3,632 research outputs found

    Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing

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    We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that individual demands are comparable, though perhaps different, commodities, and that agents are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same amount of output always pay the same price; this holds true under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric in all individual demands. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays his/her stand alone cost under full responsibility; this holds true under partial responsibility only if, in addition, the cost function is symmetric. By generalizing Moulin and Shenker.s (1999) Distributivity axiom to cost- sharing methods for heterogeneous goods, we identify in each of our two theories a different serial method. The subsidy-free serial method (Moulin, 1995) is essentially the only distributive method meeting Ranking and Dummy. The cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont, 1998) is the only distributive method satisfying Separability and Strong Ranking. Finally, we propose an alternative characterization of the latter method based on a strengthening of Distributivity.

    Lexicographic Preferences in Discrete Choice Experiments: Consequences on Individual-Specific Willingness to Pay Estimates

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    In discrete choice experiments respondents are generally assumed to consider all of the attributes across each of the alternatives, and to choose their most preferred. However, results in this paper indicate that many respondents employ simplified lexicographic decision-making rules, whereby they have a ranking of the attributes, but their choice of an alternative is based solely on the level of their most important attribute(s). Not accounting for these simple decision-making heuristics introduces systemic errors and leads to biased point estimates, as they are a violation of the continuity axiom and a departure from the use of compensatory decision-making. In this paper the implications of lexicographic preferences are examined. In particular, using a mixed logit specification this paper investigates the sensitivity of individual-specific willingness to pay (WTP) estimates conditional on whether lexicographic decision-making rules are accounted for in the modelling of discrete choice responses. Empirical results are obtained from a discrete choice experiment that was carried out to address the value of a number of rural landscape attributes in Ireland.Continuity axiom, Discrete Choice Experiments, Lexicographic Preferences, Mixed Logit, Individual-Specific Willingness to Pay

    Axiomatic Cost and Surplis-Sharing

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    The equitable division of a joint cost (or a jointly produced output) among agents with different shares or types of output (or input) commodities, is a central theme of the theory of cooperative games with transferable utility. Ever since Shapley's seminal contribution in 1953, this question has generated some of the deepest axiomatic results of modern microeconomic theory.More recently, the simpler problem of rationing a single commodity according to a profile of claims (reflecting individual needs, or demands, or liabilities) has been another fertile ground for axiomatic analysis. This rationing model is often called the bankruptcy problem in the literature.This chapter reviews the normative literature on these two models, and emphasizes their deep structural link via the Additivity axiom for cost sharing: individual cost shares depend additively upon the cost function. Loosely speaking, an additive cost-sharing method can be written as the integral of a rationing method, and this representation defines a linear isomorphism between additive cost-sharing methods and rationing methods.The simple proportionality rule in rationing thus corresponds to average cost pricing and to the Aumann-Shapley pricing method (respectively for homogeneous or heterogeneous output commodities). The uniform rationing rule, equalizing individual shares subject to the claim being an upper bound, corresponds to serial cost sharing. And random priority rationing corresponds to the Shapley-Shubik method, applying the Shapley formula to the Stand Alone costs.Several open problems are included. The axiomatic discussion of non-additive methods to share joint costs appears to be a promising direction for future research.

    A Theory of Attribution

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    Attribution of economic joint effects is achieved with a random order model of their relative importance. Random order consistency and elementary axioms uniquely identify linear and proportional marginal attribution. These are the Shapley (1953) and proportional (Feldman (1999, 2002) and Ortmann (2000)) values of the dual of the implied cooperative game. Random order consistency does not use a reduced game. Restricted potentials facilitate identification of proportional value derivatives and coalition formation results. Attributions of econometric model performance, using data from Fair (1978), show stability across models. Proportional marginal attribution (PMA) is found to correctly identify factor relative importance and to have a role in model construction. A portfolio attribution example illuminates basic issues regarding utility attribution and demonstrates investment applications. PMA is also shown to mitigate concerns (e.g., Thomas (1977)) regarding strategic behavior induced by linear cost attribution.Coalition formation; consistency; cost allocation; joint effects; proportional value; random order model; relative importance; restricted potential; Shapley value and variance decomposition

    Endowment additivity and the weighted proportional rules for adjudicating conflicting claims

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    We propose and study a new axiom, restricted endowment additivity, for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims. This axiom requires that awards be additively decomposable with respect to the endowment whenever no agent’s claim is filled. For two-claimant problems, restricted endowment additivity essentially characterizes weighted extensions of the proportional rule. With additional agents, however, the axiom is satisfied by a great variety of rules. Further imposing versions of continuity and consistency, we characterize a new family of rules which generalize the proportional rule. Defined by a priority relation and a weighting function, each rule aims, as nearly as possible, to assign awards within each priority class in proportion to these weights. We also identify important subfamilies and obtain new characterizations of the constrained equal awards and proportional rules based on restricted endowment additivity

    Consumer Preferences for Water Supply? An Application of Choice Models to Urban India

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    Water supply, Consumer preferences, Discrete choice, Lexicographic preferences

    A systematic review of the reliability and validity of discrete choice experiments in valuing non-market environmental goods

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    AbstractWhile discrete choice experiments (DCEs) are increasingly used in the field of environmental valuation, they remain controversial because of their hypothetical nature and the contested reliability and validity of their results. We systematically reviewed evidence on the validity and reliability of environmental DCEs from the past thirteen years (Jan 2003–February 2016). 107 articles met our inclusion criteria. These studies provide limited and mixed evidence of the reliability and validity of DCE. Valuation results were susceptible to small changes in survey design in 45% of outcomes reporting reliability measures. DCE results were generally consistent with those of other stated preference techniques (convergent validity), but hypothetical bias was common. Evidence supporting theoretical validity (consistency with assumptions of rational choice theory) was limited. In content validity tests, 2–90% of respondents protested against a feature of the survey, and a considerable proportion found DCEs to be incomprehensible or inconsequential (17–40% and 10–62% respectively). DCE remains useful for non-market valuation, but its results should be used with caution. Given the sparse and inconclusive evidence base, we recommend that tests of reliability and validity are more routinely integrated into DCE studies and suggest how this might be achieved

    The principal’s dilemma

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    A recurrent dilemma in team management is to select between a team-based and an individual based wage scheme. We explore such a dilemma in a simple model of production in teams, in which the team members may differ in their effort choices and qualification. We show that, in spite of enhancing output as the basis for payment, a team-based wage scheme might be less profitable for the principal than an individual-based wage scheme. We also highlight a deep misalignment between designing optimal (output-based) incentives for a team and treating its members impartially. Finally, upon introducing the possibility of liquidity constraints in our model, we provide rationale for the so-called "rich get richer" hypothesis.team production, management, incentives, effort

    Essais en microéconomie théorique et appliquée

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