From Tarski to G\"odel. Or, how to derive the Second Incompleteness Theorem from the Undefinability of Truth without Self-reference

In this paper, we provide a fairly general self-reference-free proof of the Second Incompleteness Theorem from Tarski's Theorem of the Undefinability of Truth.Comment: 7 page

The Surprise Examination Paradox and the Second Incompleteness Theorem

We give a new proof for Godel's second incompleteness theorem, based on Kolmogorov complexity, Chaitin's incompleteness theorem, and an argument that resembles the surprise examination paradox. We then go the other way around and suggest that the second incompleteness theorem gives a possible resolution of the surprise examination paradox. Roughly speaking, we argue that the flaw in the derivation of the paradox is that it contains a hidden assumption that one can prove the consistency of the mathematical theory in which the derivation is done; which is impossible by the second incompleteness theorem.Comment: 8 page

Tarski's Undefinability Theorem and Diagonal Lemma

We prove the equivalence of the semantic version of Tarski's theorem on the undefinability of truth with a semantic version of the Diagonal Lemma, and also show the equivalence of syntactic Tarski's Undefinability Theorem with a weak syntactic diagonal lemma. We outline two seemingly diagonal-free proofs for these theorems from the literature, and show that syntactic Tarski's theorem can deliver G\"odel-Rosser's Incompleteness Theorem.Comment: 8 page

An incompleteness theorem via ordinal analysis

We present an analogue of G\"{o}del's second incompleteness theorem for systems of second-order arithmetic. Whereas G\"{o}del showed that sufficiently strong theories that are $\Pi^0_1$-sound and $\Sigma^0_1$-definable do not prove their own $\Pi^0_1$-soundness, we prove that sufficiently strong theories that are $\Pi^1_1$-sound and $\Sigma^1_1$-definable do not prove their own $\Pi^1_1$-soundness. Our proof does not involve the construction of a self-referential sentence but rather relies on ordinal analysis

Provability Logic: models within models in Peano Arithmetic

In 1994 Jech gave a model theoretic proof of G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem for Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory in the following form: ZF does not prove that ZF has a model. Kotlarski showed that Jech's proof can be adapted to Peano Arithmetic with the role of models being taken by complete consistent extensions. In this note we take another step in the direction of replacing proof-theoretic by model-theoretic arguments. We show, without passing through the arithmetized completeness theorem, that the existence of a model of PA of complexity $\Sigma^0_2$ is independent of PA, where a model is identified with the set of formulas with parameters which hold in the model. Our approach is based on a new interpretation of the provability logic of Peano Arithmetic with the modal operator interpreted as truth in every $\Sigma^0_2$-model

Finding the limit of incompleteness I

In this paper, we examine the limit of applicability of G\"{o}del's first incompleteness theorem ($\sf G1$ for short). We first define the notion "$\sf G1$ holds for the theory $T$". This paper is motivated by the following question: can we find a theory with a minimal degree of interpretation for which $\sf G1$ holds. To approach this question, we first examine the following question: is there a theory $T$ such that Robinson's $\mathbf{R}$ interprets $T$ but $T$ does not interpret $\mathbf{R}$ (i.e. $T$ is weaker than $\mathbf{R}$ w.r.t. interpretation) and $\sf G1$ holds for $T$? In this paper, we show that there are many such theories based on Je\v{r}\'{a}bek's work using some model theory. We prove that for each recursively inseparable pair $\langle A,B\rangle$, we can construct a r.e. theory $U_{\langle A,B\rangle}$ such that $U_{\langle A,B\rangle}$ is weaker than $\mathbf{R}$ w.r.t. interpretation and $\sf G1$ holds for $U_{\langle A,B\rangle}$. As a corollary, we answer a question from Albert Visser. Moreover, we prove that for any Turing degree $\mathbf{0}< \mathbf{d}<\mathbf{0}^{\prime}$, there is a theory $T$ with Turing degree $\mathbf{d}$ such that $\sf G1$ holds for $T$ and $T$ is weaker than $\mathbf{R}$ w.r.t. Turing reducibility. As a corollary, based on Shoenfield's work using some recursion theory, we show that there is no theory with a minimal degree of Turing reducibility for which $\sf G1$ holds.Comment: 18 pages. Accepted and to appear in Bulletin of Symbolic Logi

On the depth of G\"{o}del's incompleteness theorem

In this paper, we use G\"{o}del's incompleteness theorem as a case study for investigating mathematical depth. We take for granted the widespread judgment by mathematical logicians that G\"{o}del's incompleteness theorem is deep, and focus on the philosophical question of what its depth consists in. We focus on the methodological study of the depth of G\"{o}del's incompleteness theorem, and propose three criteria to account for its depth: influence, fruitfulness, and unity. Finally, we give some explanations for our account of the depth of G\"{o}del's incompleteness theorem.Comment: 23 pages, revised version. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:2009.0488

Current research on G\"odel's incompleteness theorems

We give a survey of current research on G\"{o}del's incompleteness theorems from the following three aspects: classifications of different proofs of G\"{o}del's incompleteness theorems, the limit of the applicability of G\"{o}del's first incompleteness theorem, and the limit of the applicability of G\"{o}del's second incompleteness theorem.Comment: 54 pages, final accepted version, to appear in The Bulletin of Symbolic Logi