Thwarting Selfish Behavior in 802.11 WLANs

The 802.11e standard enables user configuration of several MAC parameters, making WLANs vulnerable to users that selfishly configure these parameters to gain throughput. In this paper we propose a novel distributed algorithm to thwart such selfish behavior. The key idea of the algorithm is for honest stations to react, upon detecting a selfish station, by using a more aggressive configuration that penalizes this station. We show that the proposed algorithm guarantees global stability while providing good response times. By conducting a game theoretic analysis of the algorithm based on repeated games, we also show its effectiveness against selfish stations. Simulation results confirm that the proposed algorithm optimizes throughput performance while discouraging selfish behavior. We also present an experimental prototype of the proposed algorithm demonstrating that it can be implemented on commodity hardware.Comment: 14 pages, 7 figures, journa

Analysing BitTorrent's seeding strategies

BitTorrent is a typical peer-to-peer (P2P) file distribution application that has gained tremendous popularity in recent years. A considerable amount of research exists regarding BitTorrent’s choking algorithm, which has proved to be effective in preventing freeriders. However, the effect of the seeding strategy on the resistance to freeriders in BitTorrent has been largely overlooked. In addition to this, a category of selfish leechers (termed exploiters), who leave the overlay immediately after completion, has never been taken into account in the previous research. In this paper two popular seeding strategies, the Original Seeding Strategy (OSS) and the Time- based Seeding Strategy (TSS), are chosen and we study via mathematical models and simulation their effects on freeriders and exploiters in BitTorrent networks. The mathematical model is verified and we discover that both freeriders and exploiters impact on system performance, despite the seeding strategy that is employed. However, a selfish-leechers threshold is identified; once the threshold is exceeded, we find that TSS outperforms OSS – that is, TSS reduces the negative impact of selfish lechers more effectively than OSS. Based on these results we discuss the choice of seeding strategy and speculate as to how more effective BitTorrent-based file distribu- tion applications can be built

Autonomous Demand Side Management Based on Energy Consumption Scheduling and Instantaneous Load Billing: An Aggregative Game Approach

In this paper, we investigate a practical demand side management scenario where the selfish consumers compete to minimize their individual energy cost through scheduling their future energy consumption profiles. We propose an instantaneous load billing scheme to effectively convince the consumers to shift their peak-time consumption and to fairly charge the consumers for their energy consumption. For the considered DSM scenario, an aggregative game is first formulated to model the strategic behaviors of the selfish consumers. By resorting to the variational inequality theory, we analyze the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the formulated game. Subsequently, for the scenario where there is a central unit calculating and sending the real-time aggregated load to all consumers, we develop a one timescale distributed iterative proximal-point algorithm with provable convergence to achieve the NE of the formulated game. Finally, considering the alternative situation where the central unit does not exist, but the consumers are connected and they would like to share their estimated information with others, we present a distributed agreement-based algorithm, by which the consumers can achieve the NE of the formulated game through exchanging information with their immediate neighbors.Comment: 11 pages, 7 figure