Sharing delay information in service systems: a literature survey

Service providers routinely share information about upcoming waiting times with their customers, through delay announcements. The need to effectively manage the provision of these announcements has led to a substantial growth in the body of literature which is devoted to that topic. In this survey paper, we systematically review the relevant literature, summarize some of its key ideas and findings, describe the main challenges that the different approaches to the problem entail, and formulate research directions that would be interesting to consider in future work

Service and price competition when customers are naive

We consider a system of two service providers each with a separate queue. Customers choose one queue to join upon arrival and can switch between queues in real time before entering service to maximize their spot utility, which is a function of price and queue length. We characterize the steady-state distribution for queue lengths, and then investigate a two-stage game in which the two service providers first simultaneously select service rates and then simultaneously charge prices. Our results indicate that neither service provider will have both a faster service and a lower price than its competitor. When price plays a less significant role in customers service selection relative to queue length or when the two service providers incur comparable costs for building capacities, they will not engage in price competition. When price plays a significant role and the capacity costs at the service providers sufficiently differ, they will adopt substitutable competition instruments: the lower cost service provider will build a faster service and the higher cost service provider will charge a lower price. Comparing our results to those in the existing literature, we find that the service providers invest in lower service rates, engage in less intense price competition, and earn higher profits, while customers wait in line longer when they are unable to infer service rates and are naive in service selection than when they can infer service rates to make sophisticated choices. The customers jockeying behavior further lowers the service providers capacity investment and lengthens the customers duration of stay

Blind Queues: The Impact of Consumer Beliefs on Revenues and Congestion

In many service settings, customers have to join the queue without being fully aware of the parameters of the service provider (e.g., customers at checkout counters may not know the true service rate before joining). In such “blind queues,” customers make their joining/balking decisions based on limited information about the service provider’s operational parameters (from past service experiences, reviews, etc.) and queue lengths. We analyze a firm serving customers making decisions under arbitrary beliefs about the service parameters in an observable queue for a service with a known price. By proposing an ordering for the balking threshold distributions in the customer population, we are able to compare the effects of customer beliefs on the queue. We show that, although revealing the service information to customers improves revenues under certain conditions, it may destroy consumer welfare or social welfare. Given a market size, consumer welfare can be significantly reduced when a fast server announces its true service parameter. When revenue is higher under some beliefs, one would expect the congestion to also be higher because more customers join, but we show that congestion may not necessarily increase

Essays on Service Information, Retrials and Global Supply Chain Sourcing

In many service settings, customers have to join the queue without being fully aware of the parameters of the service provider (for e.g., customers at check-out counters may not know the true service rate prior to joining). In such blind queues\u27\u27, customers typically make their decisions based on the limited information about the service provider\u27s operational parameters from past experiences, reviews, etc. In the first essay, we analyze a firm serving customers who make decisions under arbitrary beliefs about the service parameters. We show, while revealing the service information to customers improves revenues under certain customer beliefs, it may however destroy consumer welfare or social welfare. When consumers can self-organize the timing of service visits, they may avoid long queues and choose to retry later. In the second essay, we study an observable queue in which consumers make rational join, balk and (costly) retry decisions. Retrial attempts could be costly due to factors such as transportation costs, retrial hassle and visit fees. We characterize the equilibrium under such retrial behavior, and study its welfare effects. With the additional option to retry, consumer welfare could worsen compared to the welfare in a system without retrials. Surprisingly, self-interested consumers retry too little (in equilibrium compared to the socially optimal policy) when the retrial cost is low, and retry too much when the retrial cost is high. We also explore the impact of myopic consumers who may not have the flexibility to retry. In the third essay, we propose a comprehensive model framework for global sourcing location decision process. For decades, off-shoring of manufacturing to China and other low-cost countries was a no-brainer decision for many U.S. companies. In recent years, however, this trend is being challenged by some companies to re-shore manufacturing back to the U.S., or to near-shore manufacturing to Mexico. Our model framework incorporates perspectives over the entire life cycle of a product, i.e., product design, manufacturing and delivering, and after-sale service support, and we use it to test the validity of various competing theories on global sourcing. We also provide numerical examples to support our findings from the model

Optimal Pricing Effect on Equilibrium Behaviors of Delay-Sensitive Users in Cognitive Radio Networks

This paper studies price-based spectrum access control in cognitive radio networks, which characterizes network operators' service provisions to delay-sensitive secondary users (SUs) via pricing strategies. Based on the two paradigms of shared-use and exclusive-use dynamic spectrum access (DSA), we examine three network scenarios corresponding to three types of secondary markets. In the first monopoly market with one operator using opportunistic shared-use DSA, we study the operator's pricing effect on the equilibrium behaviors of self-optimizing SUs in a queueing system. %This queue represents the congestion of the multiple SUs sharing the operator's single \ON-\OFF channel that models the primary users (PUs) traffic. We provide a queueing delay analysis with the general distributions of the SU service time and PU traffic using the renewal theory. In terms of SUs, we show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game where SUs are players employing individual optimal strategies. We also provide a sufficient condition and iterative algorithms for equilibrium convergence. In terms of operators, two pricing mechanisms are proposed with different goals: revenue maximization and social welfare maximization. In the second monopoly market, an operator exploiting exclusive-use DSA has many channels that will be allocated separately to each entering SU. We also analyze the pricing effect on the equilibrium behaviors of the SUs and the revenue-optimal and socially-optimal pricing strategies of the operator in this market. In the third duopoly market, we study a price competition between two operators employing shared-use and exclusive-use DSA, respectively, as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Using a backward induction method, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium for this game and investigate the equilibrium convergence.Comment: 30 pages, one column, double spac

Lead-Time Quotation When Customers are Sensitive to Reputation

Firms consider a variety of factors when making lead-time promises, including current shop status and the size of the incoming order. The profit-maximising model presented in this paper is the first to include reputation effects explicitly in a lend-time optimisation model. Reputation is considered to be the lasting effect on the market of a firm\u27s delivery performance over time, and so it affects the future as well as the current profits. The model is complicated, and a counter-example demonstrates that qualitative monotonicity results are not obtainable. A computational study explores the relationships between shop status, order size, reputation, market characteristics and the lead-time decision. Regression analysis sheds light on these relationships and suggests three heuristics, which provide near-optimal solutions with relatively short running times

The immediacy implications of exchange organization

The paper introduces a connection between the needs of exchanges to respond to the immediacy needs of their clientele and the need to manage the credit risks faced by exchange members. Queueing theory is used to represent the opportunity loss suffered by brokers engaging in multiple activities: order-flow origination and its intermediation. The role of market-making locals is depicted as enabling specialization. Brokers focus on originating order flow and locals on fulfilling intermediation needs. The capacity to specialize is constrained by the availability of creditworthy members acting as locals. This results in a tension between pursuit of immediacy and managing inter-member credit exposure. Two exchange rules, tick size and price limits, are evaluated for their effects in resolving this tension. This research benefits from the comments of Ray DeGennaro, Mark Flannery, Steve Kane, Tom Lindley, Jay Marchand, Pat Parkinson, Asani Sarkar, Lester Telser, Rich Tsuhara and participants of the Brookings-Wharton Financial Services Conference (January, 2002). Errors remaining in this draft are mine. The views of the paper do not reflect the official positions of the Federal Reserve.Stock exchanges ; Stock - Prices

Investigating the Effectiveness of Supermarket Transmission Control Measures on the Spread of COVID-19 in the Presence of Super-Spreaders through Agent-Based Modelling

An examination of the effectiveness of transmission control measures for COVID-19 in a supermarket setting, factoring for the inclusion of Super-Spreaders, must extend beyond the direct effects the control measure has on transmission in order to account for the indirect effects changes in human movement dynamics have on the spread of disease. The analysis makes use of Agent-Based Modelling simulation techniques to model changes in customer movement and disease transmission dynamics resulting from the isolated and combined implementation of COVID-19 transmission control measures. The bottom-up approach of agent-based modelling allows for the inclusion of heterogeneous, individual-level chances of infectiousness, compliance, and consumer behaviours, allowing for a more realistic representation of real-world behaviours. The model used for analysis is built entirely in the NetLogo environment, designed to be interactive, adaptable to user-varied inputs, and visually engaging. This allows for the model to adapt to changes in disease parameters and easily communicate model effects in a manner accessible to users in and out of the field. Control measures considered include: Vaccinations, Capacity Limiting, Social Distancing, Staff COVID-19 Testing, and the use of Sanitizers. Results indicate high levels of effectiveness for the use of Vaccinations at reducing transmission with minimal impact on customer dynamics. The results also highlight the negative effects changes in customer dynamics can have on transmission, indicated by increased shop-queue transmissions resulting from the use of Capacity Limiting or other measures slowing customer entrance to the shop. The positive effects of interactions between control measures are highlighted by the additional implementation of Social Distancing in reducing these increases. The implications of these findings involve the need to factor for changes in human movement dynamics when assessing the effectiveness of transmission control measures implemented in any environment. The findings further reinforce the benefits of implementing social distancing practises in conjunction with mechanisms that reduce the flow of movement, as well as the benefits of increased vaccination coverage in the population. Lastly, the findings provide an effective comparison of the control measures considered, allowing for the direct assessment of their implementation and the resulting effects on transmission and customer dynamics