Communicative Competencies and the Structuration of Expectations: The creative tension between Habermas' critical theory and Luhmann's social systems theory

I elaborate on the tension between Luhmann's social systems theory and Habermas' theory of communicative action, and argue that this tension can be resolved by focusing on language as the interhuman medium of the communication which enables us to develop symbolically generalized media of communication such as truth, love, power, etc. Following Luhmann, the layers of self-organization among the differently codified subsystems of communication versus organization of meaning at contingent interfaces can analytically be distinguished as compatible, yet empirically researchable alternatives to Habermas' distinction between "system" and "lifeworld." Mediation by a facilitator can then be considered as a special case of organizing historically contingent translations among the evolutionarily developing fluxes of intentions and expectations. Accordingly, I suggest modifying Giddens' terminology into "a theory of the structuration of expectations.

"Meaning" as a sociological concept: A review of the modeling, mapping, and simulation of the communication of knowledge and meaning

The development of discursive knowledge presumes the communication of meaning as analytically different from the communication of information. Knowledge can then be considered as a meaning which makes a difference. Whereas the communication of information is studied in the information sciences and scientometrics, the communication of meaning has been central to Luhmann's attempts to make the theory of autopoiesis relevant for sociology. Analytical techniques such as semantic maps and the simulation of anticipatory systems enable us to operationalize the distinctions which Luhmann proposed as relevant to the elaboration of Husserl's "horizons of meaning" in empirical research: interactions among communications, the organization of meaning in instantiations, and the self-organization of interhuman communication in terms of symbolically generalized media such as truth, love, and power. Horizons of meaning, however, remain uncertain orders of expectations, and one should caution against reification from the meta-biological perspective of systems theory

Can Intellectual Processes in the Sciences Also Be Simulated? The Anticipation and Visualization of Possible Future States

Socio-cognitive action reproduces and changes both social and cognitive structures. The analytical distinction between these dimensions of structure provides us with richer models of scientific development. In this study, I assume that (i) social structures organize expectations into belief structures that can be attributed to individuals and communities; (ii) expectations are specified in scholarly literature; and (iii) intellectually the sciences (disciplines, specialties) tend to self-organize as systems of rationalized expectations. Whereas social organizations remain localized, academic writings can circulate, and expectations can be stabilized and globalized using symbolically generalized codes of communication. The intellectual restructuring, however, remains latent as a second-order dynamics that can be accessed by participants only reflexively. Yet, the emerging "horizons of meaning" provide feedback to the historically developing organizations by constraining the possible future states as boundary conditions. I propose to model these possible future states using incursive and hyper-incursive equations from the computation of anticipatory systems. Simulations of these equations enable us to visualize the couplings among the historical--i.e., recursive--progression of social structures along trajectories, the evolutionary--i.e., hyper-incursive--development of systems of expectations at the regime level, and the incursive instantiations of expectations in actions, organizations, and texts.Comment: accepted for publication in Scientometrics (June 2015

Hyperincursive Cogitata and Incursive Cogitantes: Scholarly Discourse as a Strongly Anticipatory System

Strongly anticipatory systems-that is, systems which use models of themselves for their further development-and which additionally may be able to run hyperincursive routines-that is, develop only with reference to their future states-cannot exist in res extensa, but can only be envisaged in res cogitans. One needs incursive routines in cogitantes to instantiate these systems. Unlike historical systems (with recursion), these hyper-incursive routines generate redundancies by opening horizons of other possible states. Thus, intentional systems can enrich our perceptions of the cases that have happened to occur. The perspective of hindsight codified at the above-individual level enables us furthermore to intervene technologically. The theory and computation of anticipatory systems have made these loops between supra-individual hyper-incursion, individual incursion (in instantiation), and historical recursion accessible for modeling and empirical investigation.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1011.324

Farm enterprises as self-organizing systems: A new transdisciplinary framework for studying farm enterprises?

The growing attention to sustainable food production and multifunctional agriculture calls for a multidisciplinary or transdisciplinary research and development perspective on farming, which is able to grasp the environmental, social, technical, and financial aspects of a farm and the dynamic relationship between the farm enterprises and the surrounding world. Our thesis is that a transdisciplinary approach needs to build on a working ontology that goes beyond the epistemology of each discipline and that is not just pieced together of the ontologies connected to these different epistemologies. Based on a review of three prevailing theoretical frameworks within the field of agro-sociology: The farming styles approach, the Bawden approach, and Conway’s agroecosystem approach, we argue that these existing theories do not offer such a theoretical framework. The claim of this paper is that a new concept of a farm enterprise as a self-organizing social system, which combines ideas from Actor-Network theory (ANT) and Luhmann’s theory of social systems, can serve as a useful ontological platform for understanding a farm-enterprise as an entity independent of a scientific observer. In this framework, each farm is understood as a self-organizing node in a complex of heterogeneous socio-technical networks of food, supply, knowledge, technology, etc. This implies that a farm has to be understood as the way in which these network relationships are organised by the farm as a self-organizing social system. Among all the different possible ways in which to interact with the surrounding world, the system has to select a coherent strategy in order to make the farming processes possible at all. It will be discussed how this framework may add to the understanding of the continuous development of a heterogeneity of farm strategies and contribute to a more comprehensive view of the fields of regulation and extension

Subject to Surveillance: Genocide Law As Epistemology of the Object

This article analyzes the discourse on genocide from two angles: the legal genesis of the term in the 1940s and subsequent legal capture of the concept of genocide, and a recent socio-political critique of the legal meaning of genocide. The article suggests that a cross-disciplinary critique of genocidal violence not only describes the event and the victim, but also produces knowledge of them as discursive objects. The key issue is the surveillance role of the outside observer, also produced as such in discursive relation to the object. At stake in this view of genocide law as epistemology is the capacity to re imagine law in order to help us make hard choices about how, whether, and when to intervene in events that may be characterized as genocide

Luhmann Reconsidered: Steps Towards an Empirical Research Programme in the Sociology of Communication?

Although Luhmann formulated with modesty and precaution, for example in Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft (1990a, at pp. 412f.), that his theory claims to be a universal one because it is self-referential, the "operational closure" that follows from this assumption easily generates a problem for empirical research. Can a theory which considers society--and science as one of its subsystems--operationally closed, nevertheless contribute to the project of Enlightenment which Popper (1945) so vigorously identified as the driver of an open society? How can a theory which proclaims itself to be circular and universal nevertheless claim to celebrate "the triumph of the Enlightenment" Luhmann, (1990a, at p. 548)? Is the lack of an empirical program of research building on Luhmann's theory fortuitous or does it indicate that this theory should be considered as a philosophy rather than a heuristic for the explanation of operations in social systems