Determinants of bank lending performance

During the last years the lending business has come under considerable competitive pressure and bank managers often express concern regarding its profitability vis-a-vis other activities. This paper tries to empirically identify factors that are able to explain the financial performance of bank lending activities. The analysis is based on the CFS-data-set that has been collected in 1997 from 200 medium-sized firms. Two regressions are performed: The first is directed towards relationships between the interest rate premiums and various determining factors, the second aims at detecting relationships between those factors and the occurrence of several types of problems during the course of a credit engagement. Furthermore, the results of both regressions are used to test theoretical hypotheses regarding the impact of certain parameters on credit terms and distress probabilities. The findings are somewhat “puzzling“: First, the rating is not as significant as expected. Second, credit contracts seem to be priced lower for situations with greater risks. Finally, the results do not fully support any of three hypotheses that are often advanced to describe the role of collateral and covenants in credit contracts

A detailed investigation of the effectiveness of whole test suite generation

© 2016 The Author(s)A common application of search-based software testing is to generate test cases for all goals defined by a coverage criterion (e.g., lines, branches, mutants). Rather than generating one test case at a time for each of these goals individually, whole test suite generation optimizes entire test suites towards satisfying all goals at the same time. There is evidence that the overall coverage achieved with this approach is superior to that of targeting individual coverage goals. Nevertheless, there remains some uncertainty on (a) whether the results generalize beyond branch coverage, (b) whether the whole test suite approach might be inferior to a more focused search for some particular coverage goals, and (c) whether generating whole test suites could be optimized by only targeting coverage goals not already covered. In this paper, we perform an in-depth analysis to study these questions. An empirical study on 100 Java classes using three different coverage criteria reveals that indeed there are some testing goals that are only covered by the traditional approach, although their number is only very small in comparison with those which are exclusively covered by the whole test suite approach. We find that keeping an archive of already covered goals along with the tests covering them and focusing the search on uncovered goals overcomes this small drawback on larger classes, leading to an improved overall effectiveness of whole test suite generation

Measuring microfinance access : building on existing cross-country data

Given the acknowledged need for a new effort to expand the set of available data on direct access to financial services, including a focus on access by those at low income, Honohan provides a selective review of the diverse sources of data that exist and considers how best to build on them. He proposes a basic framework within which to consider the analysis of the interesting questions: (1) How does access affect poverty and productivity? and (2) What hinders access? The author discusses existing and potential contribution of household and business user surveys, surveys of providers and their regulators, and surveys of experts, and assesses their relative strengths.Banks&Banking Reform,Environmental Economics&Policies,Health Economics&Finance,Poverty Assessment,Governance Indicators

Audits of finance companies (including independent and captive financing activities of other companies) with conforming changes as of May 1, 1997; Audit and accounting guide:

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_indev/1452/thumbnail.jp

Audits of finance companies (including independent and captive financing activities of other companies) with conforming changes as of May 1, 1998; Audit and accounting guide:

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_indev/1453/thumbnail.jp

Audits of finance companies (including independent and captive financing activities of other companies) with conforming changes as of May 1, 1993; Audit and accounting guide:

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_indev/1448/thumbnail.jp

Audits of finance companies (including independent and captive financing activities of other companies); Audit and accounting guide:

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_indev/1456/thumbnail.jp

"A Critical Assessment of Seven Reports on Financial Reform: A Minskyan Perspective, Part III--Summary Tables"

This four-part study is a critical analysis of several reports dealing with the reform of the financial system in the United States. The study uses Minsky's framework of analysis and focuses on the implications of Ponzi finance for regulatory and supervisory policies. The main conclusion of the study is that, while all reports make some valuable suggestions, they fail to deal with the socioeconomic dynamics that emerge during long periods of economic stability. As a consequence, it is highly doubtful that the principal suggestions contained in the reports will provide any applicable means to limit the worsening of financial fragility over periods of economic stability. The study also concludes that any meaningful systemic and prudential regulatory changes should focus on the analysis of expected and actual cash flows (sources and stability) rather than capital equity, and on preventing the emergence of Ponzi processes. The latter tend to emerge over long periods of economic stability and are not necessarily engineered by crooks. On the contrary, the pursuit of economic growth may involve the extensive use of Ponzi financial processes in legal economic activities. The study argues that some Ponzi processes--more precisely, pyramid Ponzi processes--should not be allowed to proceed, no matter how severe the immediate impact on economic growth, standards of living, or competitiveness. This is so because pyramid Ponzi processes always collapse, regardless how efficient financial markets are, how well informed and well behaved individuals are, or whether there is a "bubble" or not. The longer the process is allowed to proceed, the more destructive it becomes. Pyramid Ponzi processes cannot be risk-managed or buffered against; if economic growth is to be based on a solid financial foundation, these processes cannot be allowed to continue. Finally, a supervisory and regulatory process focused on detecting Ponzi processes would be much more flexible and adaptive, since it would not be preoccupied with either functional or product limits, or with arbitrary ratios of "prudence." Rather, it would oversee all financial institutions and all products, no matter how new or marginal they might be. See also, Working Paper Nos. 574.1, 574.2, and 574.3.

Audits of finance companies (including independent and captive financing activities of other companies) with conforming changes as of May 1, 2000; Audit and accounting guide:

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_indev/1455/thumbnail.jp