Consciousness and the prefrontal parietal network: insights from attention, working memory, and chunking

Consciousness has of late become a “hot topic” in neuroscience. Empirical work has centered on identifying potential neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs), with a converging view that the prefrontal parietal network (PPN) is closely associated with this process. Theoretical work has primarily sought to explain how informational properties of this cortical network could account for phenomenal properties of consciousness. However, both empirical and theoretical research has given less focus to the psychological features that may account for the NCCs. The PPN has also been heavily linked with cognitive processes, such as attention. We describe how this literature is under-appreciated in consciousness science, in part due to the increasingly entrenched assumption of a strong dissociation between attention and consciousness. We argue instead that there is more common ground between attention and consciousness than is usually emphasized: although objects can under certain circumstances be attended to in the absence of conscious access, attention as a content selection and boosting mechanism is an important and necessary aspect of consciousness. Like attention, working memory and executive control involve the interlinking of multiple mental objects and have also been closely associated with the PPN. We propose that this set of cognitive functions, in concert with attention, make up the core psychological components of consciousness. One related process, chunking, exploits logical or mnemonic redundancies in a dataset so that it can be recoded and a given task optimized. Chunking has been shown to activate PPN particularly robustly, even compared with other cognitively demanding tasks, such as working memory or mental arithmetic. It is therefore possible that chunking, as a tool to detect useful patterns within an integrated set of intensely processed (attended) information, has a central role to play in consciousness. Following on from this, we suggest that a key evolutionary purpose of consciousness may be to provide innovative solutions to complex or novel problems

Linking Attention to Learning, Expectation, Competition, and Consciousness

The concept of attention has been used in many senses, often without clarifying how or why attention works as it does. Attention, like consciousness, is often described in a disembodied way. The present article summarizes neural models and supportive data and how attention is linked to processes of learning, expectation, competition, and consciousness. A key them is that attention modulates cortical self-organization and stability. Perceptual and cognitive neocortex is organized into six main cell layers, with characteristic sub-lamina. Attention is part of unified design of bottom-up, horizontal, and top-down interactions among indentified cells in laminar cortical circuits. Neural models clarify how attention may be allocated during processes of visual perception, learning and search; auditory streaming and speech perception; movement target selection during sensory-motor control; mental imagery and fantasy; and hallucination during mental disorders, among other processes.Air Force Office of Scientific Research (F49620-01-1-0397); Office of Naval Research (N00014-01-1-0624

Neural modulations of interference control over conscious perception

The relation between attention and consciousness is a highly debated topic in Cognitive Neuroscience. Although there is an agreement about their relationship at the functional level, there is still no consensus about how these two cognitive processes interact at the neural level. According to the gateway hypothesis (Posner, 1994), attention filters the information accessing to consciousness, resulting in both neural and functional modulations. Contrary to this idea, the cumulative influence hypothesis (Tallon-Baudry, 2012) proposes that both attention and consciousness independently impact decision processes about the perception of stimuli. Accordingly, we could observe an interaction between attention and consciousness at the behavioral level, but not at the neural level. Previous studies have shown that alerting and orienting networks of attention modulate participants’ ability to verbally report near-threshold visual stimuli both at behavioral and neural levels, supporting the gateway hypothesis over the cumulative influence hypothesis. The impact of the executive control network of attention on conscious perception, however, has only been explored behaviorally (Colás et al., 2017). In the present study, we employed high-density encephalography to investigate the neural basis of the interaction between executive attention and conscious perception. We presented a classical Stroop task concurrently with a detection task of near-threshold stimuli. In two separate sessions, we manipulated the proportion of congruent and incongruent Stroop stimuli. We found that the Stroop-evoked N2 potential (usually associated to conflict detection and localized in the anterior cingulate cortex) was modulated by both conflict detection and conscious perception processes. These results suggest that the relation between executive control and conscious perception lies in frontal lobe regions associated to conflict detection, supporting the gateway hypothesis over the cumulative influence hypothesisThis work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness [research project PSI2014–58681-P to Ana B. Chica; Ramón y Cajal Fellowship to Ana B. Chica, RYC-2011-09320

The Informational Model of Consciousness: Mechanisms of Embodiment/Disembodiment of Information

It was shown recently that information is the central concept which it is to be considered to understand consciousness and its properties. Arguing that consciousness is a consequence of the operational activity of the informational system of the human body, it was shown that this system is composed by seven informational components, reflected in consciousness by corresponding cognitive centers. It was argued also that consciousness can be connected to the environment not only by the common senses, but also by a special connection pole to the bipolar properties of the universe, allowing to explain the associated phenomena of the near-death experiences and other special phenomena. Starting from the characteristics of this model, defined as the Informational Model of Consciousness and to complete the info-communication panorama, in this paper it is analyzed the info-connectivity of the informational system with the body itself. The brain areas where the activity of each informational component are identified, and a definition of consciousness in terms of information is proposed. As the electrical connectivity by means of the nervous system was already proved, allowing the application of the analysis and developing tools of the information science, a particular attention is paid to the non-electrical mechanisms implied in the internal communication. For this, it is shown that the key mechanisms consists in embodiment/disembodiment processes of information during the inter and intra communication of the cells. This process can be modeled also by means of, and in correlation with specific concepts of the science and technology of information, referred to network communication structures, and is represented by epigenetic mechanisms, allowing the acquired trait transmission to the offspring generation. From the perspective of the informational model of consciousness, the human organism appears therefore as a dynamic reactive informational system, actuating in correlation with matter for adaptation, by embodiment/disembodiment processes of information

Adaptive Resonance: An Emerging Neural Theory of Cognition

Adaptive resonance is a theory of cognitive information processing which has been realized as a family of neural network models. In recent years, these models have evolved to incorporate new capabilities in the cognitive, neural, computational, and technological domains. Minimal models provide a conceptual framework, for formulating questions about the nature of cognition; an architectural framework, for mapping cognitive functions to cortical regions; a semantic framework, for precisely defining terms; and a computational framework, for testing hypotheses. These systems are here exemplified by the distributed ART (dART) model, which generalizes localist ART systems to allow arbitrarily distributed code representations, while retaining basic capabilities such as stable fast learning and scalability. Since each component is placed in the context of a unified real-time system, analysis can move from the level of neural processes, including learning laws and rules of synaptic transmission, to cognitive processes, including attention and consciousness. Local design is driven by global functional constraints, with each network synthesizing a dynamic balance of opposing tendencies. The self-contained working ART and dART models can also be transferred to technology, in areas that include remote sensing, sensor fusion, and content-addressable information retrieval from large databases.Office of Naval Research and the defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (N00014-95-1-0409, N00014-1-95-0657); National Institutes of Health (20-316-4304-5

Implicit Processes are Dynamic and Interactive

Can the implicit level of mind execute only simple sensory/cognitive functions? And is the bottleneck to consciousness single, or multi-gated? These questions are elusive, especially considering examples such as implicit semantic priming, and implicit stroop effect (Hung talk in this symposium). I will aim for taxonomy and integration of related findings including my own, to have a clearer overview. First, there are multiple definitions of implicit processing on top of “subliminal”, as exemplified in causal misattribution in action (Wu talk), and attention vs. consciousness (Tsuchiya talk). Second, the implicit/ explicit distinction will NOT map onto the lower-/higher-levels of cognitive function (Hung talk). Rather, there are multiple gates to consciousness as indicated in the binocular rivalry debate (80s, up to now), and also quick interplays between implicit and explicit processes. Third, the implicit process may be dynamic spreading over time, operating predictively and postdictively. Auditory-visual “rabbit” effect would be a great example where implicit postdictive process leads to a conscious percept (Shimojo talk). The implicit process is also based on separate dynamic sampling frequencies. Some evidence comes from interpersonal bodily and neural synchrony (Shimojo talk), and dependence of perceptual changes upon allocation of attention relying on different temporal frequencies (Tsuchiya talk). Thus all together, we may need to abandon several simplistic ideas of implicit processes, and rather take a more dynamic and interactive view

Consciousness and Perceptual Attention: A Methodological Argument

Our perception of external features comprises, among others, functional and phenomenological levels. At the functional level, the perceiver’s mind processes external features according to its own causal- functional organization. At the phenomenological level, the perceiver has consciousness of external features. The question of this paper is: How do the functional and the phenomenological levels of perception relate to each other? The answer I propose is that functional states of specifically perceptual attention constitute the necessary basis for the arising of consciousness in a perceiver. Widely studied within cognitive psychology, perceptual attention is still awaiting a thoroughgoing philosophical treatment. The paper presents and draws upon Anne Treisman’s feature-integration theory of attention (cf. A. Treisman & G. Gelade, “A Feature-Integration Theory of Attention,” Cognitive Psychology, 12, 1980. Pp. 97-136). According to this theory, attentional mechanisms are responsible for the binding of perceptual features into coherent and stable objects of perception. By itself, I will claim, the theory of feature integration does not allow a straightforward reduction of consciousness to the functional processing underlying it. However, on the basis of Treisman’s theory we can produce a methodological argument for endorsing the non-reductivist thesis that attentional states constitute the necessary basis for the arising of consciousness in a perceiver. The paper closes by presenting this argument, according to which the thesis is implied by a unified account of the common representational natures of attentional and conscious states

Attention as a Process of Selection, Perception as a Process of Representation, and Phenomenal Experience as the Resulting Process of Perception Being Modulated by a Dedicated Consciousness Mechanism

Equivalence of attention and consciousness is disputed and necessity of attentional effects for conscious experience has become questioned. However, the conceptual landscape and interpretations of empirical evidence as related to this issue have remained controversial. Here I present some conceptual distinctions and research strategies potentially useful for moving forward when tackling this issue. Specifically, it is argued that we should carefully differentiate between pre-conscious processes and the processes resulting in phenomenal experience, move the emphasis from studying the effects of attention on the modality-specific and feature-specific perception to studying attentional effects on panmodal universal attributes of whatever conscious experience may be the case, and acknowledge that there is a specialized mechanism for leading to conscious experience of the pre-consciously represented contents autonomous from the mechanisms of perception, attention, memory, and cognitive control

Neurocognitive predictors of metacognition in individuals at clinical high risk for psychosis

Background:Metacognition refers to the ability to evaluate and control our cognitive processes. While studies have investigated metacognition in schizophrenia and clinical high risk for psychosis (CHR), less is known about the potential mechanisms which result in metacognitive deficits.Aims:We aimed to investigate whether neurocognitive functions including attention, working memory, verbal learning and executive functions predicted the tendency to focus on one's thoughts (cognitive self-consciousness) and beliefs in the efficacy of one's cognitive skills (cognitive confidence).Method:Participants (130 CHR individuals) were recruited as part of the multi-site PREDICT study. They were assessed using the Metacognitions Questionnaire (MCQ) as well as measures of executive function (WCST), attention (N-Back), working memory (LNS) and verbal learning (AVLT).Results:Cognitive competence was negatively correlated with N-Back while cognitive self-consciousness was positively correlated with N-Back and LNS. Linear regression analysis with N-Back, AVLT, LNS and WCST as predictors showed that neurocognition significantly predicted cognitive self-consciousness, with N-Back, LNS and WCST as significant predictors. The model accounted for 14% of the variance in cognitive self-consciousness. However, neurocognition did not result in a significant predictive model of cognitive competence.Conclusions:Neurocognition was associated with an increased focus on one's thoughts, but it was not associated with higher confidence in one's cognitive skills. Neurocognition accounted for less than one-sixth of the variance in metacognition, suggesting that interventions that target neurocognition are unlikely to improve metacognitive abilities

Hypnosis and meditation: Vehicles of attention and suggestion

Although hypnosis and meditation represent distinct domains of practice, they appear to overlap in phenomenology, cognitive mechanisms, neural substrates, and potential therapeutic merits. Whereas numerous studies have documented the beneficial impact of these approaches, few have harnessed these distinctive phenomena together, either clinically or as a means of illuminating cognitive questions. This paper introduces the theme of the present issue and discusses the potential value of yoking empirical studies of hypnosis and meditation. The marriage of these seemingly disparate yet overlapping practices promises to improve our scientific understanding of each as well as unravel their underlying mechanisms. On the one hand, albeit largely overlooked by researchers studying meditation, the intimate relationship between attention and suggestion holds important implications for both theoretical models and therapeutic applications of contemplative practice. On the other hand, hypnosis and meditation serve as complementary vehicles for elucidating salient topics in cognitive neuroscience, including the neural underpinnings of perception and cognitive control, and the governing of deeply-ingrained processes. Binding these approaches to the science of attention and suggestion paves the road to a more nuanced appreciation of hypnosis and meditation while fostering novel therapeutic prospects and improving our understanding of consciousness and cognition