The quantum measurement problem and physical reality: a computation theoretic perspective

Is the universe computable? If yes, is it computationally a polynomial place? In standard quantum mechanics, which permits infinite parallelism and the infinitely precise specification of states, a negative answer to both questions is not ruled out. On the other hand, empirical evidence suggests that NP-complete problems are intractable in the physical world. Likewise, computational problems known to be algorithmically uncomputable do not seem to be computable by any physical means. We suggest that this close correspondence between the efficiency and power of abstract algorithms on the one hand, and physical computers on the other, finds a natural explanation if the universe is assumed to be algorithmic; that is, that physical reality is the product of discrete sub-physical information processing equivalent to the actions of a probabilistic Turing machine. This assumption can be reconciled with the observed exponentiality of quantum systems at microscopic scales, and the consequent possibility of implementing Shor's quantum polynomial time algorithm at that scale, provided the degree of superposition is intrinsically, finitely upper-bounded. If this bound is associated with the quantum-classical divide (the Heisenberg cut), a natural resolution to the quantum measurement problem arises. From this viewpoint, macroscopic classicality is an evidence that the universe is in BPP, and both questions raised above receive affirmative answers. A recently proposed computational model of quantum measurement, which relates the Heisenberg cut to the discreteness of Hilbert space, is briefly discussed. A connection to quantum gravity is noted. Our results are compatible with the philosophy that mathematical truths are independent of the laws of physics.Comment: Talk presented at "Quantum Computing: Back Action 2006", IIT Kanpur, India, March 200

A Survey on Continuous Time Computations

We provide an overview of theories of continuous time computation. These theories allow us to understand both the hardness of questions related to continuous time dynamical systems and the computational power of continuous time analog models. We survey the existing models, summarizing results, and point to relevant references in the literature

On the possible Computational Power of the Human Mind

The aim of this paper is to address the question: Can an artificial neural network (ANN) model be used as a possible characterization of the power of the human mind? We will discuss what might be the relationship between such a model and its natural counterpart. A possible characterization of the different power capabilities of the mind is suggested in terms of the information contained (in its computational complexity) or achievable by it. Such characterization takes advantage of recent results based on natural neural networks (NNN) and the computational power of arbitrary artificial neural networks (ANN). The possible acceptance of neural networks as the model of the human mind's operation makes the aforementioned quite relevant.Comment: Complexity, Science and Society Conference, 2005, University of Liverpool, UK. 23 page

Nature as a Network of Morphological Infocomputational Processes for Cognitive Agents

This paper presents a view of nature as a network of infocomputational agents organized in a dynamical hierarchy of levels. It provides a framework for unification of currently disparate understandings of natural, formal, technical, behavioral and social phenomena based on information as a structure, differences in one system that cause the differences in another system, and computation as its dynamics, i.e. physical process of morphological change in the informational structure. We address some of the frequent misunderstandings regarding the natural/morphological computational models and their relationships to physical systems, especially cognitive systems such as living beings. Natural morphological infocomputation as a conceptual framework necessitates generalization of models of computation beyond the traditional Turing machine model presenting symbol manipulation, and requires agent-based concurrent resource-sensitive models of computation in order to be able to cover the whole range of phenomena from physics to cognition. The central role of agency, particularly material vs. cognitive agency is highlighted

Logical openness in Cognitive Models

It is here proposed an analysis of symbolic and sub-symbolic models for studying cognitive processes, centered on emergence and logical openness notions. The Theory of logical openness connects the Physics of system/environment relationships to the system informational structure. In this theory, cognitive models can be ordered according to a hierarchy of complexity depending on their logical openness degree, and their descriptive limits are correlated to Gödel-Turing Theorems on formal systems. The symbolic models with low logical openness describe cognition by means of semantics which fix the system/environment relationship (cognition in vitro), while the sub-symbolic ones with high logical openness tends to seize its evolutive dynamics (cognition in vivo). An observer is defined as a system with high logical openness. In conclusion, the characteristic processes of intrinsic emergence typical of “bio-logic” - emerging of new codes-require an alternative model to Turing-computation, the natural or bio-morphic computation, whose essential features we are going here to outline