Role of the Bank for International Settlements in Shaping the World Financial System, The

The Bank for International Settlements ( BIS ) was set up in Basel, Switzerland in 1923 to handle remaining financial issues from World War II largely having to do with German reparation payments. It was the first of the semi-public international banks. Over the years its functions have changed and, largely since the late 1970\u27s, it has served as the situs for the world\u27s central banks and financial regulators to pool ideas and deal with international financial issues. A group of committees, com- posed largely of representatives of central bankers, now meets at BIS and has been issuing memoranda and drafts of regulations on a number of subjects affecting international banking. Among these are the regulation of capital, the management of international conglomerates, and problems resulting from electronic banking. Problems in world banking have sensitized observers to the absence of coordinated regulation and to the need for some form of unified control. That there is a need for one international bank regulators increasingly acknowledged. BIS comes closer than any other organization to fulfilling this function. The International Monetary Fund ( IMF ) comes close but is too politicized and has been too involved in attempting to meet a continuing series of crises to do any long range thinking. Only BIS has attracted the intellectual resources to analyze and resolve international problems in a thoughtful and deliberate manner. Only BIS output is being adopted in the world\u27s banking centers. BIS has been proposed as a world senior financial regulator. This article acknowledges the rationale for such a decision but argues that now is not the time for such an attempt. Banking is, of course, conducted locally even though its reach is international. To anoint any body as a senior regulator with the power to impose rules would require massive compromises among national regulators to achieve one central set of rules. It would also involve an abdication of measures of sovereignty by the constituent states. An effort of this kind would risk destroying the whole concept. Rather than start such a bold stroke at such an inopportune time, this Article argues that the international banking world would fare far better assisting BIS to proceed down the current track. As it continues to mature, and as its edicts are increasingly accepted throughout the world it will continue to approach its rightful place as the world\u27s bank regulator

RECASTING THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AGENDA

This paper argues that the agenda for international financial reform must be broadened in at least two senses. First of all, it should go beyond the issues of financial prevention and resolution to those associated with development finance for poor and small countries, and to the “ownership” of economic and development policies by countries. Secondly, it should consider, in a systematic fashion, not only the role of world institutions but also of regional arrangements and the explicit definition of areas where national autonomy should be maintained. These issues should be tabled in a representative, balanced negotiation process. In the area of financial crisis prevention and resolution, a balance must be struck between the need to improve the institutional framework in which financial markets operate and the still insufficient attention to the design of appropriate schemes to guarantee the coherence of macroeconomic policies worldwide, the enhanced provision of emergency financing during crises, and the creation of adequate debt standstill and orderly debt workout procedures. In the area of development finance, emphasis should be given to the need to increase funding to low-income countries. The role of multilateral development banks in counter-cyclical financing – including support to social safety nets during crises – must also be emphasized. The enhanced provision of emergency and development financing should be accompanied by a renewed international agreement on the limits of conditionality and a recognition of the central role of the “ownership” of development and macroeconomic policies by developing countries. Regional and subregional institutions should play an essential role in the supply of “global public goods” and other services in international finance. The required financial architecture should in some cases have the nature of a network of institutions that provide the services required in a complementary fashion (in the areas of emergency financing surveillance of macroeconomic policies, prudential regulation and supervision of domestic financial systems, etc.), and in others (particularly in development finance) should exhibit the characteristics of a system of competitive organizations. The fact that any new order would continue to have the characteristics of an incomplete “financial safety net” implies both that national policies would continue to play a disproportionate role in crisis prevention and that certain areas should continue to be realms of national autonomy, particularly capital account regulations and the choice of exchange rate regimes.

Responding to the Global Financial and Economic Crisis: Meeting the Challenges in Asia

Based on a review of international and regional responses to the global financial and economic crisis and its implications for finance in Asia, Douglas Arner and Lotte Schou-Zibell draw lessons for Asian financial systems with regard to the scope of regulation; financial standards; supervision, regulation, and infrastructure; financial crises resolution; financial sector development; and strengthened regional financial architecture. They conclude with a discussion of challenges and policy options.Global financial crisis; Group of 20; systemic risk; financial sector development

The Political Economy of Finance

If the private benefits of control are high and management owns a small equity stake, managers and workers are natural allies. There are two forces at play. First, managers effectively transform employees into a “poison pill’’ by signing generous long-term labor contracts and thereby reducing the firm’s attractiveness to a raider. Second, employees act as “white squires’’ for the incumbent managers, lobbying against hostile takeovers to protect the high wages enjoyed under incumbent management. Our model is consistent with available empirical findings, and yields new predictions as well.political economy, shareholder protection, corporate governance, bankruptcy law, credit market regulation, financial development, privatization

The treatment of distressed banks.

This article suggests some reforms of regulatory architecture for the treatment of distressed banks. Our main recommendations are: • a special bankruptcy regime for banks should be implemented ; • strong, truly independent supervisory agencies should be established ; • the incentives of the top managers of distressed banks should not be kept unchecked ; • procyclicality of solvency regulations should be dampened by the introduction of “automatic stabilisers” ; • one should move toward centralised supervision in economic areas which are meant to be integrated.

Banking and Financial Regulation

This chapter provides a basic overview of banking and financial regulation for the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics (Francesco Paris, ed.). Among other things, the chapter compares traditional and shadow banking and their regulation, differentiating “micro prudential” regulation (which focuses on protecting individual components of the financial system, such as banks) and “macro prudential” regulation (which focuses on protecting against systemic risk). The chapter also examines how regulation can help to correct market failures that undermine financial efficiency. In that context, it discusses, among other things, capital requirements, ring-fencing, and stress testing. Finally, the chapter examines how regulation can help to protect against systemic risk, including by addressing potential triggers of systemic risk (such as maturity transformation—the asset-liability mismatch that results from the short-term funding of long-term projects—and limited liability)

Regulatory reform : integrating paradigms

The Subprime crisis largely resulted from failures to internalize systemic risk evenly across financial intermediaries and recognize the implications of Knightian uncertainty and mood swings. A successful reform of prudential regulation will need to integrate more harmoniously the three paradigms of moral hazard, externalities, and uncertainty. This is a tall order because each paradigm leads to different and often inconsistent regulatory implications. Moreover, efforts to address the central problem under one paradigm can make the problems under the others worse. To avoid regulatory arbitrage and ensure that externalities are uniformly internalized, all prudentially regulated intermediaries should be subjected to the same capital adequacy requirements, and unregulated intermediaries should be financed only by regulated intermediaries. Reflecting the importance of uncertainty, the new regulatory architecture will also need to rely less on markets and more on"holistic"supervision, and incorporate countercyclical norms that can be adjusted in light of changing circumstances.Debt Markets,Banks&Banking Reform,Emerging Markets,Labor Policies,Financial Intermediation

The Role of Industrial Country Policies in Emerging Market Crises

This paper considers policies of the industrialized countries, as they pertain to crises in emerging markets. These fall into three areas: (1) their own macroeconomic policies, which determine the global financial environment; (2) their role in responding to crises when they occur, particularly through rescue packages, which have three components -- reforms in debtor countries, public funds from creditor countries, and private sector involvement; and (3) efforts to reform the international financial architecture, with the aim of lessening the frequency and severity of future crises. A recurrent theme is the tension between mitigating crises that occur, and the moral hazard that such efforts create in the longer term. In addition to reviewing these three areas of policy, we consider the institutions through which the more powerful countries exercise their influence. We conclude with a discussion of the debate over the sins of the International Monetary Fund, and proposals for reform.

Financial Regulation and Supervision in the Euro Area: A Four-Peak Proposal

In this paper, we discuss pros and cons of different models for financial market regulation and supervision and we present a proposal for the re-organisation of regulatory and supervisory agencies in the Euro Area. Our arguments are consistent with both new theories and effective behaviour of financial intermediaries in industrialized countries. Our proposed architecture for financial market regulation is based on the assignment of different objectives or "finalities" to different authorities, both at the domestic and the European level. According to this perspective, the three objectives of supervision - microeconomic stability, investor protection and proper behaviour, efficiency and competition - should be assigned to three distinct European authorities, each one at the centre of a European system of financial regulators and supervisors specialized in overseeing the entire financial market with respect to a single regulatory objective and regardless of the subjective nature of the intermediaries. Each system should be structured and organized similarly to the European System of Central Banks and work in connection with the central bank which would remain the institution responsible for price and macroeconomic stability. We suggest a plausible path to build our 4-peak regulatory architecture in the Euro area.