All for one and one for all: Fully decentralised privacy-preserving dark pool trading using multi-party computation

Financial dark pool trading venues are designed to keep pre-trade order information secret so that it cannot be misused by others. However, dark pools are vulnerable to an operator misusing the information in their system. Prior work has used MPC to tackle this problem by assuming that the dark pool is operated by a small set of two or three MPC parties. However, this raises the question of who plays the role of these operating parties and whether this scenario could be applied in the real world. In this work, we implement an MPC-based dark pool trading venue with up to 100 parties. This configuration would allow a real-world implementation where the operating parties are the active participants that trade in the venue (i.e., a ``no operator\u27\u27 model), or where the parties are the main stakeholders of the venue (e.g., members of a non-profit partnership such as Plato). We use AWS cloud to empirically test the performance of the system. Results demonstrate that the system can achieve trading throughput required for some real-world venues, while the cost of hosting the system is negligible compared with the savings expected from guaranteeing no information leakage

The seconomics (security-economics) vulnerabilities of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations

Traditionally, security and economics functionalities in IT financial services and protocols (FinTech) have been perceived as separate objectives. We argue that keeping them separate is a bad idea for FinTech “Decentralized Autonomous Organizations” (DAOs). In fact, security and economics are one for DAOs: we show that the failure of a security property, e.g. anonymity, can destroy a DAOs because economic attacks can be tailgated to security attacks. This is illustrated by the examples of “TheDAO” (built on the Ethereum platform) and the DAOed version of a Futures Exchange. We claim that security and economics vulnerabilities, which we named seconomics vulnerabilities, are indeed new “beasts” to be reckoned with

The seconomics (security-economics) vulnerabilities of decentralized autonomous organizations.

Traditionally, security and economics functionalities in IT financial services and protocols (FinTech) have been perceived as separate objectives. We argue that keeping them separate is a bad idea for FinTech “Decentralized Autonomous Organizations” (DAOs). In fact, security and economics are one for DAOs: we show that the failure of a security property, e.g. anonymity, can destroy a DAOs because economic attacks can be tailgated to security attacks. This is illustrated by the examples of “TheDAO” (built on the Ethereum platform) and the DAOed version of a Futures Exchange. We claim that security and economics vulnerabilities, which we named seconomics vulnerabilities, are indeed new “beasts” to be reckoned with