29 research outputs found
Stackelberg Network Pricing is Hard to Approximate
In the Stackelberg Network Pricing problem, one has to assign tariffs to a
certain subset of the arcs of a given transportation network. The aim is to
maximize the amount paid by the user of the network, knowing that the user will
take a shortest st-path once the tariffs are fixed. Roch, Savard, and Marcotte
(Networks, Vol. 46(1), 57-67, 2005) proved that this problem is NP-hard, and
gave an O(log m)-approximation algorithm, where m denote the number of arcs to
be priced. In this note, we show that the problem is also APX-hard
Stackelberg Network Pricing Games
We study a multi-player one-round game termed Stackelberg Network Pricing
Game, in which a leader can set prices for a subset of priceable edges in a
graph. The other edges have a fixed cost. Based on the leader's decision one or
more followers optimize a polynomial-time solvable combinatorial minimization
problem and choose a minimum cost solution satisfying their requirements based
on the fixed costs and the leader's prices. The leader receives as revenue the
total amount of prices paid by the followers for priceable edges in their
solutions, and the problem is to find revenue maximizing prices. Our model
extends several known pricing problems, including single-minded and unit-demand
pricing, as well as Stackelberg pricing for certain follower problems like
shortest path or minimum spanning tree. Our first main result is a tight
analysis of a single-price algorithm for the single follower game, which
provides a -approximation for any . This can
be extended to provide a -approximation for the
general problem and followers. The latter result is essentially best
possible, as the problem is shown to be hard to approximate within
\mathcal{O(\log^\epsilon k + \log^\epsilon m). If followers have demands, the
single-price algorithm provides a -approximation, and the
problem is hard to approximate within \mathcal{O(m^\epsilon) for some
. Our second main result is a polynomial time algorithm for
revenue maximization in the special case of Stackelberg bipartite vertex cover,
which is based on non-trivial max-flow and LP-duality techniques. Our results
can be extended to provide constant-factor approximations for any constant
number of followers
The Green Choice: Learning and Influencing Human Decisions on Shared Roads
Autonomous vehicles have the potential to increase the capacity of roads via
platooning, even when human drivers and autonomous vehicles share roads.
However, when users of a road network choose their routes selfishly, the
resulting traffic configuration may be very inefficient. Because of this, we
consider how to influence human decisions so as to decrease congestion on these
roads. We consider a network of parallel roads with two modes of
transportation: (i) human drivers who will choose the quickest route available
to them, and (ii) ride hailing service which provides an array of autonomous
vehicle ride options, each with different prices, to users. In this work, we
seek to design these prices so that when autonomous service users choose from
these options and human drivers selfishly choose their resulting routes, road
usage is maximized and transit delay is minimized. To do so, we formalize a
model of how autonomous service users make choices between routes with
different price/delay values. Developing a preference-based algorithm to learn
the preferences of the users, and using a vehicle flow model related to the
Fundamental Diagram of Traffic, we formulate a planning optimization to
maximize a social objective and demonstrate the benefit of the proposed routing
and learning scheme.Comment: Submitted to CDC 201
A Stackelberg Strategy for Routing Flow over Time
Routing games are used to to understand the impact of individual users'
decisions on network efficiency. Most prior work on routing games uses a
simplified model of network flow where all flow exists simultaneously, and
users care about either their maximum delay or their total delay. Both of these
measures are surrogates for measuring how long it takes to get all of a user's
traffic through the network. We attempt a more direct study of how competition
affects network efficiency by examining routing games in a flow over time
model. We give an efficiently computable Stackelberg strategy for this model
and show that the competitive equilibrium under this strategy is no worse than
a small constant times the optimal, for two natural measures of optimality
Efficiency of Restricted Tolls in Non-atomic Network Routing Games
An effective means to reduce the inefficiency of Nash flows in non-
atomic network routing games is to impose tolls on the arcs of the network. It is a well-known fact that marginal cost tolls induce a Nash flow that corresponds to a minimum cost flow. However, despite their effectiveness, marginal cost tolls suffer from two major drawbacks, namely (i) that potentially every arc of the network is tolled, and (ii) that the imposed tolls can be arbitrarily large.
In this paper, we study the restricted network toll problem in which tolls can be imposed on the arcs of the network but are restricted to not exceed a predefined threshold for every arc. We show that optimal restricted tolls can be computed efficiently for parallel-arc networks and affine latency functions. This generalizes a previous work on taxing subnetworks to arbitrary restrictions. Our algorithm is quite simple, but relies on solving several convex programs. The key to our approach is a characterization of the flows that are inducible by restricted tolls for single-commodity networks. We also derive bounds on the efficiency of restricted tolls for multi-commodity networks and polynomial latency functions. These bounds are tight even for parallel-arc networks. Our bounds show that restricted tolls can significantly reduce the price of anarchy if the restrictions imposed on arcs with high-degree polynomials are not too severe. Our proof is constructive. We define tolls respecting the given thresholds and show that these tolls lead to a reduced price of anarchy by using a (\lambda,\mu)-smoothness approach
The price of anarchy in series-parallel graphs
Abstract Congestion games model self-interested agents competing for resources in communication networks. The price of anarchy quantifies the deterioration in performance in such games compared to the optimal solution. Recent research has shown that, when the social cost is defined as the maximum cost of all players, specific graph topologies impose a bound on the price of anarchy. We extend this research by providing bounds on the price of anarchy for congestion games on series-parallel networks. First we show that parallel composition does not increase the price of anarchy. This result is then used to show that the price of anarchy is bounded above by both the diameter of the graph and the number of players in the game, and that these bounds are tight. Finally we identify an important aspect of proofs for bounds on the price of anarchy: when a bound is achieved by restricting multiple parameters of the game, one should also prove that this bound cannot be realized using only a subset of these restrictions
The Network Improvement Problem for Equilibrium Routing
In routing games, agents pick their routes through a network to minimize
their own delay. A primary concern for the network designer in routing games is
the average agent delay at equilibrium. A number of methods to control this
average delay have received substantial attention, including network tolls,
Stackelberg routing, and edge removal.
A related approach with arguably greater practical relevance is that of
making investments in improvements to the edges of the network, so that, for a
given investment budget, the average delay at equilibrium in the improved
network is minimized. This problem has received considerable attention in the
literature on transportation research and a number of different algorithms have
been studied. To our knowledge, none of this work gives guarantees on the
output quality of any polynomial-time algorithm. We study a model for this
problem introduced in transportation research literature, and present both
hardness results and algorithms that obtain nearly optimal performance
guarantees.
- We first show that a simple algorithm obtains good approximation guarantees
for the problem. Despite its simplicity, we show that for affine delays the
approximation ratio of 4/3 obtained by the algorithm cannot be improved.
- To obtain better results, we then consider restricted topologies. For
graphs consisting of parallel paths with affine delay functions we give an
optimal algorithm. However, for graphs that consist of a series of parallel
links, we show the problem is weakly NP-hard.
- Finally, we consider the problem in series-parallel graphs, and give an
FPTAS for this case.
Our work thus formalizes the intuition held by transportation researchers
that the network improvement problem is hard, and presents topology-dependent
algorithms that have provably tight approximation guarantees.Comment: 27 pages (including abstract), 3 figure