular agreement implements the “downstream incremental distribution”, an axiomatic solution to water allocation that assigns all gains from cooperation to downstream countries.Self-Enforcing Agreement, Repeated Extensive-Form Game, Water Allocation, Renegotiation-Proofness

Feedback Communication Systems with Limitations on Incremental Redundancy

This paper explores feedback systems using incremental redundancy (IR) with noiseless transmitter confirmation (NTC). For IR-NTC systems based on {\em finite-length} codes (with blocklength $N$) and decoding attempts only at {\em certain specified decoding times}, this paper presents the asymptotic expansion achieved by random coding, provides rate-compatible sphere-packing (RCSP) performance approximations, and presents simulation results of tail-biting convolutional codes. The information-theoretic analysis shows that values of $N$ relatively close to the expected latency yield the same random-coding achievability expansion as with $N = \infty$. However, the penalty introduced in the expansion by limiting decoding times is linear in the interval between decoding times. For binary symmetric channels, the RCSP approximation provides an efficiently-computed approximation of performance that shows excellent agreement with a family of rate-compatible, tail-biting convolutional codes in the short-latency regime. For the additive white Gaussian noise channel, bounded-distance decoding simplifies the computation of the marginal RCSP approximation and produces similar results as analysis based on maximum-likelihood decoding for latencies greater than 200. The efficiency of the marginal RCSP approximation facilitates optimization of the lengths of incremental transmissions when the number of incremental transmissions is constrained to be small or the length of the incremental transmissions is constrained to be uniform after the first transmission. Finally, an RCSP-based decoding error trajectory is introduced that provides target error rates for the design of rate-compatible code families for use in feedback communication systems.Comment: 23 pages, 15 figure

Calculation of wing response to gusts and blast waves with vortex lift effect

A numerical study of the response of aircraft wings to atmospheric gusts and to nuclear explosions when flying at subsonic speeds is presented. The method is based upon unsteady quasi-vortex lattice method, unsteady suction analogy and Pade approximant. The calculated results, showing vortex lag effect, yield reasonable agreement with experimental data for incremental lift on wings in gust penetration and due to nuclear blast waves

Calculation of wing response to gusts and blast waves with vortex lift effect

A numerical study of the response of aircraft wings to atmospheric gusts and to nuclear explosions when flying at subsonic speeds is presented. The method is based upon unsteady quasi-vortex-lattice method, unsteady suction analogy, and Pade approximate. The calculated results, showing vortex lag effect, yield reasonable agreement with experimental data for incremental lift on wings in gust penetration and due to nuclear blast waves

Duration and Term Structure of Trade Agreements

Why are some trade agreements concluded for a limited period of time while others have the form of evergreen contracts supplemented with an advance termination notice clause? We use a dynamic incomplete contracting model to demonstrate that the time structure of the trade agreement is related to the nature of the underlying trade-related investments (or other types of irreversible resource adjustments). If these investments are lumpy and specialized to trade in a particular homogeneous good, the agreements with the \u85xed term of duration are more likely. The xed-term agreement provides incentives for the initial investment but leaves the parties the exibility to revisit the need for future investment by resorting to renegotiation. If the agreement covers trade in goods or services requiring incremental investments with spillovers of the investment bene\u85ts across industries, there is a lower risk of overinvestment. Therefore, the parties are more likely to choose an evergreen agreement (with an advance termination notice or an escape clause). We show that these predictions are consistent with the econometric evidence on the trade agreements to which the U.S. is a party. We are grateful to Arnaud Costinot, Petros Mavroidis, Marc Melitz and the participants of the Midwest In

Duration and Term Structure of Trade Agreements

Why are some trade agreements concluded for a limited period of time while others have the form of evergreen contracts supplemented with an advance termination notice clause? We use a dynamic incomplete contracting model to demonstrate that the time structure of the trade agreement is related to the nature of the underlying trade-related investments (or other types of irreversible resource adjustments). If these investments are lumpy and specialized to trade in a particular homogeneous good, the agreements with the fixed term of duration are more likely. The fixed-term agreement provides incentives for the initial investment but leaves the parties the flexibility to revisit the need for future investment by resorting to renegotiation. If the agreement covers trade in goods or services requiring incremental investments with spillovers of the investment benefits across industries, there is a lower risk of overinvestment. Therefore, the parties are more likely to choose an evergreen agreement (with an advance termination notice or an escape clause). We show that these predictions are consistent with the econometric evidence on the trade agreements to which the U.S. is a party.